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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation and the basic research problem
This thesis analyzes production in a general equilibrium model with incomplete
markets (GEI). While most of the GEI literature derives results for asset struc-
tures exogenously specified, this thesis presents an early stage attempt on the
study of endogenous asset formation in a simple two period general equilib-
rium model with incomplete markets. It focuses attention on the organization
of production at first instance, because production is obviously a major source
of asset endogeneity, since dividend payoffs, payoffs from bonds and any other
financial assets like derivatives and options are all endogenous. Moreover, this
thesis introduces a model of the firm in which the production sets available to
firms are also endogenized. This allows economic relevant interpretations of
the role firms play in terms of short and long run optimization behavior, and in
terms of financial and real economic activities.
Ex ante, a study of endogenous asset structure formation is interesting for
two main reasons. It allows to generalize the asset structure and (at minimum)
to replicate the existing results in the literature, and to progress with the re-
search program on production in general equilibrium with incomplete markets.
The other reason, why this research could be interesting ex ante is that besides
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generalizing the asset structure, there exists the possibility to improve on exist-
ing economic results derived independently of the asset structure. This thesis
provides a systematic criticism of the exogenous asset formation literature, and
shows that the later ex ante consideration turns out to be the case. Among those
equilibrium properties of principal interest to this thesis are:
• The endogenous asset formation model introduced in this thesis allows
to analyze properties of economic equilibria for more general assets struc-
tures. In particular, we consider smooth and non-smooth real asset struc-
tures which are not independent of financial activities of the firms.
• The study of an endogenous asset formation model facilitates a reexami-
nation of the results derived under exogenous asset structures. While the
simplified exogenous asset structure of GEI models is sometimes regarded
as sufficiently general [26], I examine properties of productive organiza-
tion for its extension to an endogenous asset formation model.
• The endogenous asset model provides a more hospitable and realistic frame-
work for studying the organization of production. This includes the mod-
eling of the financing of the firm, a topic receiving seemingly less attention
in contemporary literature.
The general equilibrium model with incomplete markets is a generalization
of the Arrow-Debreu model where time and uncertainty enters the model in an
essential way. Studying production in an incomplete markets framework is in-
teresting, because the introduction of time and uncertainty into the analysis of
economic general equilibrium brings many new phenomena into light which
cannot be described by the model of the firm in the classical Arrow-Debreu
framework. Those of foremost interest to this thesis include:
1. the interdependence of real and financial assets
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2. the objective function of the firm
3. the efficient organization of production
4. the potential (ir)relevance of financial policy of the firm.
The interest of studying these properties comes at first instance from the con-
temporary view of the literature on what the goal of the firm should be (opti-
mization problem) when markets are incomplete, namely the maximization of
some sort of assigned utility to the firm’s objective function. This thesis criticizes
this approach to the study of the firm for the main reason of how to decide what
utility to assign to it, and for the highly stylized model of the firm, in which fi-
nancial assets essentially play no role. The classical model of production seems
highly streamlined, and this thesis aims at improving on that. The primary aim
is therefore, to establish a link between the real and financial sector (1), and
to consider the role that financial assets play. With this in mind, what is the ex-
plicit derivation of the objective function of the firm (2) establishing this link? In
particular, how is the efficient production boundary of each production set de-
termined? The organization of production in (3) is another economic property
of interest. The organizational productive inefficiency property of the classical
GEI model of production is a further critique of the contemporary approach to
the model of the firm. It is well known that the organization of production in-
troduces an additional source of productive inefficiency in utility maximization
models of the firm. We compare allocational efficiency of this model with the
model introduced in this thesis. Finally, the study of the Modigliani and Miller
theorem is motivated by the independence of the production set available to
each firm from the firms’ activities on capital markets (4). In the classical GEI
model of production the financing of production is mostly not explicitly mod-
eled. At best, firms issue stocks in order to finance production inputs at given
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production sets. However, the alternative interpretation of the classical model is
also that production inputs are financed with the sell of total production output.
From this view point, financial assets essentially play no role, and consequently
the Modigliani and Miller theorem holds under standard assumptions.
Another important element of endogenous asset formation is the study of
default. This research is still at its infancy, and only a few papers deal with this
issue, despite its importance (Dubey, Geanokopolos and Shubik [45]). This pa-
per determines default penalties for strategic default of individuals and shows
that a GEI equilibrium with default exists. However, this research line is proba-
bly of less interest when considering default in an endogenous asset formation
model. Firms with limited liability cannot be punished for defaulting. More
important, the problem of the firm of acquiring cash through the stock market
in order to build up production capacity will become even more difficult when
a firm is expected to default. For simplicity, this thesis considers the case of no
bankruptcy only, since much more work needs to be done on the way of endo-
genizing default. However, a first step already in progress in this direction is to
endogenize the states of nature as a function of the firm’s financial policy.
The economic interest in permitting incomplete markets derives from the
introduction of a further element of realism into the analysis of economic equi-
librium. The basic objective of the GEI theory is to expand the Arrow-Debreu
model to a more general economic model with real and financial assets but
with limited ability to trade into the future. For example, in the Arrow-Debreu
model, since there is no need to transfer wealth between future uncertain states
of the world, there is no trade on the stock market, hence no attention is paid
to the different roles real and financial assets play. Thus, in the complete mar-
kets general equilibrium model, where markets function at their best, the role
of the firm reduces to simple arithmetics. Essentially, the analysis of the firm in
the Arrow-Debreu model becomes trivial, since many of the economic activities
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firms perform cannot be modeled. Among these are the financing of produc-
tion through the stock market, the link between real and financial assets, and
the endogenous asset structure formation. For these reasons I believe that the
economic scenario, in which markets are incomplete is more realistic for a study
of the firm.
A main criticism of the general equilibrium theory with incomplete markets
concerns the exogenous specification of the asset structure. The current GEI the-
ory heavily relies on results derived from an equilibrium analysis independent
of the asset structure. This perhaps because the research program on endoge-
nous asset formation is progressing relatively slowly. Problems associated with
production in general equilibrium with incomplete markets impede the further
development of this research program. These problems have been expressed in
various ways. Here a few citations from the research frontier.
The firm fits into general equilibrium theory as a balloon fits into an enve-
lope: flatted out! Try with a blown-up balloon: the envelope may tear, or fly
away: at best, it will be hard to seal and impossible to mail.... Instead, burst
the balloon flat, and everything becomes easy. [20]
Evidently the question of what the goal of the firm should be with incomplete
markets is widely thought to be one of the bugaboos of GEI analysis. [2]
However, one reason for seeking more general asset structures is beyond the
scope of the pure exchange model: it is that of being able to understand some
of the phenomena linking financial markets and production.... I hope this is
a motivation for moving towards more general asset structures. A case that
is however very close to our framework is the one where the firm maximizes
ex-post value of the output. [8]
This thesis is an early attempt towards a study of endogenous asset forma-
tion. Despite the fact that production is a major source of asset endogeneity,
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there is only little significant progress observable in this direction. This not
at least because there is no consensus in the literature about what the goal of
the firm should be when markets are incomplete. The study of the objective
function seems to be merely at a stand still since the papers by Dre`ze [21], and
Grossman and Hart [28]. The present understanding of the objective function
of the firm suggest assigning utilities to the firm, just as general equilibrium has
always assigned utilities to consumers [26]. This approach is not satisfying. The
immediate question about what utility to assign to which firm arises. It is possi-
ble to think of any utility, but they all have in common that they are decided by
the modeler. This is precisely the starting point of this research program. This
thesis deals at first instance with the problem of defining an objective function
of the firm which is independent of any ”average” utility assigned to it.
1.2 Definition of the problem and research questions
The aim of this thesis is to provide a simple two period general equilibrium
model with an endogenized asset structure, and to study equilibrium properties
of such a model as outlined in the previous section. This research is important
because most of the general equilibrium literature on incomplete markets de-
rives equilibrium properties for exogenously specified asset structures. This is
a grave drawback of the GEI analysis as it implicitly assumes the equivalence
of equilibrium properties of exogenous asset formation and endogenous asset
formation models. This thesis aims at elaborating on this widely believed folk-
lore.
Given the overall motivation of introducing an endogenized asset model,
the more specific research question deals with defining an objective function of
the firm. This problem receives much attention because production is a major
source of asset endogeneity, since the production set, and payoffs from any fi-
nancial securities are all endogenous. Introducing an objective function of the
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firm which is independent of extra information not contained in market prices
would improve on models induced by Dre`ze [21], and Grossman and Hart [28].
These are the dominant GEI models on which most of the resent research on
production in incomplete markets is based. Assigning utilities to firms is not
unproblematic. The question of what utility to assign to which firm is not re-
solved at full satisfaction yet, and mostly specified by the modeler by assump-
tion. This research line is motivated by the question: Do the preferences of
shareholders, and the prices of shares on the stock market, influence the choices
of firms among alternative state distributions of profits [20]?
This thesis therefore, is motivated by a different set of questions and asks:
What role do financial assets play in an endogenous asset formation model, and
what objective function of the firm would endogenously determine the firm’s
production set and dividend payoffs? Can the decentralization property of the
Arrow-Debreu model be generalized to the case of incomplete markets? These
questions lie at heart of my research program presented in this thesis.
1.3 Summary of main results
In this thesis, I consider a generalization of the asset structure beyond the smooth
asset structure of the pure exchange general equilibrium model with incomplete
markets. This involves establishing a link between financial assets and produc-
tion in order to enhance the understanding of real world economic phenomena,
where the real and financial sectors are not independent of each other. The main
result on the asset structure introduced establishes a class of regular endogenized
smooth asset structures. This result is very convenient and applies for stock mar-
ket models, where stocks are the only financial assets considered. The expansion
of this result to other financial assets, such as bonds, is primarily a matter of no-
7
tation.1
An indispensable equilibrium property to be proved is the existence of equi-
libria. It is shown that for above mentioned regular asset structure, equilibria
always exist. This result follows from the applications of Thom’s parametric
transversality theorem. Moreover, the presented proof of existence of equilibria
is expanded to the case of convex, piece-wise linear production sets. The main
proof of existence of equilibria is established under the unnecessary strong as-
sumption of long run profits maximization for a reduced form model of the
firm. This assumption is relaxed in subsequent chapters, and therefore, in or-
der to guarantee existence of equilibria for the extensive form model of the firm
an equivalence result between the reduced form model and the extensive form
model is established.
Existence of equilibria for non-smooth production sets follows from the smooth
existence proof case for a given regularized endogenous asset structure. For that, I
first apply regularization theory from real analysis, in particular, I use the tech-
nique of convolution in order to smooth out the piece wise linear production
manifold. It is shown that the regularized production manifold approximates the con-
vex hull of the piece-wise linear production set sufficiently well.
While most of the general equilibrium with incomplete markets literature
models incomplete markets by hypothesis, it is shown that incomplete markets
is a consequence of the idiosyncratic risk present in this economy. This result con-
tributes to the further understanding of why financial markets are incomplete.
Moreover, most of the classical GEI takes the number of firms as exogenously
given. This is at variance with the model presented here, where the number of
1However, some care is required in case of the possibility that firms can go bankrupt. This
research is in progress, but not subject of this thesis.
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firms (the degree of incompleteness) is endogenized. Hence, this thesis consid-
ers a model of endogenously determined incomplete markets.
I consider an economic scenario which is sufficiently interesting and rich in
structure to study the organization of production in a general economic equi-
librium. The main contribution of this thesis is the introduction of a model of
the firm in a general equilibrium framework with incomplete markets, where
the objective function of the firm is independent of any extra information pro-
vided by the group of owners of the firm. Essentially, this thesis rehabilitates
the profit maximization objective of the firm of the Arrow-Debreu model for
the more general case when time and uncertainty is explicitly modeled. This is
at variance with the current GEI literature on the objective of the firm, which
suggests to assign utilities to firms. Moreover, the sequential objective function
of the firm introduced allows a short and long run economic interpretation. Firms
build up production capacity in the long run, and given their installed produc-
tion sets, choose a profit maximizing short run net activity. Over both periods
firms choose real and financial quantities to maximize their profits, hence the
objective of each firm is long run profit maximization.
The model introduced allows a new formalization of ownership and control.
While in the classical GEI model shareholders directly impose control over the
net activities of the firm, here, the owners control total production capacity
available to a firm. This rehabilitates the idea that operational decisions are
taken by managers acting in the interest of their stock holders when maximiz-
ing profits in a very traditional way.
A consequence of the model of production introduced is the preservation of
the decentralization theorem of the Arrow-Debreu model when time and uncer-
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tainty enter the model in an essential way. This result improves on Dre`ze, and
Grossman and Hart who were able to separate the activities of the firm from
the activities of the consumers, once a present value vector determined by the
consumers is assigned to the objective function of the firm.
While most of the GEI literature assumes that production is automatically
financed, I explicitly model the financing of the firm. The long run financial prob-
lem of the firm is to issue stocks and to buy capital. The level of capital acquired
determines the production set available to the firm in period two. The firm’s
short run financial activity is then to finance inputs of production with the rev-
enue acquired by selling its output on the spot markets. This is at variance with
classical GEI theory, where firms issue stocks in order to finance the inputs of
production in period one, at fixed production capacity. In addition, the financ-
ing of production capacity determines the size of the firm, an important economic
property largely ignored in the GEI literature.
The Modigliani and Miller theorem implicitly assumes that the firm’s finan-
cial policy finances its production activity. Most proofs in GEI analysis adapt
this assumption and replicate the validity of the theorem on the irrelevance of
financial policies for the case of no bankruptcy. These literature includes papers
by Stiglitz, Duffie, Shafer, and DeMarzo [[52],[53][14][23]]. I show that when
the production set available to a firm is financed via financial markets the firm’s
financial policy has generally real equilibrium effects, depending on the firm’s ability
of acquiring capital.
A comparison of the model introduced in this thesis with the classical GEI
production model suggests issues related to the (in)efficient organization of pro-
duction. I show that the model introduced in this thesis is productive superior ef-
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ficient relative to the models with utility maximizing firms. This result follows
from the independence of the objective function of the firm from any present
value vectors derived from the shareholders. Efficiency properties are those of the
classical pure exchange economies. This suggests, at variance with centralized GEI
models of production, that the organization of production is efficient.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
2.1 Related literature
This section aims at providing the broad context in which the literature on the
specific phenomenon of production is embedded. The literature on general
equilibrium under time and uncertainty dates back to the seminal paper by Ar-
row ([1][2]). This paper makes two fundamental contributions. It introduces a
new approach to probability theory by introducing the idea that a random vari-
able is a function defined on a set of states of nature. This leads to the equilib-
rium concept under time and uncertainty known as contingent market equilib-
rium. The second fundamental contribution of this paper is that it economizes
on the number of contingent markets needed in order to obtain the same Pareto
efficient allocation as in the contingent markets model by introducing financial
markets. Arrow considered elementary securities which promise to deliver one
unit of account if a particular state occurs and nothing otherwise.
The first to consider a set of markets with less financial securities than states
of nature was Diamond [16]. This paper builds the cornerstone of the model
of production in general equilibrium with incomplete markets. Diamond no-
tices that with an incomplete financial markets system, Pareto efficiency does
no more hold. Under the restrictive assumption of multiplicative uncertainty
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Diamond showed constrained efficiency of equilibrium for the special case of a
one good and single period model. In this model stock holders generally agree
upon the production plan to be implemented by the firm.
Two main directions have emerged from Diamond’s model where agents
have limited possibilities to transfer wealth across time and states of nature.
One branch of research deals with temporary equilibrium, where agents have
exogenously given rules for forming expectations as functions of past and cur-
rent variables. The other branch, and of primary interest to this thesis, is related
to rational expectations 1 equilibrium, where agents correctly anticipate future
variables. Either of these ideas closes the basic model of Diamond with an equi-
librium concept. The later, formally introduced by Radner [46], who also real-
ized problems associated with the objective function of the firm in establishing
existence of equilibrium.
A paper which has much stimulated the literature on incomplete markets is
due to Hart [31]. By means of examples he showed that equilibrium does not
generally exist. This has lead to a huge literature on establishing existence of
equilibrium. Two main branches can be classified. The first research line re-
stricts attention to asset structures for which the payoff matrix cannot change
rank. Cass [9] and Werner [56] considered a payoff structure in units of account
while Geanokopolos and Polemarchakis [27] established existence for an asset
structure with payoffs in a numeraire good. The other research line and of in-
terest to this thesis shows that the set of economies for which equilibrium does
not exist is of measure zero, implying that the probability of observing such
an economy is very small and can therefore, be disregarded. The first proof in
this direction is an extension of Balasko [4] to incomplete markets provided by
Duffie and Shafer [11]. Other contributions to the study of existence of equi-
libria are Geanokopolos and Shafer [34], Husseini et al., [50], Hirsch et al., [37],
Bottazzi [8].
1The idea of this concept was implicitly contained in Arrow’s model
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Beyond the one good model, generic equilibria are generally inefficient. This
was first shown by Geanokopolos and Polemarchakis [27], Duffie and Shafer
[23], and Geanokopolos et al. [33], each applying a different parameterization.
The underlying idea of all proofs is simple. Since there is an incomplete income
transfer space, agents’ gradient vectors will generally not point in one direction.
Next section introduces the development of production within the context of
this development of the general equilibrium literature with incomplete markets.
2.2 Literature on production
The benchmark model of the firm in general equilibrium under uncertainty is
presented in the most elegant synthesis of Arrow and Debreu in the book called
theory of value [12]. In this theory, the exogenously given primitive data of
the economy consist of consumers described by preferences, and producers de-
scribed by production sets. Agents optimize, have rational expectations, and
markets clear. It is worth remarking here that producers are only and fully de-
scribed by their exogenously given technology. In the context of a two period
model, the exogenously given production sets range over both periods. The ob-
jective function of the firm is profit maximization. Each firm chooses a profit
maximizing production plan at competitive prices. This corresponds to choos-
ing inputs in period one with associated outputs in each state of the world in
period two. For a complete set of contingent markets no problems arise regard-
ing to what the goal of the firm should be, since at equilibrium all gradient
vectors of the share holders point in the same direction.
New economic phenomena come into life once time and uncertainty enter
the model in an essential way. These include problems related to the definition
of an objection function of the firm at first instance. Others relate to the financing
of the firm, a problem receiving seemingly less attention. The landmark paper
studying specific problems of production economies is due to Diamond [16]. He
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restricts attention to a one good and single period model and shows that under
the assumption of multiplicative uncertainty and objective of value maximiza-
tion of the single firm equilibrium allocations are constrained efficient. A main
property of this model is that the one period production set available to the firm
is fully described by an exogenously given technology function. This function
is independent of financial activities of the firm. The objective function of the
firm is similar to the objective function of the firm in the Arrow-Debreu model
with no stock market.
Beyond one good static models, Radner [46] formalized the general model of
production and drew attention to problems associated with the objective func-
tion of the firm when spanning fails to hold. The question of what the goal of
the firm should be in general equilibrium with incomplete markets has been at
the center of the incomplete markets literature since Radner. Although unanim-
ity of shareholder on the production plan of the firm was not explicitly stressed
by Diamond, much of the subsequent work deals with finding conditions for
which the market value objective of the firm generally holds. Ekern and Wilson
[49] identified conditions for which unanimity of share holders on the produc-
tion plan of the firm holds. These conditions amount to allow for production
plans for each firm which are priced by the market. Radner[47] introduced a
partial spanning assumption on production sets and shows that unanimity of
shareholders can be achieved under this conditions. Other papers within the
spanning literature are Grossman and Stiglitz [29], and Milne and Starrett [41].
In conclusion on the literature on market value maximization, a firm would
have to know the effects of a given modification of a production plan on its
market value. The literature shows that restrictive assumptions are needed in
order to render this goal of the firm operational.
When spanning prevails, it was shown that share holders will unanimously
agree on the firm’s production plan. This however, is not more generally true
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in absence of partial spanning, as there is room for share holders to disagree
about future values of risky investments. Dre`ze [21] was the first to recognize
that stock prices do not always convey sufficient information to guide produc-
tion decisions. He identified conditions for which unanimity of shareholders is
established. One condition is that a collective group of new shareholders (af-
ter trade at the stock markets occurred) decide what production plan the firm
should employ. This concept of the firm requires a second condition, which
allows for side payments among share holders in order to achieve unanimous
agreement on a production plan to be employed by the firm. Dre`ze was the first
to introduce an objective function of the firm which is not independent of the
preferences of the owners of the firm. Criteria for additional market informa-
tion were derived from the Hicks Kaldor sum, which leads to a weighted share-
holder criterion of the final group of shareholders. He established constrained
efficiency for a single good model and introduced additional information from
shareholders’ preferences into the objective function of the firm. Grossman and
Hart [28] criticized that production decisions are made by the final group of
shareholders, since it would not allow to go beyond a two period model, be-
cause effects of production decisions on stock prices can be ignored in a model
where final shareholders guide decisions on production plans. They therefore,
introduced a decision criterion where production plans of the firms are guided
by the initial shareholders (before trade at the stock market takes place). This re-
quired expanding the idea of competitive pricing to a framework of incomplete
markets. They introduced the assumption of competitive price perceptions. The
more recent literature on generalized production models maintains the central-
ized property of the objective function of the firm introduced by Dre`ze. For an
example of this large literature see Duffie and Shafer [22], DeMarzo [14], Magill
and Shafer [40], Geanokopolos et al. [33], and Magill and Quinzii [38].
Based on the concepts introduced by Dre`ze and Grossman and Hart are ideas
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related to voting mechanisms. This literature deals with economic problems like
proxy fights or instability issues of the political economic for example. For a
sample of voting applications of the these models see DeMarzo [15], Dre`ze [20]
and Tvede and Cres [54], [55].
Other developments on the study of the objective function of the firm are
related to the maximization of a function. For a sample of this research line see
Dierker and Grodal [18], Bejan [7], and recent work by Magill and Quinzii [38].
The foundations for the market value maximization objective of the firm are
provided by the Modigliani and Miller theorem [43] in a partial equilibrium set
up. They showed that the value of the firm does not depend on how its produc-
tion is financed. The first to prove the irrelevance of financial policy in general
equilibrium model was Stiglitz [52],[53]. He noticed that in an incomplete mar-
kets framework, the theorem fails to hold for debt policies which may lead to
bankruptcy, but do otherwise generally hold. More recent papers by Duffie and
Shafer [23], and DeMarzo [14] replicate the validity of Modigliani and Miller’s
theorem for preference dependent objective functions of the firms, and interfirm
security holdings.
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Chapter 3
The Mathematical Model: Existence
of Equilibrium
3.1 Introduction
This chapter establishes the corner stone of this thesis. It introduces the math-
ematical model, the main economic ideas, assumptions, and the mathematical
notation. The quintessence of this chapter is the introduction of the model of the
firm into an incomplete markets framework in an essential way that it eventu-
ally eliminates the present value problem of current production models with in-
complete markets, where firms are utility maximizers. This amounts to assign-
ing a sequential optimization structure to the firm, where the efficient sphere
of the production set is not independent of the total number of financial assets
issued by the firm. This naturally leads us into the world of endogenous asset
formation and the study of economic phenomena of linking financial markets
with production.
This chapter is unfortunately, as most of the general equilibrium literature on
incomplete markets, unavoidably notational intensive. To keep potential confu-
sion at a minimum, we introduce a long run profits maximization assumption.
This assumption has the convenient advantage that it allows postponing a rigor-
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ous study of the precise nature of the objective function of the firm until chapter
5. Easy examples of the extensive form model of the firm however, can already
be found in chapter 4.
The sine qua non of every model is then to prove existence of equilibrium.
We establish generic existence for convex smooth, and convex piece-wise lin-
ear production sets. We also exhibit a class of endogenous asset structures for
which equilibrium always exists. This class of smooth asset structures gener-
alizes existing asset structures in two aspects. The efficient boundaries of the
real assets structures are endogenously determined, and not independent of the
firms’ ability of acquiring cash through financial markets by issuing stocks. The
other advantage of this asset structure introduced is that it allows interesting
economic interpretations of the model of the firm, and therefore, to enhance
the theory of the firm in general equilibrium with incomplete markets. Such
are related to the long and short run optimization behavior of the firm, a new
formalization of ownership and control, and the goal of the firm which is in-
dependent of extra information derived from any group of owners of the firm,
for example. This list is not exhaustive, and further economic properties of the
model of the firm will be introduced subsequently.
3.2 Assumptions, definitions and notation
We consider a two period t ∈ T = {0, 1} model with technological uncertainty
in period 1 represented by states of nature. An element in the set of mutually
exclusive and exhaustive uncertain events is denoted s ∈ {1, ..., S}, where by
convention s = 0 represents the certain event in period 0. Where no confusion
of notation is expected, we sometimes denote S the set of all mutually exclusive
uncertain events. We count in total (S + 1) states of nature.
The economic agents are the j ∈ {1, ..., n} producers and i ∈ {1, ...,m} con-
sumers which are characterized by sets of assumptions F and C below. There
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are k ∈ {1, ..., l} physical commodities and j ∈ {1, ..., n} financial assets, re-
ferred to as stocks. In fact, stocks are the only financial assets considered here.
This allows for a sufficiently rich structure in order to introduce the benchmark
model of production in its simplest form. Physical goods are traded on each of
the (S+1) spot markets. Producers issue stocks which are traded at s = 0, yield-
ing a payoff in the next period at uncertain state s ∈ {1, ..., S}. The quantity of
stocks issued by firm j ∈ {1, ..., n} is denoted zj ∈ R−, where zˆ = (z1, ..., zn)T .
There are in total l(S+1) physical goods available for consumption. The con-
sumption bundle of agent i ∈ {1, ...,m} is denoted by xi = (xi(0), xi(s), ..., xi(S)) ∈
Rl(S+1)++ , with xi(s) = (x1i (s), ..., xli(s)) ∈ Rl++, and
∑m
i=1 xi = x. The consump-
tion space for each consumer i ∈ {1, ...,m} is Xi = Rl(S+1)++ , the strictly posi-
tive orthant. The associated price system is a collection of vectors represented
by p = (p(0), p(s), ..., p(S)) ∈ Rl(S+1)++ , with p(s) = (p1(s), ..., pl(s)) ∈ Rl++, the
strictly positive orthant. Each consumer i ∈ {1, ...,m} is endowed with ini-
tial resources ωi ∈ Ω, where Ω = RlT++, and ωi = (ωi(0), ωi(1)) a collection
of strictly positive vectors. Denote an initial resource vector at time period
t ∈ T = {0, 1}, ωi(t) = (ω1i (t), ..., ωli(t)) ∈ Rl++, and the sum of total initial re-
sources,
∑m
i=1 ωi = ω.
There is no aggregate risk in this economy. All risk in the economy is born by
the producers. Hence, initial endowments do not depend on the state of nature.
In total, there are n financial assets traded in period t = 0. Denote the quantity
vector of stocks purchased by consumer i ∈ {1, ...,m}, zi = (zi(1), ..., zi(n)) ∈
Rn+, a collection of quantities of stocks purchased from producers j ∈ {1, ..., n},
and denote
∑m
i=1 zi = z, with associated stock price system q = (q(1), ..., q(n)) ∈
Rn++. Denote producer j’s period t = 0 vector of capital purchase yj(0) ∈
Rl−, and denote his period t = 1 state dependent net activity vector yj(s) =
(y1j (s), ..., y
l
j(s)) ∈ Rl. Let yj(t = 1) = (yj(s), ..., yj(S)) ∈ RlS denote the collec-
tion of state dependent period t=1 net activity vectors. A period t = 1 input of
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production for every s ∈ {1, ..., S} is by convention denoted ykj (s) < 0, and a
production output in state s ∈ {1, ..., S} satisfies ykj (s) ≥ 0. For notational con-
venience, we treat quantity vectors as column vectors, and price vectors as row
vectors, hence, we drop the notation for transposing vectors, whenever possible.
3.2.1 The model of the firm
Each firm j ∈ {1, ..., n} issues stocks zj at stock price qj in period one in order
to build up production capacity. A firm’s total cash acquired via stock mar-
ket determines the upper bound of the total value of production capacity it can
install in the same period. Denote this liquidity constraint qjzj = Mj , where
Mj ∈ R+ is a non-negative real number and zj ∈ R+ a feasible financial pol-
icy of the firm j ∈ {1, ..., n}. Mj constraints the quantity of capital y(0) ∈ Rl−
a producer j can purchase at spot price system p(0) ∈ Rl++. The quantity of
capital yj(0) purchased in period t = 0 determines a correspondence φj|Z . This
correspondence defines the technology of the firm at feasible financial policy.
For notational convenience let yj(0) := Zj1 for every j ∈ {1, ..., n}. Hence, the
production function of the firm, available to it in period t = 1 is not indepen-
dent of the capital choices a firm takes in period t = 0. Let the production set
available to each producer j ∈ {1, ..., n} in period t = 1 be described by this
technology, φj|Z : Ra− → Rb+, a correspondence defined on the set of period t = 1
inputs, and denote it Yj|z ⊂ Rl. Let S denote the set of all exogenously given
states of nature. Then for each producer j ∈ {1, ..., n} let the t = 1 one period
production set be defined by a map Φj|Z with domain Ra− × R++ and range Rb−,
and denote it Yj|z(s) ⊂ RlS , where a + b = l. In reality this correspondence is
likely to map into k 6= b, as there is no reason to expect the same number of
consumption goods l in each period. This restriction is purely for mathematical
convenience, and changing dimension will not alter the analysis of this paper.
1I use this notational definition in order to economize on notation.
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Denote the transformation map Φ for all producers j ∈ {1, ..., n} and states of
nature s ∈ {1, ..., S}, Φj|Z : Ra− × RS++ → Rb+.
Following paragraphs introduce and discuss the main assumptions under-
lying the model of the firm. These include: (i) an idiosyncratic risk assump-
tion postulating that all risk present in the economy is born by the producers,
(ii) a set of assumptions characterizing the endogenized production set avail-
able to each producer j ∈ {1, ..., n}, and (iii) for mathematical convenience an
assumption on what the goal of the firm should be in order to derive a closed
form equilibrium definition. This assumption is relaxed in subsequent chapters,
where the sequential structure of the firm is studied in more detail.
We assume technological uncertainty which introduces idiosyncratic risk by
stating that each producer j ∈ {1, ..., n} has a production function Φj|Z ( at fixed
t = 0 capital yj(0) defined on the set of t = 1 factors of production Rm− and a set
of random variables s ∈ S, each reflecting an exogenous realization in the set
of finite states of nature S = RS++. The production function itself is determined
by the ability of the producer j ∈ {1, ..., n} of accumulating capital in period
t = 1. Thus, the level of production output y+j (s) for a given technology Φj|Z ,
if state of nature s ∈ {1, ..., S} occurs, is a function of the inputs y−j and state
s ∈ {1, ..., S} at fixed capital Zj = yj(0). The boundary of the technology map is
determined by the upper bound of the producer’s total production capacity ac-
quired by issuing stocks. For example y+j (s) = Φj|Z(y−, s). The main properties
of this function are: non-decreasing, quasi-convexity, and differentiability, and
for y−j = 0, Φj|Z(0, s) = 0. These are formally introduced in set of assumptions
3.1 (F) below.
It is now possible to expand Debreu’s [12] assumptions on exogenously de-
fined production sets to an economic setting, where period one production sets
available to producers are endogenously determined by the firms’ choice of
production capacity in period t = 0. Denote a producer’s financial policy Z˜2,
2Note that Z˜ and Z represent a financial policy in the first case and a fixed level of capital in
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here restricted to be a feasible quantity of stocks issued, determining the firms
production capacity, Φj|Z , and let Φj|Z ⇒ Yj|z, where the capacity constraint∑m
i=1 zij ≤ zj ≤ 0 is binding, and where Yj|z(s) denotes the production set avail-
able to the firm j ∈ {1, ..., n} in each state of the world s ∈ {1, ..., S}. Each pro-
ducer j ∈ {1, ..., n} is formally characterized by set of assumptions 3.1 (F ). This
set of assumptions determines the characterization of the short run production
activities available to a firm.
Assumption 3.1 (F) (i) For each j ∈ {1, ..., n}, Yj|z ∈ RlS is closed, convex, and
(ω+
∑n
j=1 Yj|z)∩RlS+ compact for all ωi ∈ RlT++. 0 ∈ Yj|z ⇐ Yj|z ⊃ RlS− . Yj|z ∩RlS+ =
{0}. (ii) For each j ∈ {1, ..., n} denote ∂Yj|z ⊂ RnS+ a C∞ manifold. (iii) For each j ∈
{1, ..., n}, transformation maps Φ|Z(j) are non-linear representing decreasing returns
to scale technology. (iv) For each j ∈ {1, ..., n}, endogenized production capacity is
bounded above and is characterized by zj ∈ [
∑m
i=1 zi(j), 0] in the closed interval of
feasible financial policies.
(i) The closedness assumption is introduced for its mathematical convenience.
Convexity of the production set implies that no increasing returns to scale tech-
nologies are considered, describing the competitive economic environment. For
example, it permits constant return to scale or decreasing return to scale tech-
nologies further specified by the assumption (iii) on the transformation maps
Φ|Z(j) for all j ∈ {1, ..., n}. It is assumed that the total production possibilities
of the whole economy are bounded above. Finally a free disposal assumption is
introduced, implying the possibility of inaction of the firm. A firm has always
the choice of producing no outputs with zero inputs. It is assumed in (ii) that
the efficient boundary of the production set is smooth. Here, C∞ implies dif-
ferentiability at any order required. The order depending on all transversality
arguments employed. Assumption (iv) characterizes the bounds on the level of
production capacity yj(0)⇒ Φ|Z(j) accumulated at feasible financial policy.
the second case.
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We now introduce the long run production sets. This requires to assume
separability of the production sets over the two periods. Consider the the clas-
sical production set Yj ⊂ Rl(S+1) as introduced in [12]. Assume that it satisfies
separability:
Assumption 3.2 (FL) (y(0), (1−λ)(1))y(1)+(λ(1)y′(1), ..., (1−λ)(S)y(S)+λ(S)y′(S)) ∈
Yj for all y = (y(0), y(1), ..., y(S)), y′ = (y(0), y′(1), ..., y′(S)) ∈ Yj and all λ(1), ..., λ(S) ∈
[0, 1].
Assumption 3.2 introduces separability of production across states of nature
s ∈ S in period t = 1 given capital yj(0) in period t = 0 for every j ∈ {1, ..., n}.
Then Yj|z ∈ RlS introduced above is defined by: Yj|z ∈ RlS = {y(1), ..., y(S) ∈
RlS|(y(0), y(1), ..., y(S)) ∈ Y }. For the case that capital only is considered in
period t = 0 have a production set Yj ⊂ R− × RlS rather than Yj ⊂ Rl(S+1).
Proposition 3.1 There exists Yj(y(0), 1), ..., (y(0), S) ⊂ Rl such that
Yj|z = Yj(y(0), 1)×, ...,×Yj(y(0), S).
An example of a production set Yj requires to define a function φj such that
Yj|z results. Let there be two goods (capital) only, l = 2. Then a required function
can be expressed as y2 ≤ F (y1(0), y2(0), y1(1, s), s), where the first and second
goods at date t = 0 are the inputs of production (capital), the first good at t = 1
is an input, the second good at t = 1 is an output and the state s ∈ S influences
production to build the production set. In this example, clearly, the distribution
of production varies across states of nature at date t = 1.
Assumption 3.3 (P) The objective of each producer j ∈ {1, ..., n} is to maximize its
long run profits.
Assumption 3.3 (P ) of long run profits maximization is a convenient as-
sumption which needs further explanation. The full elaboration of this assump-
tion is subject of subsequent chapters. Here, it suffices to justify it for its mathe-
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matical and economical practicality, and its useful consequences. One idea un-
derlying this assumption is to simplify the objective function of the firm such
that it is mathematically more tractable for establishing existence of equilib-
rium. This assumption allows the introduction of a reduced form equilibrium
for which existence of equilibria will be shown. The other idea is related to the
simplification of the problem of linking the real with the financial sector. The
assumption enables to think of the optimization structure of the firm as a se-
quential optimization problem, where in period two, given its production sets,
each producer chooses a net activity plan in it such that it is profit maximizing.
The assumption is convenient as we do not need to model the process of the
firm of building up production capacity in period one by implicitly assuming
that production capacity is given. This assumption leads us into a similar envi-
ronment to the Arrow-Debreu model with private ownership firms, where the
model of the firm is strongly simplified, and the objective of the firm of profit
maximization well defined. Similar to the Arrow-Debreu model, where produc-
tion capacity is exogenously determined, in the reduced form model firms take
their productions sets as given.
Assumption 3.3 (P ) is a reinterpretation of the profit maximization criterion
in classical GEI models of production, where firms maximize profits by choos-
ing net activity vectors over two period production sets. Here, it facilitates the
introduction of a constraint sequential optimization structure, similar to the se-
quential optimization structure on the consumer side in classical GEI models.
This sequential optimization structure has the convenient property of facilitat-
ing the introduction of one period production sets, similar to those of the stan-
dard Arrow-Debreu model, with the significant difference that a period two pro-
duction set available to a firm is not independent of its capacity determined in
period one. An immediate implication of assumption 3.3(P ) is then, at variance
with current models, that period one capital performs the role of determining
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the firms production sets, and therefore the firm’s size. The level of capital a
firm can buy depends on the firm’s ability of acquiring financial liquidity on the
stock market by issuing stocks. This sequential structure and the role financial
assets play are non-trivial elements of the structure of the firm, as they eliminate
the present value problem of the firm present in classical GEI models of produc-
tion, where producers choose real quantities in period one, and share holders
generally evaluate future income streams differently since gradient vectors gen-
erally point in different directions when incompleteness of financial markets is
satisfied.
The algebraic form of the long run profit maximization assumption (3.3) is
stated in equation (3.1).
(yj) ∈ argmax
{
pyj
∣∣∣ yj(s) ∈ Yj|z(s)
qzj = p(0)  yj(0)
for all s ∈ S
}
, (3.1)
where  is the box product, a state by state mathematical operation which
is context dependent. Here,  denotes the ”s by s” inner product. This equa-
tion says that in period two, for a given state of nature s ∈ {1, ..., S}, and for
given production set Yj|z(s), each producer j ∈ {1, ..., n} chooses a profit maxi-
mizing net activity plan yj(s) at given spot price system p(s). This is essentially
equivalent to the Arrow-Debreu model, or the expansion of it to a one period
incomplete markets model as proposed by Diamond [16]. Let production capac-
ity be characterized by the set of all feasible financial policies zj in the interval
(
∑m
i=1 zi(j), 0), and let
∑m
i ξi(j) =
∑m
i zi(j) − zj j ∈ {1, ..., n}. We then call this
objective function a reduced form objective function, since financial policies and
their role are not explicitly considered.
Notice here that all that information is available to the agents in period t = 0,
after trade at the stock market has taken place. Therefore, in period t = 0, the
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producer’s problem is to acquire capital by issuing stocks in order to build up
production capacity. Once the level of capital is determined at the end of period
t = 0, and all information available to the agents, there is no reason not to expect
that the objective of long run profit maximization is not well defined.
Denote a long run equilibrium output vector associated with the production
set boundary yj ∈ ∂Yj,eff |z. Denote the t = 1 maps implied by the long run
profit maximization equation (3.1),
pij : Rl++ × Rl → R, (3.2)
for all s ∈ {1, ..., S}, and j ∈ {1, ..., n}. For each state s ∈ {1, ..., S} and
all producers j ∈ {1, ..., n} define the (S × n) total long run payoff matrix, a
collection of n vectors denoted
Π(p1,Φ|Z) =

p(s)  y1(s) ... p(s)  yn(s)
... ... ...
p(s)  y1(S) ... p(s)  yn(S)
 . (3.3)
Π(p1,Φ|Z) denotes the price and capacity dependent total payoff structure of
the economy for equilibrium financial policies Z˜.
3.2.2 The consumers
Consumers play the same role in this production model as in the classical GEI
model with production. They invest into firms because they want to transfer
wealth between future uncertain states of nature, and to smooth out consump-
tion across states of nature. Each consumer i ∈ {1, ...,m} purchases stocks zi
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at stock price q in period one in return for a dividend stream in the next pe-
riod. The consumer’s optimization problem is to maximize utility subject to a
sequence of (S + 1) budget constraints. Each consumer i ∈ {1, ...,m} is charac-
terized by set of assumptions C below. These are the standard assumptions for
smooth economies introduced in Debreu [13].
Assumption 3.4 (C) (i) ui : Rl(S+1)++ → R is continuous on Rl(S+1)++ , and C∞ on
Rl(S+1)++ . (ii) Ui(xi) =
{
x′i ∈ Rl(S+1)++ : ui(x′i) ≥ ui(xi)
}
⊂ Rl(S+1)++ , for all xi ∈ Rl(S+1)++ .
(iii) For each xi ∈ Rl(S+1)++ , Dui(xi) ∈ Rl(S+1)++ for all s ∈ S. (iv) For each xi ∈ Rl(S+1)++ ,
hTD2ui(xi)h < 0, for all nonzero hyperplane h such that (Dui(xi))Th = 0.
Assumptions (3.4) are introduced in order to obtain differentiable demand
functions, and consequently differentiable equilibrium equations. Smoothness
of the function u has the convenient property that we do not have to keep track
of the order of differentiability of a Ck function for finite order of differentiation
k = 1, ..., K. (ii) Smoothness on the non-negative orthant is introduced in order
to avoid boundary problems when considering first or second order conditions,
for example. The characterization of each consumer i ∈ {1, ...,m} also intro-
duces a (iii) strong monotonicity assumption for differentiable functions, and a
family of local conditions implying strictly quasi-concavity of the utility func-
tion. This condition implies that locally, for each xi ∈ Rl(S+1)++ the gradient vector
Dui(xi) changes direction for any small change dx on the indifference surface,
so that the indifference surface is not locally flat.
Denote consumer i’s sequence of (S + 1) budget constraints
Bzi =
{
(xi) ∈ Rl(S+1)++
∣∣∣ p(0)  (xi(0)− ωi(0)) = −qzi
p(s) · (xi(s)− ωi(1)) = Π(p1,Φ|Z)θi(zi)
}
, (3.4)
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where θi in (3.4), and (3.9) denote the endogenously determined ownership
structure of consumer i ∈ {1, ...,m}, a (n× 1) vector defined by the mappings
θij : R+ → R+ for all j ∈ {1, ..., n}, (3.5)
where zi(j) ∈ R+ is a non-negative real number for every j ∈ {1, ..., n}. θij =
zi(j)[
∑
i zi(j)]
−1 is the proportion of total payoff of financial asset j ∈ {1, ..., n}
hold by consumer i ∈ {1, ...,m} after trade at the stock market took place in
period one. For the moment, I assume that no discontinuities in θij arise, and
that no shareholder has market power. Hence, each consumer considers prices,
production choices and also other’s consumer choices to be fixed. This assump-
tion allows to consider linear ownership structures. A convenient property of
this assumption is that there arise nor problems in the definition of no arbitrage.
Relaxing this assumption will enable to consider strategic interactions on the
stock markets, a topic receiving seemingly less attention in the literature. In
compressed notation, we write
Bzi =
{
(xi) ∈ Rl(S+1)++
∣∣ p(s) · (xi(s)− ωi(t)) ∈ Π̂[zi|θi(zi)]}, (3.6)
for all s ∈ {1, ..., S}, t ∈ {0, 1}, and consumers i ∈ {1, ...,m}, where
Π̂(p1,Φ|Z) =

−q1 ... −qn
p(s)  y1(s) ... p(s)  yn(s)
... ... ...
p(s)  y1(S) ... p(s)  yn(S)

(3.7)
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represents the full payoff matrix of the economy of order ((S + 1)× n).
The sequential optimization problem of the consumer i ∈ {1, ...,m} is to invest
into firms in period one in order to smooth out future uncertain consumption
and to optimize consumption of goods in every (S + 1) spot market. For a
given price system p = (p(0), p(1), ..., p(S)) ∈ Rl(S+1)++ of consumption goods and
price system q ∈ Rn++ of financial assets (stocks), a consumer chooses bundles of
consumption goods and quantities of stocks (x, z)i ∈ Xi×Rn+ such that ui(xi; zi)
is maximized subject to the sequence of (S+ 1) constraints in Bzi . Algebraically,
each i ∈ {1, ...,m}
(xi; zi) ∈ argmax
{
ui(xi; zi) : zi ∈ Rn+, xi ∈ Bzi
}
. (3.8)
This optimization problem can be reformulated in a reduced form problem,
where the reduced form budget set becomes
Bξi =
{
(xi) ∈ Rl(S+1)++
∣∣∣ p(0)  (xi(0)− ωi(0)) = −qξi
p(s) · (xi(s)− ωi(1)) = Π(p1,Φ|Z)θi(ξi)
}
, (3.9)
where
∑m
i ξij =
∑m
i zi(j)− zj is the equation allowing to move between the
two budget sets introduced, for all j ∈ {1, ..., n}, each consumer i ∈ {1, ...,m}
solves following problem:
(xi; ξi) ∈ argmax
{
ui(xi; ξi) : ξi ∈ Rn, xi ∈ Bξi
}
. (3.10)
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Recall that this is the reduced form maximization problem of the consumer.
Here financial policies are exogenously modeled, and therefore, given by the
firm. This simplifies the nature of the problem of interest. We relax this con-
straint in chapter 5.
3.2.3 Equilibrium equations
We introduce following prize normalization S = {p ∈ Rl(S+1)++ : ‖p‖ = ∆} such
that the Euclidean norm vector of the spot price system p is a strictly positive
real number R++. A competitive equilibrium of the production economy de-
fined by the initial resource vector ω ∈ Ω is a price pair (p, q) ∈ S × Rn++ if
equality between demand and supply of physical goods and financial assets is
satisfied in all states of nature, s = 0, 1, ..., S. Its associated competitive equi-
librium allocation is a collection of vectors (x, y, ξ) ∈ Rl(S+1)m++ × Rl(S+1)n × Rnm
of consumption, production and financial quantities. Market clearance condi-
tions are determined by the aggregate excess demands for physical goods and
for financial assets as expressed by the equilibrium equations:
(i)
∑m
i=1(xi(0)− ωi(0)) =
∑n
j=1 yj(0)
(ii)
∑m
i=1(xi − ωi(1)) =
∑S
s=1
∑n
j=1 yj(s)
(iii)
∑m
i=1(zij) = 0,
∑m
i=1 θ(zi)j = 1 for all j ∈ {1, ..., n}
(3.11)
In case of the reduced form equilibrium, have
∑m
i=1 ξi(j) = 0, for all j ∈
{1, ..., n}, and∑mi=1 θ(ξij) = 1 for all j ∈ {1, ..., n} satisfied.
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3.2.4 Definition of a stock market equilibrium
In a financial markets (stock market) general equilibrium with production, each
producer j ∈ {1, ..., n} optimizes a sequential optimization problem defined by
equation (3.1) under assumption (3.3) of long run profit maximization. Every
consumer i ∈ {1, ...,m} optimizes the standard sequential optimization prob-
lem of the classical GEI model as in equation (3.10). Finally, all equilibrium
conditions (3.11) are satisfied. It remains to formally introduce (in its reduced
form) the definition of a long run profit maximization stock market equilibrium.
Definition 3.1 (FE) A reduced form stock market equilibrium (p, q) with associated
equilibrium allocations (x, ξ), (y) for generic initial resources ω ∈ Ω, and each producer
j ∈ {1, ..., n} satisfying assumption 3.3 (P ) of maximizing long run profits satisfies:
(i) (xi; ξi) ∈ argmax
{
ui(xi; ξi) : ξi ∈ Rn, xi ∈ Bξi
}
∀i ∈ {1, ...,m}
(ii) (yj) ∈ argmax
{
pyj
∣∣∣ yj(s) ∈ Yj|z(s)
qzj = p(0)  yj(0)
for all s ∈ S
}
∀ j ∈ {1, ..., n}
(iii)
∑m
i=1(xi − ωi) =
∑n
j yj∑m
i ξij =
∑m
i zij − zj,
∑m
i θ(ξij) = 1, ∀j ∈ {1, ..., n}
3.3 Existence of Equilibrium
This section of chapter 3 establishes the main existence result for the reduced
form stock market general equilibrium model with long run profit maximizing
firms introduced by definition (3.1). Section (3.4) introduces an extension of this
result to piece-wise linear production manifolds. The novelty of this equilibrium
concept is that production sets available to producers in period two are endo-
genized and not independent of the level of capital acquired via stock market
in period one. The sequential objective function of the firm links the real with
the financial sector of the economy. This information is implicitly contained in
assumption 3.3(P ).
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We establish generic existence for smooth endogenized production mani-
folds for the equilibrium concept formally introduced in section (3.1). The rela-
tion between a reduced form and an extensive form equilibrium will formally
be introduced in chapter 5. For the moment, it is sufficient to know that the
later differs only in the sense that financial polices are explicitly modeled. The
strategy of the proof is to show that a technical more tractable pseudo equilib-
rium with production exists, and that every pseudo equilibrium is also a stock
market equilibrium with sequential structure of the firm. The precise relations
between pseudo and (FE) equilibria are introduced in propositions (3.2), and
(3.3). Subsection (3.3.1) establishes a class of smooth endogenized asset struc-
tures for which the existence theorem introduced in the same section guarantees
existence.
Existence of pseudo equilibria for exchange economies with exogenous fi-
nancial markets were established by Duffie, Shafer, Geanokopolos, Hirsh, Hus-
seini, and others [[11],[34],[50],[37],[8]]. Geanokopolos et. al. [33] showed that
pseudo equilibria exist for an economy with production for the case of exoge-
nous financial markets and where the problem of the firm is to maximize the
utility of the average share holder. We improve on this proof by showing that in
a sequential incomplete markets model of the firm with decentralized decisions
and objective function of the firm independent of the utility of share holders,
pseudo equilibria with endogenously determined production sets exist.
Definition 3.2 if @ z ∈ Rn++ s.t. Π̂(p1,Φ|Z)[
∑m
i=1 θ(zi)
S
s=1] > 0, then q ∈ Rn++
is a no-arbitrage stock price relative to p1.
Lemma 3.1 ∃β ∈ RS++ s.t. q =
∑S
s=1 βΠ(p1,Φ|Z)[
∑m
i=1 θ(zi)
S
s=1].
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Lemma (3.3) allows to rescale equilibrium prices without affecting equilib-
rium allocations, let P1 = βp1. Note that this lemma is derived under the
assumptions of linearity of the ownership structure and no discontinuities in it.
The next step in deriving a pseudo equilibrium is to derive a normalized no ar-
bitrage equilibrium definition [9]. Let β ∈ RS++ be (λ(s)λ )i=1, the gradient vector
from the optimization problem of agent 1, called the Arrow-Debreu agent. The
Walrasian budget set for the Arrow-Debreu agent is a sequence of constraints
denoted
B1 =
{
x1 ∈ Rl(S+1)++ :
P (0) · (x1(0)− ω˜1(0)) = 0
P (s) · (x1(s)− ω1(1)) =
∑n
j=1 θ1jP (s) · yj(s)
}
, (3.12)
for all s ∈ {1, ..., S}. Let ω˜1(0) =
∑n
j=1 θ1jP (0) · yj(0).
For all consumers i ≥ 2, the no arbitrage budget set consisting of a sequence
of (S + 1) constraints is denoted
Bi≥2 =
{
xi ∈ Rl(S+1)++ :
P (0) · (xi − ω˜i(0)) = 0
P (s) · (xi(s)− ωi(1)) ∈ 〈Π(P1,Φ|Z)〉
}
, (3.13)
where 〈Π(P1,Φ|Z)〉 denotes the span of the income transfer space of period
t = 1. Let ω˜i(0) =
∑n
j=1 θijP (0) · yj(0). Replace 〈Π(P1,Φ|Z)〉with L in Gn(R)S3
Lemma 3.2 Gn(R)S is the Grassmann manifold with smooth (S − n) dimensional
3See i.e. Dieudonne` [19] for properties of the Grassmann manifold. See Duffie and Shafer for
an exposition of the Grassmann manifold in economics [11].
34
structure, and L an n-dimensional affine subspace of Gn(R)S .
Denote the pseudo opportunity set Bi(P,L;ωi), for each i ∈ {2, ...,m},
Bi =
{
xi ∈ Rl(S+1)++ :
P · (xi − ω˜i) = 0
P (s) · (xi(s)− ωi(s)) ⊂ L
}
. (3.14)
Let S ′ = {p ∈ Rl(S+1)++ : ‖p‖ = ∆} be the set of normalized prices, and let
∆ ∈ R++ be a fixed strictly positive real number. This convenient normalization
singles out the first good at the spot s = 0 as the numeraire. We introduce fol-
lowing definitions for the long run payoff maps associated with sets S and S ′ of
normalized prices. This definition introduces the relation between β dependent
payoff structures for a financial markets- and a pseudo equilibrium definition.
The full payoff structure Π satisfying this definition is relabeled Γ.
Definition 3.3 (i) For any p1 ∈ S , such that pi : S × Rl → A , let Γ(P1,Φ|Z) =
β[(proj∆( 1β )TP1)y], where T denotes the transpose, proj∆ = ∆(
z
‖z‖),
1
β
= ( 1
β(s)
, ..., 1
β(S)
) ∈ RS++, and β = (β(1), ..., β(S)) ∈ RS++. (ii) For any p1 ∈ S ′, such
that pi : S ′ ×Rl → A, let Γ(P1,Φ|Z) = β[(( 1β )TP1) · y], where A is a set of (S × n)
matrices A of order (S × n).
Using the no arbitrage result of previous section (lemma (3.3)) and above
definition (3.3) leads to the analytically more tractable concept of a pseudo stock
market equilibrium for which we will establish existence. The main benefit of
a pseudo equilibrium is that it allows to apply transversality arguments. This
follows from the two consequences of the normalized gradient vector of the
Arrow-Debreu agent. It gives his (i) standard GE demand functions satisfying
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boundary conditions, and (ii) it guarantees independency of aggregate demand
functions, such that Walras’ law applies [39].
Definition 3.4 A pseudo stock market equilibrium (P¯ , L¯) ∈ S ′×GnRS with associates
equilibrium allocations (x¯, y¯) ∈ Rl(S+1)m++ ×Rl(S+1)n+ for generic initial resources ω ∈ Ω,
satisfies:
(i) (x¯1) arg max
{
u1(x1) s.t. x1 ∈ B1(P¯ , ω1)
}
i = 1
(ii) (x¯i) arg max
{
ui(xi) s.t. xi ∈ Bi(P¯ , L¯, ωi)
} ∀ i ≥ 2
(iii)
〈
Γ(P¯1, φ¯)
〉 ⊂ L¯, proper if 〈Γ(P¯1, φ¯)〉 = L¯
(iv) (y¯)j arg max
{
p¯(s) · yj(s)
∣∣∣∣ yj(s) ∈ Yj(s) ∀s ∈ S } ∀ j ∈ {1, ..., n}
(v) x¯1 +
∑m
i=2 x¯i =
∑m
i=1 ωi +
∑n
j=1 y¯j
Lemma 3.3 Under assumptions 3.4(C), demand mappings f1(P, ω1) and fi(P,L, ωi)
for 1 = 2, ...,m, from argmax (i) and (ii) are C∞. Under assumptions 3.1(F), supply
mappings gj(P ) for j = 1, ..., n, from argmax (iv) are C∞.
A proof of this known result is omitted4. Smoothness of demand and supply
functions follows from the setup of the model for smooth economies. Following
results show the relation between pseudo and (FE) equilibria. They imply that,
in order to prove existence of equilibrium it is sufficient to establish existence in
the much easier case of a pseudo equilibrium, since every pseudo equilibrium
is also a (FE) equilibrium. The advantage of a pseudo equilibrium is that the
financial assets cancel out of the equations. This simplifies the existence proof.
The propositions state that every pseudo equilibrium is a (FE) equilibrium, but
the reverse is not always true. Therefore, establishing existence of equilibrium
for the pseudo equilibrium case is sufficient in order to guarantee existence of
4A proof of this result for the case of an exchange economy can be found in Duffie and Shafer
(1985), [11]. The expansion to production is obvious and follows from the set up
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equilibrium of a reduced form (FE) equilibrium.
Proposition 3.2 For every full rank stock market equilibrium with production (FE),
(p, q), with associated equilibrium allocations (x, ξ, y), there exists a β ∈ RS++ and a
n-dimensional subspace L ∈ Gn(RS) such that (P ,L) is a pseudo equilibrium with
associated equilibrium allocations (x, y).
Proposition 3.3 If (P ,L) is a pseudo stock market equilibrium with associated equi-
librium allocations (x, y) for every β ∈ RS++, there exists a stock price system q ∈ Rn++
and investment portfolios z = (z(1), ..., z(n)) ∈ Rn+ such that (p, q) with associated al-
locations (x, ξ, y) is a (x, y) allocational equivalent stock market equilibrium (FE) with
production.
3.3.1 Regular endogenized payoff structure
Long run financial payoffs depend on the technology of the firm, which in turn
depends on the production capacity installed via stock market, and on a set of
regular prices. Hart illustrated by means of carefully chosen examples that equi-
librium may not exist for some structures of the payoff matrix [31]. He showed
that when price vectors are collinear the rank of the payoff matrix changes and
that consequently equilibrium may fail to exist due to discontinuities of demand
functions. We will exhibit a class of regular endogenous asset structures for
smooth production economies for which equilibria will always exist. For this
class of well behaved asset structures, generic existence of equilibrium is estab-
lished by the application of Thom’s parametric transversality theorem [32].
The class of endogenized asset structures considered, enables for interest-
ing economic interpretations of economic phenomena beyond those of the pure
exchange model, and allows enhancing the theory of the firm in a general equi-
librium framework with endogenous incomplete markets, where production is
not independent of the stock market.
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Definition 3.5 Define the rank dependent long run payoff maps piρ : Rl++×Rl → Aρ,
for 0 ≤ ρ ≤ n. The set of reduced rank matrices Aρ of order (S × n) with rank(Aρ) =
(n− ρ) is denoted Aρ, and is of order (S × n).
Proposition 3.4 (i) for (1 ≤ ρ < n), Aρ is a submanifold of A of codimension (S −
n + ρ)ρ. (ii) for ρ = n the set Aρ is empty, Aρ = {∅}, and (iii) for ρ = 0, the set of
reduced rank matrices Aρ is equivalent to the set of full rank matrices A, Aρ = A.
Proposition (3.4) states rank properties of the income transfer space, the co-
domain of rank dependent payoff maps. For example, for any integers (1 ≤ ρ <
n), Aρ, the incomplete income transfer space is rank reduced. This properties
are important when applying transversality arguments in the existence proof.
Theorem(3.1) below exhibits a regular asset structure R for the smooth pro-
duction economy and shows that, for a map pi to the ambient space A which is
transverse to a submanifold Aρ along all values of the domain of pi, R is big in
a topological sense. This follows from the transversality theorem for maps and
submanifolds. SinceR is open and dense, it follows that its complement, the set
of critical values is closed and of measure zero. Denote the set satisfying Γ t Aρ,
R, and its complementR.
Theorem 3.1 (i) pij t Aρj for integers (1 ≤ ρ < n)j for all j = {1, ..., n}. (ii) Γj t Aρ
for any β ∈ RS++ and integers (1 ≤ ρ < n) for all j = {1, ..., n}. (iii) R = Γj t Aj is
generic, since it is dense and open for all j = {1, ..., n}.
The economic relevance of theorem (3.1) is that it exhibits a class of well
defined smooth endogenized asset structures for production economies with
production sets defined by set of assumptions 3.1 (F ), for which for each j ∈
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{1, ..., n} a sequential optimization structure of the firm applies. This result im-
proves on Bottazzi [8] by generalizing the asset structure. It also improves on
Duffie and Shafer [11], since the proposed asset structure is not more general
but also independent of initial endowments and preferences.
For any gneneric production set structure satisfying theorem (3.1), equilib-
rium exists by the existence theorem below.
Definition 3.6 Denote Ψρ the vector bundle defined by (i) a basis P ρ = {P ∈ Rl(S+1)++ :
rank(Γ(P1,Φ|z)) = (n − 1)}, and (ii) let the orthogonal income transfer space be de-
noted by L⊥ ⊂ 〈Γ(P1,Φ|z)〉⊥, then
Ψρ =
{
(P, 〈Γ(P1,Φ|z)〉⊥, L⊥) ∈ P ρ ×GS−n+ρ(RS)×GS−n(RS)
such that L⊥ ⊂ 〈Γ(P1,Φ|z)〉⊥
}
.
We thus have defined a fiber bundle Ψρ of codimension l(S + 1) − 1 − ρ2
containing the spot price system P and income transfer space 〈Γ(., .)〉 consisting
of a base vector P ρ and fiber GS−n(RS−n+ρ). We can now state the main result.
Theorem 3.2 There exists a pseudo (FE) stock market equilibrium (P ,L) with asso-
ciated equilibrium allocations (x, y) for generic initial resources ω ∈ Ω. Moreover, by
the relational propositions (3.2), and (3.3), a stock market equilibrium (FE) (p, q) with
associated equilibrium allocations (x, ξ, y) exists for generic initial resources ω ∈ Ω.
Proof 3.1 (Theorem 3.2) By proposition (3.4) and theorem(3.1), and using the def-
inition of the vector bundle in (3.6), define a parameterized evaluation map Zρ on
Ψρ × Rl(S+1)m++ , where parameter space Rl(S+1)m++ = Ω denotes the set of the economy’s
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total initial endowments, such that Zρ maps into N , denoted
Zρ : Ψρ × Rl(S+1)m++ → N.
For the normalized (Arrow-Debreu) agent have
Zρ1 : Ψ
ρ × Rl(S+1)m++ → N. (3.15)
This evaluation map is a submersion, since Dω1Z
ρ
1 for all initial resources ω1 ∈ Ω is
surjective everywhere. There exists for each ω1 ∈ Ω
Zρ1,ω1∈Ω : Ψ
ρ → N tω∈Ωρ {0}. (3.16)
where {0} ⊂ N , and ρ = 0 satisfied. The dimension of the preimage of the evalua-
tion map defined on the set {0}, Zρ1,ω1∈Ω({0}) is l(S + 1) − 1. by Thom’s parametric
transversality theorem5, it follows that the subset Ωρ ∩ Ω is generic, since it is a dense
and open set. Equilibria for this pseudo economy exist. By the equivalence propositions
(3.2) and (3.3) know that full rank financial markets equilibria with endogenized smooth
productions sets exist.
For all ρ satisfying (1 ≤ ρ ≤ n) the preimage of the rank reduced evaluation map
Zρ1,ω1∈Ω({0}) is l(S+ 1)− 1 has dimension l(S+ 1)− 1− ρ2. By application of Thom’s
theorem this implies that for generic endowments ω ∈ ∩ρ(Ωρ) for all ρ = 1, ..., n there
is no reduced rank equilibrium, since for Zρ1 (., ω) the set of zeros is empty, {0} = ∅.
5See Thom R. (1954) ”Quelques proprie´te´s globales des varie`te`s differentiables”. Comm.
Math. Helv. 28, 17-86.
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3.4 Existence of equilibrium for endogenized con-
vex piece-wise linear production sets
The linear activity model belongs to a large class of models with many impor-
tant economic applications6. The Leontief Input-Output model is an example
of such a linear activity model. The goal of this section therefore, is to estab-
lish generic existence of equilibrium for the linear activity model, a model with
convex production sets and constant returns to scale technologies.
A linearity assumption on the transformation map φj is introduced by re-
placing the non-linearity assumption on the transformation map (iii) in set of
assumptions 3.1(F ) with assumption 3.5(L) below.
The main result of this section shows that, by similar arguments of the previ-
ous sections, equilibria exist for regularized production manifolds. This requires
to firstly show that we can sufficiently well approximate the non-smooth pro-
duction manifolds with smooth manifolds.
Assumption 3.5 (L) The t = 1 transformation map φj|z(s) : Ra− → Rb+ is piecewise
linear for all s ∈ {1, ..., S}, and j ∈ {1, ..., n}.
Geometrically, each endogenized period two production set Yj|z is repre-
sented by a polyhedral cone, a set generated as a convex hull of a finite number
of rays.
We apply techniques from regularization theory to production sets7 in order
to smooth out convex, piecewise linear production manifolds ∂Yj|z by convo-
lution, and show that these convolutes, denoted Φj , are compact and smooth
manifolds approximating the piecewise linear production manifolds. Let the
6For details of such models see Gale (1960) for example [25].
7Similar to Chiappori and Rochet (Econometrica, 1987) who applied regularization theory to
smooth out utilities.
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state dependent convolute Φj(s) for producer j ∈ {1, ..., n} be defined by equa-
tion
(λσ ∗ φj(y))(s)j =
{ ∫
Rm−
(λσ(ζ)φj(y − ζ)dζ)j(s) for all s ∈ S
0 otherwise
(3.17)
for all j ∈ {1, ..., n}, where y ∈ Uσ, and Uσ = {y ∈ U : B(y, σ) ⊂ U}.
Continuity of φj(s) implies the existence of a distance σ = inft(σt), where 0 <
σ < 1. Associate with measure σ ∈ [0, 1] the manifolds λσ(j), for all j ∈ {1, ..., n},
defined by following equation.
λσ(y, s)j =
1
σ
λ(
y
σ
(s)), for all s ∈ S. (3.18)
A convolution kernel λ(s) ∈ L1(Rl−) is a smooth, non-negative and symmet-
ric manifold with mass equal to 1 and with compact support containing 0:
λ(y0, s)j =

(
exp
(
−1
1−‖y0‖2
)
/
∫
Rl−
exp
(
−1
1−‖y0‖2
)
dy0
)
(s) if ‖y0‖ < 1
0 if ‖y0‖ ≥ 1
, (3.19)
for all s ∈ {1, ..., S}, and for all j ∈ {1, ..., n}.
Proposition 3.5 Each regularized production manifold ∂Y˜j|Z(s), defined by the con-
volute Φj(s), for all s ∈ S and j ∈ {1, ..., n} is C∞ and compact.
Proposition 3.6 For every j ∈ {1, ..., n} and C∞ kernel λ, λ∗ is bounded and con-
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verges to identity φ, it satisfies
|(λσ ∗ φ)j(s)− φ(s)|j ≤ ε(s)j for all s ∈ S.
Theorem 3.3 For every endogenously determined and regularized production manifold
∂Y˜j|Z , j ∈ {1, ..., n}, there exists a pseudo (FE) stock market equilibrium (P ,L) with
associated equilibrium allocations (x, y) for generic initial resources ω ∈ Ω. Moreover,
by the relational propositions (3.2), and (3.3), a stock market equilibrium (FE) (p, q)
with associated equilibrium allocations (x, ξ, y) exists for generic initial resources ω ∈
Ω.
3.5 Conclusion
This chapter introduces the benchmark model of the firm in its reduced form.
The reduced form equilibrium definition follows from a reinterpretation of the
long run profits maximization assumption of the classical general equilibrium
models of production with incomplete markets. This assumption has the con-
venient advantage that it enables to economize on mathematical notation, and
therefore, to simplify the establishment of existence of equilibrium, since the
precise nature of the structure of the firm needs not to be considered. The long
run profits maximization assumption implicitly implies a sequential structure
of the firm, where each firm issues stocks in period one in order to build up
production capacity, and then, subject to given production sets and states of
the world to choose a production plan in order to maximize its profits. Note
that at this point in time, we model incomplete markets by hypothesis. This is
improved on in chapter 5, where the extensive form model of the firm is intro-
duced, and the optimal number of firms endogenously determined.
For the reduced form equilibrium concept introduced, existence of equilibria
was proved for two asset structures: for convex production sets (i) and non-
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linear technologies, (decreasing returns to scale technologies), (ii) and for linear
technologies (constant return to scale technologies). The later was shown by
using techniques from regularization theory and smoothing out the piece-wise
linear production manifolds by convolution. Existence of equilibrium is then
shown for the approximated production set.
It remains to formally introduce an extensive form equilibrium which relaxes
the long run profits assumption, and in which the role of financial assets are
explicitly modeled. This is subject of chapter 4, where by means of examples
the role of financial assets is illuminated, and more rigorously in chapter 5.
This chapter has also exhibited a class of endogenized smooth asset struc-
tures. This result is very convenient, then for every endogenized asset structure
belonging to this general asset class, equilibrium always exists. Moreover, it
enables to derive a theory of the firm in general equilibrium with incomplete
markets, where the real sector is not independent of the financial sector. Con-
sequently, interesting economic phenomena related to the firm can be studied.
This result also provides a way of naturally introducing further financial assets,
such as bonds for example, into the analysis of economic equilibrium with pro-
duction.
The following chapter studies some of these properties by means of exam-
ples. In particular, the idea of chapter 4 is to contrast equilibrium properties of
the model of production of the classical GEI model to properties of the model
introduced in this thesis. Only the minimum structure is imposed on each ex-
ample, such that each example highlights an economic interesting property in
its simplest form. This allows to keep mathematical notation at a minimum.
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Chapter 4
Examples: Equilibrium Properties
Beyond Existence of Equilibrium
4.1 Introduction
This chapter intends to give some simple examples of properties of general equi-
librium models with production beyond existence of equilibrium. These proper-
ties are mainly related to the objective function of the firm, and the role financial
assets play in these models. The set of examples in part I aims at constructing a
simple model and variations of it which is sufficiently rich in structure to repro-
duce some economic properties of a particular class of GEI models of produc-
tion. These examples elaborate on the problems associated with the organiza-
tion of production when firms maximize the utility of a group of shareholders
or any other utility of a representative agent. The second set of examples in part
II of this chapter studies the same equilibrium properties for a simplified ver-
sion of the model introduced in chapter 3. For the purpose of illustration, we
consider special cases only.
By means of examples, the main contribution of this chapter is to show that,
in contrary to widely believed, the objective function of the firm can be viewed
as independent of any form of utility of the owners or of the utility of a manager
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assigned to it. This in its simplest form establishes one of the main results of this
thesis. An example of such an objective function is introduced in part II. This
function turns out to have a nice property. It enables to prove another inter-
esting result, namely, the generalization of the decentralization theorem of the
Arrow-Debreu model to the case of incomplete markets. This result improves
on Dre`ze [21] and Grossman and Hart [28] who where able to separate the ac-
tivities of the agents only, but not the objective of the firm from the utility of the
shareholders. The third main result suggests a reexamination of the Modigliani
and Miller theorem in incomplete markets. It shows at a very preliminary level
that real allocations are not independent of financial policies of the firm under
standard GEI assumptions. This result follows from the objective function of the
firm which links the real with the financial sphere through the way financial as-
sets (stocks) are introduced. This result however, is incomplete at this stage and
subject to further research. Finally, this chapter comments on the organization
of production as an additional source of inefficiency. It shows that equilibrium
allocations of the model introduced in chapter 3 are generally allocational su-
perior efficient relative to any utility dependent production model. The degree
of inefficiency depending on the present value vector assigned to the objective
function of the firm.
Part I introduces a simple model with technological uncertainty. This models
is designed in order to maintain the main properties of the classical GEI models.
We use this model to reproduce some properties of production of centralized
models. Part II studies production properties of the model introduced in chap-
ter 3. We elaborate on the consequences of the two different ways production is
organized in general equilibrium with incomplete markets. Despite the study
of a very simple and highly stylized general equilibrium model in this chapter.
We are able to make economic sense of this rather special case, and occasion-
ally, where convenient, interpret this single agent model as an entrepreneurship
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model.
4.2 Examples: Part I
4.2.1 Introduction part I
Part I considers a set of examples replicating some equilibrium properties of
centralized GEI models of production. These examples shall illustrate problems
related to the organization of production when time and uncertainty are mod-
eled explicitly. In order to illustrate the properties of interest, it is sufficient to
consider a highly stylized 1 agent model. This model differs from current mod-
els in the following ways:
1. we consider technological uncertainty rather aggregate uncertainty,
2. (beyond the one agent model), initial ownership is not exogenously given,
but modeled),
3. at variance with Magill and Quinzii [38], the firm finances production
through the stock market, rather the bond market.
The main property of the classical GEI model of production that we main-
tain is the exogenously determined two period production set available to the
producer. Given such a production set, the firm chooses inputs of production in
period one with associated outputs in period two. This property is necessary in
order to replicate the results known in the literature. Another property that we
maintain is related to the objective function of the firm, where financial assets
enter the objective function of the firm additively and independent of the pro-
duction set. These two properties turn out to introduce a problem related to the
question of how to model the firm.
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4.2.2 Introduction to the centralized single agent reduced form
model: Example (1)
The idea of considering a reduced form model is to introduce a simplified model
where financial policies are not explicit modeled. Its counterpart, the extensive
form model will be introduced later.
In the single agent reduced form model, the consumer performs the role as
a consumer and as a producer. As a consumer the agent buys stocks z and re-
ceives a proportion of the real value of the firm θ(z) = 1 (in this case) in the
next period in return. As a producer the agent issues the quantity of stocks b
(here b is not modeled explicitly) in order to finance a project. Notice the nature
of the role financial assets play in this model. Namely, the firm issues stocks in
order to finance factors of production in period one, taking its technology as ex-
ogenously given. This is at variance with the model introduced in the previews
chapter. The return of financial investment the agent obtains as a consumer is
denoted R(y¯, s)z, and the dividend payoff the agent pays as a producer is de-
noted R(y¯, s)b. The agent’s S + 1 budget constraints are denoted
Bz =

(x) ∈ RS+1++ :
p(0)x(0) = p(0)ω(0)− θ(z¯)p(0)y(0)− qz + qb
p(s)x(s) = p(s)ω(1) + θ(z¯)p(s)y(s) +R (y¯, s) z −R (y¯, s) b
 , (4.1)
where R (y¯, s) = D(y¯,s)
bˆ
is the dividend payoff per stock issued1. Let ξ = z− b,
then the agent’s sequence of budget constraints can be rewritten as
1We sometimes abuse notation in this chapter. In particular, we do not write the dot product
explicitly. This because, whenever possible, we think of the model as a single good model, and
therefore, can omit it.
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Bξ =
(x) ∈ RS+1++ : p(0)x(0) = p(0)ω(0)− θ(z¯)p(0)y(0)− qξp(s)x(s) = p(s)ω(1) + θ(z¯)p(s)y(s) +R (y¯, s) ξ
 , (4.2)
where p(0)y(0) denotes the investment costs in period one associated with
revenue p(s)y(s) in each state of nature s ∈ {1, ..., S} in period two. In this
model the firm’s production set is Y = RS+1 if only one good in each state of
nature is considered (otherwise Rl(S+1)). Note that a price normalization im-
plies that p(0) = 1, and p(s) = 1 in every s ∈ {1, ..., S}. The production set
is described by a function Φ : R− → RS+, where Y =
{
y ∈ RS+1 : Φ(y) ≤ 0} .
Standard assumptions on technology sets apply. Ownership of the firm θ(.) is a
function of quantity of stocks purchased as a consumer.
Definition 4.1 (p¯, q¯) is a reduced form equilibrium with associated equilibrium alloca-
tions (x¯, ξ¯, y¯) for generic initial resources ω ∈ Ω if following conditions are satisfied:
(i)
(
x¯; ξ¯, y¯
) ∈ arg max {u(x) : x ∈ Bξ}
(ii) ξ¯ = 0.
(4.3)
Condition (ii) implies that the quantity of stocks that the consumer buys is
equal to the quantity of stocks he issues as a producer. ξ denotes the net trade of
stocks, where at equilibrium ξ¯ = 0 is satisfied. For the case that more than one
consumption good is considered, x¯(0) = ω(0) + y¯(0), and x¯(s) = ω(1) + y¯(s) for
all states of nature hold. The agent’s optimization problem is to choose ξ and y
such that utility of x is maximized.
Propositions (4.1), (4.2), and (4.3) state that in a single agent reduced form
model, where economic activities are centralized, the utility maximization prob-
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lem has a solution. The first two propositions show a first step towards model-
ing financial assets (on consumer side only), where ξ implying z and b implicitly
contained in ξ, and for the case that the agent as a consumer takes financial pol-
icy of the firm b as given and chooses z to finance his preferred consumption
bundle x. Proposition (4.3) shows the equivalence of these models.
Proposition 4.1 (p¯, q¯) is a reduced form equilibrium with associated equilibrium al-
locations
(
x¯, ξ¯, y¯
)
of the maximization problem (i), if and only if for generic initial re-
sources ω ∈ Ω
q¯ is a no-arbitrage price (4.4)
is satisfied.
Definition 4.2 (p¯, q¯) is a reduced form equilibrium with associated equilibrium alloca-
tions (x¯, z¯, y¯) for for generic initial resources ω ∈ Ω if following conditions are satisfied:
(i) (x¯; z¯, y¯) ∈ arg max {u(x) : (x; z, y) ∈ Bz}
(ii) z¯ + bˆ = 0
(4.5)
and x¯(0) = ω(0) + y¯(0), and x¯(s) = ω(1) + y¯(s) for all s hold for l > 1.
Proposition 4.2 (p¯, q¯) is a reduced form equilibrium with associated equilibrium al-
locations (x¯, z¯, y¯) of the maximization problem (i), if and only if for generic initial re-
sources ω ∈ Ω
q¯ is a no-arbitrage price (4.6)
is satisfied.
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Proposition 4.3 The reduced form model (4.1) and the reduced form model (4.2) are
equivalent if
ξ¯ = z¯ − bˆ (4.7)
The reduced form model (4.2) is equivalent to the reduced form model (4.1) if
z¯ − bˆ = ξ¯. (4.8)
4.2.3 The separated activities single agent reduced form model:
Example (2)
This subsection expands the centralized reduced form model to an economic
framework where decisions of the single agent are separated. This allows to
introduce two separated optimizations problems, one for each role the agent
plays. This example, although very simple, is non-trivial. It remarks on a fun-
damental issue regarding the literature on the objective function of the firm in
general equilibrium with incomplete markets.
Suppose that the consumer assigns to the firm his own present value vector
β. The objective of the agent as a producer is, given his own present value vector,
to maximize the present value of streams of profits. This economic framework
is sufficiently rich in structure in order to show the separation of activities of the
agent as a consumer and as a producer. This is a variation of a contemporary
result known in the GEI literature on centralized models of the firm.
Proposition 4.4 (p¯, q¯) is a separated activities reduced form equilibrium with associ-
ated equilibrium allocations (x¯, ξ¯, (y¯)), for generic initial resources ω ∈ Ω, if and only
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if for p¯i assigned to the objective function of the firm it satisfies:
(i)
(
x¯, ξ¯
)
arg max {u(x¯) : x¯ ∈ Bξ}
(ii) (y¯) ∈ arg max{β¯p¯y : y ∈ Y }
(iii) ξ¯ = 0.
(4.9)
Remark 1 This result is sometimes referred to as the equivalence of the decentralization
theorem of the Arrow-Debreu model for the case of incomplete markets [20]. This word-
ing can be misleading. What the result actually does is separating the activities of the
agent as a consumer from the activities as a producer. However, the objective function
as a producer is not independent from the present value vector of the consumer. Conse-
quently, as a producer, the agent maximizes a present value problem not independent of
information contained in the utility of the consumer. This makes sense in this one agent
set up if one is willing to think of this model as an entrepreneurship model. However,
adding another agent to the model raises the question of what present value to assign to
the single firm. What this result does not is decentralizing the objective function of the
firm.
Examples in part II will improve on this result and show that the model of
the firm introduced in chapter 3 is independent of such additional information.
This is interesting because it allows to improve on the decentralization prop-
erty by decentralizing the objective function of the firm. Proposition (4.5) shows
the inefficient organization of production of the reduced form model with sepa-
rated activities of the agent. The level of inefficiency introduced into the model
depends on the consumer’s present value vector.
Proposition 4.5 The organization of production is generally (in)efficient for any as-
signed present value β to the objective function.
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The model is production efficient, if there does not exist a production plan
yˆ 6= y in Y such that u(xˆ) > u(x). Alternatively to above, to show that the
organization of production of this centralized model introduces a source of in-
efficiency, it is sufficient to expand the model to two consumers. Then, need to
assign some arbitrarily determined average βi to the objective function of the
firm. It is easy to see that for any different average or median present value vec-
tor assigned to the firm that net activities change accordingly, and consequently
u(xˆ) 6= u(x) for yˆ 6= y. Moreover, introducing another agent also introduces a
new problem about what present value vector to assign to the firm.
4.2.4 Geometric first order conditions for the reduced form sin-
gle agent model: Example (3)
For some cases, it may turn out convenient to have the geometric first order
conditions and interpretation of equilibrium. Hence this application of convex
sets analysis. Proposition (4.6) shows that the utility maximization problem of
the reduced form model has a solution. Corollary (4.1) is the expansion of this
result to the reduced form utility maximization problem of the centralized sin-
gle agent model.
Proposition 4.6 Let Y and Z be two nonempty convex sets. Then (y¯, z¯) is a solution
of
(x¯; y¯, z¯) ∈ arg max {u(y + z) : y ∈ Y, z ∈ Z} (4.10)
if and only if
∇u(y¯ + z¯) ∈ NY (y¯) ∩NZ(z¯). (4.11)
Let Z˜ be a subset of the real line denoted by the interval [0, Z].
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Corollary 4.1 Let Y and Ξ be two nonempty convex sets. Then (y¯, ξ¯) is a solution of
(
x¯; y¯, ξ¯
) ∈ arg max {u(y + ξ) : y ∈ Y, ξ ∈ Ξ} (4.12)
if and only if
∇u(y¯ + ξ¯) ∈ NY (y¯) ∩NΞ(ξ¯). (4.13)
Let Ξ be a subset of the real line denoted by the interval [0,Ξ].
The proof of these results are based upon the separation hyperplane theorem
for convex sets [24]. Proposition (4.6) and corollary (4.1) are geometric reinter-
pretations of the reduced form model (4.2). This results say that it is necessary
and sufficient to show that the gradient vector of the centralized optimization
problem (utility maximization) must lie in the intersection of the convex cones
in order to obtain a solution of the maximization problems.
We can further simplify the study of this income transfer model by consider-
ing following optimization problem for the agent. Since the choice of a portfolio
ξ is equivalent to the choice of a vector of income transfers τ = Πξ, following
result holds.
Proposition 4.7 Let τ¯ = Πξ¯, and τ¯ ∈ 〈Π〉. Then (τ¯ , y¯) is a solution of
(τ¯ , y¯) ∈ arg max {u(ω + y + τ) : (τ, y) ∈ 〈Π〉 × Y } (4.14)
if and only if
(τ¯ , y¯) ∈ 〈Π〉 × Y, ∇u(x¯) ∈ 〈Π〉⊥ ∩NY (y¯) (4.15)
where x¯ = ω + τ¯ + y¯.
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For β¯ assigned to the objective function of the firm, the first order conditions
of the optimization problem can be decomposed into two pairs of conditions:
τ¯ ∈ 〈Π〉 , β¯ ∈ 〈Π〉⊥ (4.16)
y¯ ∈ Y, β¯ ∈ NY (y¯). (4.17)
A proof of this result is omitted. It is a simple expansion of the proof of
proposition (4.7) illustrated in the mathematical appendix. Proposition (4.8)
replicates the separation result of the previous section for the geometrically re-
formulated model. The proof shows the geometric separation of activities of the
agent as a consumer and as a producer.
Proposition 4.8 (p¯, q¯) is an equilibrium of the geometrically reinterpreted reduced
form equilibrium with associated equilibrium allocations (x¯, ξ¯, (y¯)) and separated ac-
tivities for generic initial resources ω ∈ Ω, if and only if for β¯ assigned to the objective
function of the firm it satisfies:
(i)
(
x¯, ξ¯
) ∈ arg max {u(x¯) : x¯ ∈ Bξ}
(ii) (y¯) ∈ arg max{β¯p¯y : y ∈ Y }
(iii) ξ¯ = 0.
(4.18)
4.2.5 Single agent extensive form model: Example (4)
This subsection aims at reproducing in its simplest form the irrelevance of fi-
nancial policy theorem of Modigliani and Miller [43]. The theorem states that
whatever financial policy a firm chooses, consumers can always undo this, leav-
ing effects on real allocations unchanged. The theorem implicitly assumes that
an equilibrium production plan of the firm is financed by its policy.
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The next result replicates the Modigliani and Miller theorem. For that, we
add more structure to the model and introduce an extensive form model of the
firm, where financial policies are explicitly modeled. The result shows that the
firm’s financial policy has no real effects. This result follows from the indepen-
dence of the firm’s production set from the actions of the firm in the financial
sector, an assumption implicit in the theorem of the irrelevance of financial poli-
cies.
Denote the budget set of the consumer
Bz =
{
(x) ∈ RS+1++ : px = pω + py + Πb+ Πz
}
, (4.19)
where Π =

−q
D(1)
b
...
D(S)
b

is the financial payoff matrix (vector, here). D(s)
b
denotes the payoff per stock
issued in a particular state of nature. As a consumer, the agent takes (p, q, b, y)
as given and chooses z which finances his most preferred consumption bundle
x. As a producer he takes (p, q, x, z) and present value vector β as given and
chooses b and y such that present value profits are maximized. This is formally
introduced in following definition.
Definition 4.3 (p¯, q¯) is an extensive form equilibrium with associated equilibrium al-
locations (x¯, z¯), (y¯, b¯), for generic initial resources ω ∈ Ω, if following conditions are
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satisfied:
(i) (x¯, z¯) ∈ arg max {u(x) : x ∈ Bz}
(ii)
(
y¯, b¯
) ∈ arg max
β¯p¯y + Πb : y ∈ Yb ∈ R−

(iii) z¯ − b¯ = 0.
(4.20)
Proposition (4.9) asserts that the precise nature of the producer’s financial
policy has no real effects on equilibrium allocations, provided it finances the
producer’s production plan. The result follows from showing the equivalence
between the extensive form and the reduced form model where financial poli-
cies are not explicitly modeled. Two properties of this model make the proof
work. (i) as a consumer and as a producer the agent has access to the same
market subspace 〈Π〉, and (ii) a no-arbitrage condition βΠ = 0 holds. Hence,
financial polices do not affect the budget set of the consumer, nor the present
value of future streams of profits generated by the producer. As a consumer, the
single agent can always undo the financial activities taken as a producer. The
value of the firm depends only on the production plan chosen by the producer,
and not on its financial policy.
Proposition 4.9 If (p¯, q¯) is an extensive form equilibrium with associated equilibrium
allocations (x¯, z¯), (y¯, b¯), then (p¯, q¯) is a reduced form equilibrium with associated equi-
librium allocations (x¯, ξ¯, y¯) for generic initial resources ω ∈ Ω where
ξ¯ = z¯ − b¯ (4.21)
If (p¯, q¯) is a reduced form equilibrium with associated equilibrium allocations (x¯, ξ¯, y¯),
then (p¯, q¯) is an extensive form equilibrium with associated equilibrium allocations
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(x¯, z¯), (y¯, b¯) for generic initial resources ω ∈ Ω and for all (z¯, b¯) satisfying
z − b¯ = ξ¯. (4.22)
Remark 2 Recall that in this model production sets are exogenously given. This seems
a strong assumption when considering the role of financial assets. Here, it is implicitly
assumed that the firm’s financial activity finances, given a fixed technology, the inputs
of production. Next section elaborates on this restrictive assumption.
4.3 Examples: Part II
4.3.1 Introduction part II
This set of examples considers variations of a simple single agent model with
the main feature that the one period endogenized production set available to
the firm in period two is not independent of its financial activities in period one.
This model is a special case of the model introduced in chapter 3. In short, we
consider variations of a special case of the endogenous asset formation model
introduced in chapter 3 in its reduced form. The goal of this set of examples is to
introduce an endogenous asset structure into the GEI model, and to show some
properties of productive organization, and to contrast them with the results de-
rived in Part I for a variation of the classical GEI model of production.
The financing of production in this model is at variance with the classical
GEI model, where firms issue stocks to finance production inputs in period one.
Here, we consider short and long run financing. In the long run, firms build
up production capacity by issuing stocks in period one. This determines the
production set available to the firm in period two. In the short run in period two,
the firm finances production with the revenue generated by selling its output.
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This is similar to the Arrow-Debreu model, once the production set is installed.
4.3.2 The endogenized production set single agent reduced form
model: Example (5)
Consider the budget constraints of the agent as a consumer
p(0)x(0) = p(0)ω(0)− qz
p(s)x(s) = p(s)ω(1) +R(y¯, s)z.
In a one agent model the agent also performs the role of the producer, and
therefore, adds following variables to his constraints
p(0)x(0) = p(0)ω(0)− qz + qb− p(0)k¯(0)
p(s)x(s) = p(s)ω(1) +R(y¯, s)z + p(s)y(0)
,
where k¯(0) denotes the capital purchased. Let aside the modeling of financing
production for a while, therefore, let ξ = z − bˆ, where bˆ deotes a fixed level of
capital at a feasible financial policy of the firm such that bˆ ⇒ Y |bˆ . Here, take
production set Y |bˆ as given. Then have following budget set
Bξ =
(x; y) ∈ Rl(S+1)++ × RlS : p(0)x(0) = p(0)ω(0)− qξ − p(0)k¯(0)p(s)x(s) = p(s)ω(1) +R(y¯, s)ξ + p(s)y(0)
 .
(4.23)
The agent ’s control problem is then to choose (x; ξ, y) such that utility of
consumption of goods is maximized. By reduced form, we mean a model where
financial policies are not explicitly modeled and decisions of the agents not fully
separated. We formally introduce this model via definition (4.4) below.
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Definition 4.4 A reduced form equilibrium (p¯, q¯) with associated equilibrium alloca-
tions
(
x¯; ξ¯, y¯
)
for generic initial resources ω ∈ Ω satisfies:
(i)
(
x¯; ξ¯, y¯
) ∈ arg max {u(x) : x ∈ Bξ}
(ii) ξ¯ = 0
x¯(0) = ω(0) + k¯(0)
x¯(s) = ω(1) + y¯(s) for all s ∈ {1, ..., S}.
(4.24)
Proposition (4.10) is an interesting result. At first sight it seems to reproduce
the result of propositions (4.4), and (4.8). This is commented on in remarks (3),
and (4) below. However, remark (5) enables to interpret this result as not only
separating the activities of the agent, but also separating the objective function
of the firm from the utility of the owner of the firm. The result suggests that the
classical GEI model of previous section is a special case of the model initially
introduced in chapter 3.
Proposition 4.10 (p¯, q¯) is a reduced form equilibrium with associated equilibrium al-
locations
(
x¯; ξ¯, y¯
)
for generic initial resources ω ∈ Ω separating activities of the agent
as a consumer and as a producer if assign the gradient vector β¯ to the firm and following
conditions are satisfied:
(i)
(
x¯; ξ¯
) ∈ arg max {u(x) : x ∈ Bξ}
(ii) (y¯) ∈ arg max{β¯p¯(s)y(s) : y ∈ Bξ}
(iii) ξ¯ = 0
x¯(0) = ω(0) + k¯(0)
x¯(s) = ω(1) + y¯(s) for all s ∈ {1, ..., S}.
(4.25)
Remark 3 Note that this separatation result is still dependent on the present value vec-
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tor of the consumer. Consequently, the objective function of the firm is not decentralized
yet. Condition (iii) can be simplified if think of this model as a one good model.
Remark 4 If one is willing to accept that the consumer assigns his own present value
vector to the firm to evaluate future income streams, then this model reproduces the
result from the literature (One can think of this model as an entrepreneurship model).
Remark 5 However, if one is willing to think that the single agent is perfectly able to
separate his activity as a consumer and as a producer, then this model allows him as a
producer not to attach the present value of the consumer to the objective function of the
firm, since as a producer, he is not exposed to the no-arbitrage condition. This follows
from the different role financial assets play. This gives following extension of the reduced
form model introduced in chapter 3 presented in the next subsection.
4.3.3 Decentralizing the objective function (by assumption of
long run profit maximization): Example (6)
Consider the reduced form model introduced in part II. Assume that the pro-
ducer maximizes long run profits. This means that at t = 0, ξ implicitly finances
the production set available to a firm in t = 1. Denote the production set avail-
able to the firm Y |bˆ and assume that it exists. Long run profit maximization
then implies that the producer chooses inputs of production, given production
capacity, such that production of outputs maximizes his profits. The financing
of production inputs in t = 1 is defined by the sell of production outputs. At
t = 1 no other source of financing production is needed. The reduced form
objective of long run maximization of profits is then to
(y¯) ∈ arg max {p¯2y : y(s) ∈ Y |bˆ (s), ∀s ∈ S} . (4.26)
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Proposition 4.11 (p¯, q¯) is a reduced form long run profit maximizing equilibrium with
decentralized objective function of the firm and with associated equilibrium allocations(
x¯, ξ¯
)
, (y¯) for generic initial resources ω ∈ Ω, if following conditions are satisfied:
(i)
(
x¯; ξ¯
) ∈ arg max {u(x) : x ∈ Bξ}
(ii) (y¯) ∈ arg max {p¯2y : y(s) ∈ Y |bˆ (s),∀s ∈ S}
(iii) ξ¯ = 0
x¯(0) = ω(0) + k¯(0)
x¯(s) = ω(1) + y¯(s) for all s ∈ {1, ..., S}.
This result follows from remark (5). It shows the independence of the ob-
jective function from the present value vector of the agent as a consumer. The
result is a consequence of the endogenous asset structure of the model, where
the firm builds up production capacity by issuing stocks. This is in its simplest
form one of the main results of this chapter. It generalizes, by means of a simple
example, the decentralization property of the Arrow-Debreu model to the case
where time and uncertainty explicitly enters the model in an essential way, and
incomplete markets a consequence of idiosyncratic risk2.
4.3.4 Productive efficiency of the reduced form model with de-
centralized objective function: Example (7)
Proposition 4.12 (p¯, q¯) is a reduced form equilibrium with efficient organization of
production and decentralized objective function of the firm (long run profit maximiza-
tion) with associated equilibrium allocations (x¯, ξ¯), (y¯) for generic initial resources ω ∈
Ω.
2The later remark will be introduced in form of a result in the next chapter.
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The proof of proposition (4.12) makes use of the fact that the objective func-
tion of the firm is independent of any assigned present value vectors of the
consumer to it. In order to introduce productive inefficiency into the model
it suffices, for example, to consider two consumers and a single firm. Then for
any two different average gradient vectors assigned to the firm, profits change
accordingly. The independence of the objective function from the utility of the
consumer follows from the role financial assets play in this model. The problem
of the firm in the reduced form model is essentially equivalent to the problem
of the firm in the Arrow Debreu model, where one period production sets are
taken as given. This is also the case there. This result implicitly states that any
utility maximizing model of the firm in GEI introduces a further source of inef-
ficiency due to the inefficient organization of production.
Remark 6 This model has similar (in)efficiency properties of equilibrium as the clas-
sical GEI exchange model. The point here is that at variance with the classical GEI
model of production the organization of production does not introduce a further source
of inefficiency by attaching some β to the firm.
Proposition 4.13 (p¯, q¯) is a reduced form centralized financial markets equilibrium
with equilibrium allocations (x¯, ξ¯), (y¯) with inefficient organization of production of the
firm for generic initial resources ω ∈ Ω, if and only if
β¯(s) 6= −→e for every s ∈ {1, ..., S} (4.27)
is satisfied.
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The condition β¯(s) 6= −→e for every s ∈ {1, ..., S} is generally satisfied for
centralized general equilibrium models with incomplete markets. This follows
from the no-arbitrage condition. −→e is a unit vector of appropriate dimension.
4.3.5 The extensive form model: Example (8)
We now introduce the extensive form model, where decisions are fully decen-
tralized and financial policies explicitly modeled. Consider the consumer’s con-
straints
p(0)x(0) = p(0)ω(0)− qz
p(s)x(s) = p(s)ω(1) + θ(z¯)R(y¯, s),
where qz is the value the consumer is willing to invest into the firm at ex-
pected return R. As a producer, the manager’s job is to find b such that qb = qz.
He then buys capital k(0) such that income from selling stocks is equal to his
expenditure on capital consumption, therefore, qb = p(0)k(0). At t = 0, the
producer’s problem is to
(
k¯(0); b¯)
) ∈ arg max {q¯b : q¯z¯ ≥ q¯b = p¯(0)k(0)} , (4.28)
where the level of capital, k(0), implies total production capacity available to the
firm, a correspondence Φ|bˆ . This correspondence in turn determines the produc-
tion set available to the firm, denoted Y |bˆ .Given this production set, and the set
of states of nature, the producer’s t = 1 problem is to
(y¯(s)) ∈ arg max {p¯(s)y(s) : y(s) ∈ Y |bˆ (s),∀s ∈ S} . (4.29)
Inputs of production are financed with sells from outputs. The level of rev-
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enue a firm can generate in each state s ∈ {1, ..., S} depends on the available
production set determined in the certain state of the world. The next result es-
tablishes the full version of the endogenous asset formation model of this thesis
for the special case of a single agent model. It shows the independence of the
objective function from any present value vector derived from the owners of
the firm. It also establishes, through the objective function of the firm, the link
between the real and financial sector. The generalization of this result is stated
in chapter 5.
Proposition 4.14 (p¯, q¯) is a decentralized objective function extensive form equilib-
rium with associated equilibrium allocations ((x¯, z¯) ,
(
y¯, b¯
)
) for generic initial resources
ω ∈ Ω, if for any feasible bˆ 6 z¯ following conditions are satisfied:
(i) (x¯; z¯) ∈ arg max {u(x) : x ∈ Bz}
(ii) arg max
(y¯,bˆ;(k¯(0)))
q¯b+ p¯2y : q¯z¯ ≥ q¯b = p¯(0)k(0)y(s) ∈ Y |bˆ (s) s ∈ S

(iii) z¯ − bˆ = 0 θ(z¯) = 1
x¯(0) = ω(0) + k¯(0)
x¯(s) = ω(1) + y¯(s) for all s ∈ {1, .., S}.
(4.30)
Next result is a first step towards a study of the Modigliani and Miller theo-
rem in the endogenous asset formation model introduced in this thesis. It shows
that the real and financial sectors are not independent of each other, and that
consequently financial policies have real effects. This result follows from the
way financial assets enter the model. In particular, the objective function of the
firm links the real with the financial sphere. In the classical GEI model, firms is-
sue stocks in order to finance production inputs in period one, here, firms issue
stocks in order to buy capital and to build up their production set. Hence, real
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effects. Note that this result is established without considering other financial
assets. The idea of the proof is to criticize the implicit assumption that financial
policy is independent of the production set at first instance. More work needs to
be done in order to proof the full version of the Modigliani and Miller theorem.
This is work in progress.
Proposition 4.15 (i) If ((p¯, q¯), (x¯, z¯), (y¯, bˆ)) is an extensive form equilibrium (EFE)
with decentralized objective function for generic initial resources ω ∈ Ω then ((p¯, q¯),
(x¯, ξ¯), (y¯)) is a reduced form equilibrium (RFE) with decentralized objective function
for generic initial resources ω ∈ Ω where
ξ¯ = z¯ − bˆ (4.31)
(ii) If ((p¯, q¯), (x¯, ξ¯), (y¯)) is a (RFE) with decentralized objective function for generic
initial resources ω then ((p¯, q¯), (x¯, z¯), (y¯, bˆ)) is a (RFE) with decentralized objective
function for generic initial resources ω ∈ Ω for any bˆ ≤ z¯ satisfying
z¯ − bˆ = ξ¯. (4.32)
4.4 Geometric decentralization of activities and ob-
jective of the firm
This section considers a geometric approach to the study of the endogenous as-
set formation model. The result below separates the activities of the agent as a
consumer and as a producer. Moreover, it separates the objective function of the
firm from the present value vector derived from utility maximization.
Proposition 4.16 (p¯, q¯) is a geometrically reinterpreted extensive form equilibrium
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with associated equilibrium allocations ((x¯, z¯) ,
(
y¯, b¯
)
) for generic initial resources ω ∈
Ω with decentralized objective function of the firm if for any feasible bˆ 6 z¯ following
conditions are satisfied:
(i) (x¯; z¯) ∈ arg max {u(x) : x ∈ Bz}
(ii) arg max
(y¯,bˆ;(k¯(0)))
q¯b+ p¯2y : q¯z¯ ≥ q¯b = p¯(0)k(0)y(s) ∈ Y |bˆ (s) s ∈ S

(iii) z¯ − bˆ = 0 θ(z¯) = 1
x¯(0) = ω(0) + k¯(0)
x¯(s) = ω(1) + y¯(s) for all s ∈ {1, .., S}.
(4.33)
Lemma 4.1 x¯|z¯ is a solution of
max {u(x; z) : x ∈ B} (4.34)
if and only if, x¯|z¯ ∈ B, and
∂u( x¯|z¯) ∩NB( x¯|z¯) 6= {0} (4.35)
is satisfied.
Lemma 4.2 y¯|z¯ is a solution of
max {Π(p; z) : y ∈ Y |z¯} (4.36)
if and only if, y¯|z¯ ∈ Y, and
∂u(y¯) ∩NY (y¯) 6= {0} (4.37)
is satisfied.
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Lemma 4.3 Let Y |ξ¯ and Ξ be two nonempty convex sets. Then (y¯, ξ¯) is a geometric
solution of the reduced form problem (4.4)
(
x¯; y¯, ξ¯
) ∈ argmax{u(y + ξ) : y ∈ Y |ξ¯ , ξ ∈ Ξ} (4.38)
if and only if
∇u(y¯ + ξ¯) ∈ NY |ξ¯(y¯) ∩NΞ(ξ¯). (4.39)
Proof 4.1 (Proposition 4.16) By lemma (4.3) ((p¯, q¯), (x¯, ξ¯))) is a reduced form equi-
librium satisfying (i) of the extensive form model with decentralized activities if and
only if the geometric first order conditions of lemma (4.1) hold. The profit maximization
problem (ii) of the extensive form model with decentralized activities (y¯, bˆ) is satisfied if
and only if the geometric first order condition of lemma (4.2) holds. Since using lemma
(4.3) (x¯, z¯), (y¯, bˆ) satisfies (i) of the (centralized) reduced form model if and only if both
geometric first order conditions hold lemma (4.1), lemma (4.2), ((p¯, q¯), ((x¯, z¯), (y¯, b)))
is a geometric extensive form with decentralized activities equilibrium.
4.5 Conclusion
This chapter first shows by means of simple examples some properties of clas-
sical GEI models with production for a simple model with technological uncer-
tainty, and production inputs financed by the stock market. This class of models
is referred to as centralized models, since the objective function of the firm is not
independent of extra information provided by the stock holders. In particular,
the examples elaborate on the dependency of the objective function of the firm
on the utility of the (average) utility of the shareholders. This dependency is
not unproblematic as the second set of examples shows, where a special case of
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the model of chapter 3 is considered. This model has enough structure to im-
prove on economically interesting properties of the classical GEI model. For this
model with endogenized production sets, we show that the objective function
of the firm is independent of the utility of the stock holders. As a consequence,
equilibrium properties change. For example: (i) we can decentralized the ob-
jective function of the firm, (ii) eliminate productive inefficiencies deriving from
the organization of production, and (iii) we establish a link between the real sec-
tor and the financial sector of the economy. This result suggests a reexamination
of the validity of the Modigliani and Miller theorem. (iv) Preliminary work on
the Modigliani and Miller theorem suggests that it does not generally hold in
the model introduced in this thesis.
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Chapter 5
Decentralization of the Objective
Function of the Firm
5.1 Introduction
This chapter formalizes some of the ideas introduced by means of simple ex-
amples in the previous chapter. The primary goal of this chapter is to elaborate
on the long run profits maximization assumption introduced in chapter 3, and
to formally introduce the objective function of the firm. For this purpose, we
relax the long run profits maximization assumption of chapter 3, and define an
extensive form equilibrium. This requires the firm to issue stocks in period one
and to purchase capital. Total capital acquired determines the firm’s production
capacity described by a production function. This function in turn, describes
the production set available to the firm in the next period in each state of the
world for a particular feasible financial policy and given a set of states of the
world. This economic intuition sketches the proof by construction of the first
result of this chapter, -a decentralization theorem. This result formally intro-
duces the objective function of the firm, and shows the independence of the
objective function of the firm from any utilities of the owners of the firm. As a
consequence of this independence of any extra information, firms do not play a
70
Nash equilibrium strategy but maximize their profits in a very traditional sense.
This result rehabilitates the objective of the firm of the classical Arrow-Debreu
model, where firms are profit maximizers.
Existence of equilibria for this model needs to be verified. For that, we
show allocational equivalence between the reduced form- and the extensive
form equilibrium. This equivalence result closes the missing gap in the exis-
tence proof of chapter 3, where existence of equilibrium was shown under the
assumption of long run profits maximization. By the allocational equivalence
result, we know that equilibria exist for the extensive form of the stock market
model introduced in this chapter.
While much of the GEI literature models incomplete markets by hypothesis,
we show that in our set up, incomplete markets is a consequence of the assump-
tion of technological uncertainty introduced. This contributes to the literature,
where predominantly the source of uncertainty considered is aggregate risk.
The proof is based on the idea of market entrance, where firms enter the market
as long they find positive long run profits opportunities. This result determines
the optimal number of endogenous assets in the economy. This improves on
GEI models with fixed number of financial assets.
The final part of this paper deals with an equivalence study between the class
of centralized GEI models of production and the model introduced in this chap-
ter. We reduce both models to exchange economies and compare equilibrium
allocations of these pseudo exchange economies. It is shown that equilibrium
allocations are generally different. This result follows from the properties of the
model of the firm introduced, where the objective function of the firm is inde-
pendent of any utility assigned to it. This result suggest that the way production
is organized is non-trivial. Utility maximizing firms introduce a further source
of inefficiency due to inefficient organization of production.
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5.2 The objective function of the firm
The early research on the objective function of the firm in general equilibrium
with incomplete markets is concentrated around following question: Do spot
and equity prices provide firms with enough information to deduce what the
appropriate objective function of the firm should be? The classical GEI with
production literature replies no to this question. It then adds the suffix, not
without further extra information ([39],[20],[26], and others). This additional
information comes from the group of owners of the firm. We label the objec-
tive functions related to this research line, PO, and the corresponding economic
model EPO1. This model of the firm is introduced in subsection (5.2.1)
We then ask a different question about what the objective function of the
firm should be? What role do financial assets play in determining the produc-
tion set of the firms, and what is the precise nature of the objective function
in determining these sets? The objective function associated with this research
line is labeled CO, and the corresponding model ECO. The introduction of this
nomenclature allows us to use acronyms once we compare the models, and to
economize on plain text. The model of the CO objective function firm is intro-
duced in subsection (5.2.2).
5.2.1 Firms with (PO) objective functions
Let a firm in the standard GEI model maximize its present value of future in-
come streams
βjDj =
∑S
s=0
βj(s)Dj(s), for all j ∈ {1, ..., n} (5.1)
1The labeling is arbitrary
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satisfying the equation
βjDj = βj · (pyj) , for all j ∈ {1, ..., n} (5.2)
for βj = (1, βj(1), ..., βj(S)) ∈ RS+1++ , for all j ∈ {1, ..., n} . Let a firm’s maxi-
mization problem be to
(y¯j) ∈
yj∈Yj
arg max
{
β¯j · (p¯y)
}
, for all j ∈ {1, ..., n} , (5.3)
where a net activity vector yj = (yj(0), ..., yj(S)) is an element of the two pe-
riod production set, Yj = Rl(S+1). Let Π =
 p(0) · yj(0)− qj ... p(0) · yn(0)− qn
p(1)yj(1) ... p(1)yn(1)

denote the full payoff matrix of order ((S + 1)× n). For βj satisfying βjΠ = 0⇔
βj ∈ 〈Π〉⊥ ∩ RS+1++ , for all j ∈ {1, ..., n} , the study of the theory of the firm in
incomplete markets reduces to the examination of how to determine βj, the ad-
ditional market information the firm needs to guarantee a well defined objective
function. Since generally βi 6= βj, where βi 6= βi′ ⇐ βiΠ = 0, and S − n > 0, for
all i ∈ {1, ...,m}, criteria for additional market information can be derived from
the Hicks Kaldor sum. Let
β¯j =
m∑
i=1
θ¯ijβ¯i, for all j ∈ {1, ..., n} (5.4)
where θij is the proportion of ownership of firm j ∈ {1, ..., n} hold by indi-
vidual i ∈ {1, ...,m} after trade at the stock market occurred (Dre`ze criterion).
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The other criterion
β¯j =
m∑
i=1
ξ¯ijβ¯i, for all j ∈ {1, ..., n} (5.5)
represents a present value vector for firm j ∈ {1, ..., n}, where ξij is the pro-
portion of ownership of firm j ∈ {1, ..., n} hold by individual i ∈ {1, ...,m} be-
fore trade at the stock market takes place (Grossman and Hart criterion). Both
criteria imply some notion of firms acting in the interest of shareholders (Own-
ership implies control). The additional information needed by firms, β¯j, is there-
fore, provided by the owners of the firm. The consequence of this derivation of
the objective function of the firm is that, it comes at cost of centralizing decisions,
and firms maximizing average utilities depending on the criterion utilized. The
notion that ownership implies control is not independent of the choice of the
criterion applied. In addition, it implies that share holders directly intervene
into operational activities of the enterprise by directly controlling the net activ-
ity vector of the firm.
5.2.2 Firms with (CO) objective functions
We state a different research question about what the objective function of the
firm should be, and ask: ”What role do financial assets play (here stocks only)
in determining the production set of the firm”? How is the production set of the
firm determined, and what structure does the optimization problem of the firm
have in order to determined this set? These questions are all related to the the
problem of endogenizing asset structures, and the role of the objective function
of the firm in this process.
Some of the examples presented in chapter 4 illustrate problems associated
with the utility maximization approach introduced in the early 80’s by Dre`ze
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[21], Grossman Hart [28]. They suggest that the strategic game nature of the
problem of the firm could be resolved by assigning utilities to firms. In order to
derive a closed from solution of the model they assigned some average utility
to the firms. The question of what utility to assign to the firm is to some extend
still an open question. Many suggestions have been proposed. Beyond those
of the early contributors are, the utility of the manager, the utility of the board
of directors for example or the average utility of any other influential groups.
What all these models have in common is that they assign a present value vector
βj , determined by those who control the firm, to the firm. One approach in
resolving the problem of the firm is to define an objective function which is
independent of this βj . This is subject of this section of the thesis.
We therefore, construct an alternative theory of the firm, where each firm
maximizes its long run profits by taking financial and real decisions sequen-
tially, and independently of any utility assigned to it. The reduced form objec-
tive function is formally introduced in equ. (3.1) in chapter 3. In that model,
the period two production set available to the firm in each state of nature is
taken as given. Given that set, each firm chooses net activities maximizing long
run profits. The assumption of long run profits maximization implicitly implies
some short- and long run activity of the firm. The long run activity of the firm is
to build up the production set available to it in period two. For that, each firm
issues stocks in period one, buys capital, and builds up production capacity.
The firms’s short run activity in period two is then to chose inputs of produc-
tion, given the production set available to it, such that profits are maximized.
This suggests a sequential optimization structure of the firm where the efficient
boundary of the real asset structure is not independent of of the choice of finan-
cial quantities chosen by the firm. Operational activities and decisions are left
to the management of the firm.
The first result of this section formalizes this idea. It shows that the net activ-
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ity of the firm in period two is independent of any extra information provided
by the utility of shareholders, but not independent of the firm’s level of cap-
ital acquired in period one. The independence of any utility assigned to the
firm implies the decentralization property of the objective function. This re-
sult improves on Dre`ze [21]. Another economic implication of this result is that
it allows a new interpretation of ownership and control. In the classical GEI
model, ownership implies control over the net activity of a firm. This concept
has various drawbacks. For example, stock holders would have to decide at
the shareholders meeting on the future net activity of the firm. This is costly,
requires managerial understanding and operational participation of the share
holders, and perhaps requires some kind of voting process as decision mecha-
nism. In the ECO model, stockholders do not control the net activity of the firm,
but control the total level of production capacity available to a profit maximizing
firm.
Theorem 5.1 For every producer j ∈ {1, ..., n}, the period two net activity vector
yj(s) in available production set Yj|Z(s) is independent of any present value vector βi
for all i ∈ {1, ...,m}, and s ∈ {1, ..., S}.
Proof 5.1 Using assumptions (3.1(F )) and (??(T )), let qj(i) =
∑S
s=1 βi(s) [p(s) · yj(s)],
where βi denotes i’s marginal evaluation of one additional unit of future income for
βi(s) 6= βi′(s)⇐ βiΠˆ = 0 at S > n, for all i ∈ {1, ...,m} , where
Πˆ(p1, q, y) =

−q1 · · · −qn
p(1) · y1(1) · · · p(1) · yn(1)
...
...
p(S) · y1(S) · · · p1(S) · yn(S)

represents the full payoff matrix of
order ((S + 1)× n) .
Denote zi(j) the consumer’s i ∈ {1, ...,m} demand of quantity of stocks j ∈ {1, ..., n}
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evaluated at qj(i) and βi.
Now, let
∑m
i=1
z¯i(j) = z¯j for all j ∈ {1, ..., n} ⇒ q¯∑m
i=1
(x¯i(0)− ω˜i(0)) = 0⇒ p¯(0)∑m
i=1
(x¯i(s)− ωi(s)) =
∑n
j=1
y¯j(s), ∀s ∈ S ⇒ p¯(s)
Consider t = 0 optimization problem for i ∈ {1, ...,m} and j ∈ {1, ..., n} . For given
equity prices system q¯ and spot prices system p¯(0), let each consumer i ∈ {1, ...,m}
max
x(0)∈Bzi ,zi
ui(xi; zi)⇒ x¯i(0), z¯i
and each producer j ∈ {1, ..., n}
max
z(j)
q¯z(j) : q¯z(j) = q¯
∑m
i=1
z¯i(j)⇒ z¯(j).
Given maximum quantity of stocks producer j ∈ {1, ..., n} can sell on the stockmarket,
z¯(j), the problem of the producer j ∈ {1, ..., n} is then to purchase capital y(0). The
problem of produce j ∈ {1, ..., n} is then to maximize the level of capitalat at given spot
price system p¯(0), and given cash acquired by issuing stocks, q¯z¯(j) = M¯j . Let
max
y(0)j
p¯(0)yj(0) : M¯j = p¯(0)yj(0)⇒ y¯j(0).
Let the level of capital y¯j(0), at financial policy z¯(j) determines a correspondence Φ|z .
This correspondence maps Rm− into Rn+ for every state of nature s ∈ {1, ..., S} . This
correspondence describes the production set available to the firm in period two, denoted
Yj |z¯( s) for all s ∈ {1, ..., S}. Consider t = 1 optimization problem for i ∈ {1, ...,m}
and j ∈ {1, ..., n} . For given p¯(s), each consumer i ∈ {1, ...,m}
max
x(s)∈Bzi
ui(xi; z¯i)⇒ x¯i(s),
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and each producer j ∈ {1, ..., n}, given his endogenized production set Yj |z¯(s) for all
s ∈ {1, ..., S}
max
yj(s)
{p¯(s) · yj(s) : yj(s) ∈ Yj |z¯ (s)} ⇒ y¯j(s).
We have constructed a sequential two argument linear objective function with endoge-
nous asset structure
arg max
(z¯,y¯(s),y¯(0))j
q¯zj + p¯yj
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
yj(s) ∈ Yj|z (s)
q¯
∑m
i=1 z¯i(j) ≥ q¯zj = p¯(0)yj(0) ∀s ∈ S
 , (5.6)
which is independent of β¯j , and consequently the choice of yj is independent of all i ∈
{1, ...,m} .
The result shows, by construction, that the objective function of profit maxi-
mization is well defined, and independent of any assigned present value vector
of a group of owners of the firm to it. This decentralizes the objective function.
The result follows from the way financial assets are introduce into the model.
5.2.3 Extensive form equilibrium definition
We now relax the assumption of long run profit maximization in the equilib-
rium definition of chapter 3 and formally introduce the sequential model of the
firm. Here, the firm’s problem is to acquire capital via stock market in period
one, and then, given production capacity and a set of states of nature, each firm
faces a well defined profit maximization problem in the second period, similar
to the Arrow-Debreu model. The main difference to the private ownership firm
introduced by Debreu [12] is that in the (EFE) model, each firm takes financial
and real quantity decisions sequentially, and production sets are endogenously
determined by level of capital a firm can buy by issuing stocks.
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Definition 5.1 (EFE) An extensive form stock market equilibrium (p¯, q¯) with associ-
ated equilibrium allocations ((x¯, z¯), (y¯, zˆ)) for generic initial resources ω ∈ Ω, and each
producer j ∈ {1, ..., n} maximizing long run profits satisfies:
(i) (x¯i, z¯i) arg max
{
ui(xi; zi) : xi ∈ Bzi , zi ∈ Rn+
}
,∀i ∈ {1, ...,m}
(ii) arg max
(y¯(s),z¯,y¯(0))j
q¯zj + p2yj : q¯
∑m
i=1 z¯i(j) ≥ q¯zj = p¯(0)yj(0)
yj(s) ∈ Yj|zˆ (s) ∀s ∈ {1, ..., S}
∀j
(iii)
∑n
j=1
∑m
i=1 z¯i(j) = 0,
∑m
i=1 θj(z¯i) = 1,∀j ∈ {1, ..., n}
x¯(0) = ω(0) +
∑n
j=1 y¯j(0)
x¯(s) = ω(1) +
∑n
j=1 y¯j(s) ∀ s ∈ {1, .., S}.
Chapter 3 showed that equilibrium exists generically for this economic model
under the assumption of long run profits maximization and reduced form model
of the firm. It therefore, remains to be shown the equivalence between the re-
duced form equilibrium model of chapter 3 and the extensive form equilibrium
model of the firm introduced in this chapter. This result is presented after we
show that incomplete markets is a consequence of the assumption of techno-
logical uncertainty. The result (5.2) has an alternative interpretation. It is some
preliminary version of the Modigliani and Miller theorem suggesting the poten-
tial irrelevance of the financial policies theorem [43], [14], [52], and others.
Proposition 5.1 n < S ⇐= ∑j Yj |z¯
Proof 5.2 (Proposition 5.1) Let Sj = 1 for every j ∈ {1, ..., n} , and
∑
j Sj = S.
Then long run profit prospects pi(p) > 0 imply long run capacity adjustment and market
entrance until n = S. Similar for negative long run prospects, the number of firms
decreases until n = S, and pi(p) = 0 satisfied. This violates assumption (T ). Let S > 1
for every j ∈ {1, ..., n}, and ∑j Sj = S. Then pi(p) > 0 implies market entrance
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and the issue of new securities such that in the limit as pi(p) → 0 the number of firms
increases until j → n < S by assumption (T ). Similar for pi(p) < 0, firms exit the
market and as pi(p)→ 0 the number of firms decreases until j → n < S by assumption
(T ), and pi(p) = 0 satisfied.
Theorem (5.2) establishes the missing gap in the existence proof in chapter 3,
where existence of equilibrium was shown under assumption 3.3(P) of long run
profits maximization for the reduced form model of the firm. Here, we show
that every reduced form equilibrium is an extensive form equilibrium and vice
versa. Hence, by the existence theorem of chapter 3, equilibria exist. The other
interpretation of this result is that it suggests real allocational effects for differ-
ent feasible financial policies of the firm, z(j). Consequently, financial policies
are non-neutral. This is the simplest version of the Modigliani and Miller theo-
rem of irrelevance of financial policies. This result, however, is not complete at
this stage, and a full version of the Modigliani and Miller theorem needs to be
studied. This involves expanding the model of the firm to a more general en-
dogenous asset structure formation model, including bonds, options,and other
financial assets.
Theorem 5.2 (i) If (p¯, q¯) is an extensive form equilibrium with associated equilibrium
allocations (( x¯|zˆ , z¯), ( y¯|zˆ , zˆ)) (DEFE) for generic initial resources ω ∈ Ω, then (p¯, q¯),
is a reduced form equilibrium with associated equilibrium allocations (( x¯|ξ¯ , ξ¯), ( y¯|ξ¯))
(DRFE) for generic initial resources ω ∈ Ω where
∑m
i=1
ξ¯ij =
∑m
i=1
z¯i(j)− zˆj for j = 1, ..., n (5.7)
(ii) If (p¯, q¯) is a reduced form equilibrium with associated equilibrium allocations (( x¯|ξ¯ , ξ¯),
( y¯|ξ¯)) (DRFE) for generic initial resources ω ∈ Ω, then (p¯, q¯), is an extensive form equi-
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librium with associated equilibrium allocations (( x¯|zˆ , z¯), ( y¯|zˆ , zˆ)) (DEFE) for generic
initial resources ω ∈ Ω, for any zˆj ≤
∑m
i=1 z¯i(j) for j = 1, ..., n satisfying
∑m
i=1
z¯i(j)− zˆj =
∑m
i=1
ξ¯ij for j = 1, ..., n. (5.8)
Lemma 5.1 x¯i|ξ¯ is a solution of the reduced form problem
max
{
u(x; ξ)i : xi|ξ¯ ∈ Bξi
}
(5.9)
if and only if, x¯i|ξ¯ ∈ Bξi , and
∂u( x¯i|ξ¯)i ∩NBξi ( x¯i|ξ¯) 6= {0} (5.10)
is satisfied.
Proof 5.3 (Lemma 5.1) (i) x¯i|ξ¯ is a solution of utility max (RFE) if and only if x¯i|ξ¯ ∈
Bξi and
intUi, x¯i|ξ¯ ∩Bξi = ∅.
By the separation theorem for convex sets (appendix), there exists P = βip ∈ Rl(S+1)++ , P 6=
0 such that
H−P =
{
xi|ξ¯ ∈ Rl(S+1)++ : P xi|ξ¯ ≤ P xi|′ξ¯ ,∀ xi|ξ¯ ∈ Bξi ,∀ xi|′ξ¯ ∈ intUi, x¯i|ξ¯
}
since x¯i|ξ¯ ∈ Bξi ,
H−P =
{
xi|ξ¯ ∈ Rl(S+1)++ : P x¯i|ξ¯ ≤ P xi|′ξ¯ ,∀ xi|′ξ¯ ∈ intUi, x¯i|ξ¯
}
.
By continuity of utility, intUi, x¯i|ξ¯ = Ui, x¯i|ξ¯ , and by continuity of the scalar product,
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H+P =
{
∀ xi|′ξ¯ ∈ Ui, x¯|ξ¯ : P x¯i|ξ¯ ≤ P xi|′ξ¯ , ∀ xi|′ξ¯ ∈ Ui, x¯i|ξ¯
}
⇔ P ∈ ∂u( x¯i|ξ¯)i
H−P =
{
∀ xi|ξ¯ ∈ Bξi : P xi|ξ¯ ≤ P x¯i|ξ¯ ,
}
⇔ P ∈ NBξi ( x¯i|ξ¯)i
hence, there exists p such that ∂u( x¯i|ξ¯)i ∩NB( x¯|ξ¯)i 6= {0} is satisfied.
(ii) Suppose that x¯i|ξ¯ ∈ Bξi , and there exists P ∈ ∂u( x¯i|ξ¯)i ∩ NBξi ( x¯i|ξ¯)i, P 6= 0.
If x¯i|ξ¯ is not a solution of the (RFE) utility maximization problem, then there exists
x¯i|ξ¯ ′ ∈ intUi, x¯i|ξ¯ ∩Bξi . Since P ∈ ∂u( x¯i|ξ¯)i, we have
P xi|ξ¯ ′ > P x¯i|ξ¯
But since P ∈ NBξi ( x¯i|ξ¯) and x¯i|ξ¯ ′ ∈ Bξi , it follows that P x¯i|ξ¯ ′ ≤ P x¯i|ξ¯ which
contradicts that x¯i|ξ¯ ′ is preferred to x¯i|ξ¯.
Lemma 5.2 y¯j|ξ¯ is a solution of
max
{
Π(p; ξ)j : y¯j|ξ¯ ∈ Yj|ξ¯
}
(5.11)
if and only if, y¯j|ξ¯ ∈ Yj|ξ¯ , and
∂Π( y¯|ξ¯)j ∩ Yj|ξ¯ ( y¯j|ξ¯) 6= {0} (5.12)
is satisfied.
Proof 5.4 (Lemma 5.2) (i) y¯j|ξ¯ is a solution of the (RFE) profit max problem if and
only if y¯j|ξ¯ ∈ Yj|ξ¯ and
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intΠy¯j ∩ Yj|ξ¯ = ∅.
By the separation theorem for convex sets (appendix), there exists p ∈ RlS++, p 6= 0
such that
H−p =
{
yj|ξ¯ ∈ Rn : p yj|ξ¯ ≤ p yj|′ξ¯ , ∀ yj|ξ¯ ∈ Yj|ξ¯ ,∀ yj|′ξ¯ ∈ intΠj y¯|ξ¯
}
since y¯j|ξ¯ ∈ Yj|ξ¯ ,
H−p =
{
yj|ξ¯ ∈ Rn : p y¯|ξ¯ ≤ p yj|′ξ¯ ,∀ yj|′ξ¯ ∈ intΠj y¯|ξ¯
}
.
By continuity of Πj , intΠj, y¯|ξ¯ = Πj, y¯|ξ¯ , and by continuity of the scalar product,
H+p =
{
∀ yj|′ξ¯ ∈ Πj, yj |ξ¯ : p y¯j|ξ¯ ≤ p yj|
′
ξ¯ ,∀ yj|′ξ¯ ∈ Πj, y¯j |ξ¯
}
⇔ p ∈ ∂Π( y¯j|ξ¯)j
H−p =
{
∀ yj|ξ¯ ∈ Yj|ξ¯ : p yj|ξ¯ ≤ p y¯j|ξ¯ ,
}
⇔ p ∈ NYj |ξ¯( y¯j|ξ¯)j
hence, there exists p such that ∂Π( y¯j|ξ¯)j ∩Nj, Yj |ξ¯( y¯j|ξ¯)j 6= {0} is satisfied.
(ii) Suppose that y¯j|ξ¯ ∈ Yj|ξ¯ , and there exists p ∈ ∂Π( y¯j|ξ¯)j ∩NYj |ξ¯( y¯j|ξ¯)j, p 6= 0.
If y¯j|ξ¯ is not a solution of the profit maximization problem (RFE), then there exists
y¯j|ξ¯ ′ ∈ intΠj, y¯j |ξ¯ ∩ Yj|ξ¯ . Since p ∈ ∂Π( y¯j|ξ¯)j , we have
p y¯j|ξ¯ ′ > p y¯|z¯
But since p ∈ NYj |ξ¯( y¯j|ξ¯) and y¯j|ξ¯ ′ ∈ Yj|ξ¯ , it follows that p y¯j|ξ¯ ′ ≤ p y¯j|ξ¯ which
contradicts that y¯j|ξ¯ ′ is preferred to y¯j|ξ¯.
Proof 5.5 (Theorem 5.2) Part (i). Let us first show that the reduced form equilib-
rium allocations ((x¯, ξ¯), (y¯)) satisfy the first order conditions (Lemma (5.1)) ∂u( x¯i|ξ¯)i∩
NBξi ( x¯i|ξ¯) 6= {0} and x¯i|ξ¯ ∈ Bξi , and (Lemma(5.2)) ∂Π( y¯|ξ¯)j ∩ Yj|ξ¯ ( y¯j|ξ¯) 6= {0} and
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y¯j|ξ¯ ∈ Yj|ξ¯ , so that the conditions (i) and (ii) in the (RFE) are satisfied. The first order
conditions for the consumer’s problem in the (EFE) are
p · xi|zˆj = p · ωi + Π(y¯, p¯)
 z¯i
θj (z¯i)
 , and βiΠ(y¯, p¯) = 0
and can be rewritten as
p · x¯i|ξ¯ = p · ωi + Π(y¯, p¯)
∑n
j=1
ξij, and βiΠ(y¯, p¯) = 0
since ξ¯i
∣∣
zˆ
=
∑m
i=1 z¯i(j) + zˆj, for all j = 1, ..., n, so that (lemma (5.1)) above holds for
any feasible zˆj 6
∑m
i=1 z¯i(j) for all j = 1, ..., n. The firm’s problem in (EFE) is to
arg max
( y¯|zˆ(s),(zˆ;y¯(0)))j
q¯zj +
∑S
s=1
p¯(s) yj|zˆ (s) :
q¯
m∑
i=1
z¯i(j) ≥ q¯zj = p¯(0)yj(0)
yj|zˆ (s) ∈ Yj|zˆ (s)
s ∈ S
 .
For any feasible zˆj 6
∑m
i=1 z¯i(j) the problem of the producer reduces to
arg max
( y¯|ξ¯(s))j
{∑S
s=1
p¯(s) yj|ξ¯ (s) : yj|ξ¯ (s) ∈ Yj|ξ¯ (s), s ∈ S
}
since feasible zˆj ⇒ Φj|zˆ (s) =⇒ Yj|zˆ (s) for all s ∈ S, for which the first order con-
ditions (lemma (5.2)) hold. The result follows ,since market clearing condition ξ¯i
∣∣
zˆj
=∑m
i=1 z¯i(j)−zˆj = 0, for all j = 1, ..., n, and
∑m
i=1 x¯i|zˆj (0) =
∑m
i=1 ωi(0)+
∑n
j=1 y¯j(0),∑m
i=1 x¯i|zˆj (s) =
∑m
i=1 ωi(1) +
∑n
j=1 y¯j|zˆ (s) for all s ∈ S hold.
Part (ii). If ((x¯, ξ¯), (y¯)) is a (RFE) for implicit zˆj, for j = 1, ..., n, then the first
order conditions are satisfied. This implies that for any feasible zˆj 6
∑m
i=1 z¯i(j)
arg max
( y¯|ξ¯(s))j
{∑S
s=1
p¯(s) yj|ξ¯ (s) : yj|ξ¯ (s) ∈ Yj|ξ¯ (s), s ∈ S
}
(5.13)
expands to
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arg max
( y¯|zˆ(s),(zˆ;y¯(0)))j
q¯zj +
∑S
s=1
p¯(s) yj|zˆ (s) :
q¯
m∑
i=1
z¯i(j) ≥ q¯zˆj = p¯(0)yj(0)
yj|zˆ (s) ∈ Yj|zˆ (s)
s ∈ S
 ,
(5.14)
for which the first order conditions are satisfied (Lemma (5.2)), hence y¯j|zˆ is a solution
of (ii) in (EFE) for feasible zˆj . Pick any feasible zˆj and define
∑m
i=1
zi(j)− zˆj = ξ¯i, for all j = 1, ..., n (5.15)
such that Πzi + Πzˆj = Πξ¯i becomes Π(zi − zˆj) = Πξ¯i, then the first order conditions
for the consumer of the (EFE) (Lemma (5.1)) are satisfied for ( x¯i|zˆj , zi). ( x¯i|zˆj , zi) is a
solution of (EFE) (i) and ( y¯j|zˆ , zˆj) is a solution of (EFE) (ii). The result follows from
0 =
∑m
i=1 ξi =
∑m
i=1 zi +
∑n
j=1 zˆj and
∑m
i=1 x¯i|zˆj (¯0) =
∑m
i=1 ωi(0) +
∑n
j=1 y¯j(0),∑m
i=1 x¯i|zˆj (s) =
∑m
i=1 ωi(1) +
∑n
j=1 y¯j|zˆ (s) for all s ∈ S.
5.3 On the equivalence of EE, EC , and EP : The models
The second part of this chapter, sections (5.3) and (5.4), compares the model in-
troduced in definition (5.1) with the classical GEI model of production. For this
purpose, this section introduces assumptions, notation, and the asset structure
of the classical GEI exchange-, and the classical GEI production model. Again,
some nomenclature is unavoidable in order to economize on plain text when
considering variations of the basic models, and when making comparisons be-
tween them.
The main conclusion of this part of chapter 5 suggests that the way the model
of the firm is introduced into general equilibrium with incomplete markets has
non-trivial equilibrium consequences. It shows that the organization of pro-
duction in the decentralized objective function model is more efficient relative
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to any utility maximization objective function model. This result suggest the
organization of production as a potential source of inefficiency. In order to
derive this conclusion, we introduce the classical GEI exchange model, EE , as
benchmark model. The idea is to reduce both production models EP and EC to
an exchange model and to compare equilibrium allocations of these exchange
economies with the classical GEI exchange model, EE .
Section (5.3) introduces the mathematical notation, the main assumptions,
and the main properties of asset structures and budget sets of the models con-
sidered, EE, EP , EC , and variations of them. We first introduce the classical pure
exchange GEI model, denoted EE , and then the production model EP . Refer-
ences to these models can be found at [26], [40].
Section (5.4) collects the results of this part of chapter 5. The main result of
subsection (5.4.1) shows the allocational equivalence of the models, EE ⇐⇒ EC .
This result is a consequence of a series of equivalence results, where it is shown
that EE ⇐⇒ EFCE ⇐⇒ EFC ⇐⇒ EC . The economic relevance of this result fol-
lows from the equivalent welfare properties of the models. It implies the effi-
cient organization of production. Subsection (5.4.2) studies a similar comparison
between the pure exchange GEI model and the PO objective function model, EP .
The main result of this section concludes that these two models are generally not
allocational equivalent, EE < EP . This result follows by showing that following
relations hold EE < EFPE ⇐⇒ EFP ⇐⇒ EP . The economic intuition of this result
is that it suggest that the way production is organized in this model introduces a
source of inefficiency, where the inefficiency comes form the present value vec-
tor, βj , assigned to the firms. The final subsection (5.4.3) concludes that for fixed
financial policies ZP = ZC , allocational equivalence between EC and EP does not
hold, EC < EP . This result is a consequence of the main results of subsections
(5.4.1) and (5.4.2). The degree of productive inefficiency introduced in PO objec-
tive function models depends on the weights assigned to the utility maximizing
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firms.
The final result in subsection (5.4.3) states that the CO objective function
model maintains the standard efficiency properties of the pure exchange GEI
model. This result is a consequence of the expansion of the decentralization
theorem of the Arrow-Debreu model to incomplete markets introduced in the
first part of this chapter. Consequently, the organization of productive activity
of the CO objective function model does not introduce a further source of inef-
ficiency. This improves on the classical GEI model of production in which the
organization of production is generally inefficient [33].
5.3.1 The pure exchange economy, EE
The classical GEI pure exchange economy consists of an exogenous payoff struc-
ture. Denote a column vector of period two returns, measured in unit of account,
Vj = (Vj(1), ..., Vj(S))
T for all j ∈ {1, ..., n}. Vj(s) denotes the unit payoff of an
asset j ∈ {1, ..., n} in uncertain state of the world s ∈ {1, ..., S} in period two.
The set of states of nature is exhaustive and elements are mutually exclusive.
Denote the full matrix of payoffs of the pure exchange economy
ΠE(q, V ) =

−q1 ... qn
V1(s) ... Vn(s)
...
...
V1(S) ... Vn(S)

, (5.16)
where q(j) is the price of financial asset j ∈ {1, ..., n} in period one. Denote for
each individual i ∈ {1, ..., } a budget set
BE(i) =
{
xi ∈ Rl(S+1)++ , zi ∈ Rn : p (xi − ωi) = Πzi
}
, (5.17)
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where xi ∈ Rl(S+1)++ is a consumption bundle in the strictly positive orthant with
associated spot price system p ∈ Rl(S+1)++ . zi ∈ Rn denotes a vector of financial
securities in period one. Denote an initial endowments vector for consumer
i ∈ {1, ...,m}, ωi = (ωi(0), ..., ωi(S)) ∈ Ω = Rl(S+1)++ . Let ZE := zi(j) denote the
number of the units of a financial asset j ∈ {1, ..., n} an individual i ∈ {1, ...,m}
wants to trade at financial markets equilibrium in period t = 0, and let zi(j)
denote the same number of units of a particular asset in period t = 1. The se-
quential optimization problem of the consumer i ∈ {1, ...,m} is to invest into
firms in period one in order to smooth out future uncertain consumption and
to optimize consumption of goods in every (S + 1) spot market. For a given
price system p = (p(0), p(1), ..., p(S)) ∈ Rl(S+1)++ of consumption goods and price
system q ∈ Rn++ of financial assets, a consumer chooses bundles of consumption
goods and quantities of stocks (x, z)i ∈ Xi × Rn++ such that ui (xi; zi) is maxi-
mized subject to the sequence of (S + 1) constraints in Bzi . Formally
(x, z)i ∈ arg max {ui(xi) : xi ∈ BE(i), zi ∈ Rn} ∀i ∈ {1, ...,m} (5.18)
5.3.2 The economy with fixed production plans, EFC
The economy with fixed production plans is an intermediate model of produc-
tion, where problems associated with the objective function are not explicitly
considered. The relation between a net activity vector y = (y1, ..., yn) of all pro-
ducers j ∈ {1, ..., n} and financial asset price vector q = (q1, ..., qn) is obtained by
solving for an equilibrium of the exchange economy EFCE with fixed production
plans y and running through all possible plans y ∈ Πnj=1Yj = Rl(S+1)2. Introduce
virtual t = 1 endowments ω˜i = (ωi(0), ω˜i(s)) ∈ Rl(S+1)++ , defined by
2Here, Πnj=1Yj is to be understood as the Cartesian product Y1 × Y2×, ...,×Yn.
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ω˜i(s) = ωi(s) +
∑n
j=1
θj (zi) yj for all i ∈ {1, ...,m} , (5.19)
where ownership structure in t = 1, θij is a function of t = 0 portfolio trades
zi(j), defined by
θj (zi) = zi(j)/
∑m
i=1
zi(j) for all j ∈ {1, ..., n} . (5.20)
The budget set of an individual i ∈ {1, ...,m} for the exchange economy with
fixed production plans becomes
BFCE(i) =
xi ∈ Rl(S+1)++ : p(0) · (xi(0)− ωi(0) = −qzip(s)(xi(s)− ω˜i(s)) = Vj(s)zi
 , (5.21)
where total payoff matrix, Π, is defined by
ΠFCE(p1, q, V ) =

−q1 ... qn
V1(s) ... Vn(s)
...
...
V1(S) ... Vn(S)

, (5.22)
and where Vj(s)E =
p(s)·yj(s)∑m
i=1 zi(j)
= Vj(s)FCE denotes the period t = 1 payoff of asset
j ∈ {1, ..., n} in state s ∈ {1, ..., S} . The consumer’s problem is to
(x, z)i ∈ arg max {ui(xi) : xi ∈ BFCE(i), zi ∈ Rn} ∀i ∈ {1, ...,m} (5.23)
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5.3.3 The economy Ec with CO objective functions
The ECO model is introduced in chapter 3 in its full length. For each j ∈ {1, ..., n}
there exists a t = 1 column vector of returns Vj = (Vj(1), ..., Vj(S))
T , where
each payoff asset Vj(s) = p(s) · yj(s), for s ∈ {1, ..., S}, denotes the revenue
yield of an endogenized real asset yj(s) = (y1j (s), ..., ylj(s))T ∈ Rl at spot price
p(s) =
(
p1(s), ..., pl(s)
) ∈ Rl++. Denote the full matrix of payoffs
ΠC(q, p1, y) =

−q1 ... qn
p(s) · y1(s) ... p(s) · yn(s)
...
...
p(s) · y1(S) ... p(s) · yn(S)

. (5.24)
Then, for every consumer i ∈ {1, ...,m}, denote the budget set
BC(i) =
xi ∈ Rl(S+1)++ : p(0) · (xi(0)− ωi(0)) = −qzip(s)(xi(s)− ωi(s)) = V (p1, y)θ(zi)
 . (5.25)
The firm’s problem is to maximizes long run profits,
∈
(y¯)j
arg max
{
p¯(s)yj(s)
∣∣∣∣ yj ∈ Yj|z ∀s ∈ S
}
∀j ∈ {1, ..., n} . (5.26)
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Let for ZC := zi(j) in t = 0 denote the demand of individual i ∈ {1, ...,m}
of financial asset j ∈ {1, ...,m}, issued by firm j ∈ {1, ...,m}, and let t = 1
ownership be a function of t = 0 demand for asset z(j), defined by θij =
zi(j) [
∑m
i=1 zi(j)]
−1 for all j ∈ {1, ...,m} . Let ∑mi=1 zi(j) = z(j) be satisfied for
all j ∈ {1, ...,m} . The consumer’s problem is to
(x, z)i arg max
{
ui(xi) : xi ∈ BC(i), zi ∈ Rm+
}∀i ∈ {1, ...,m} . (5.27)
5.3.4 The economy EP with PO objective functions
This section introduces the classical GEI model with production. The main dif-
ference to chapter 3 is the interpretation of the long run profits assumption,
leading to a different model of the firm, with three non-trivial consequences. (1)
The objective function of the firm is indeterminate without any extra informa-
tion provided by the owners of the firm. (2) The decentralization property of the
standard Arrow-Debreu model fails to hold when markets are incomplete, and
(3) for any βj 6= βˆj assigned to the objective function of the firm the organization
of production is inefficient.
Assumption (P.2): Each firm j ∈ {1, ..., n}maximizes long run profits.
The classical interpretation of this assumption is that each firm chooses in-
puts of production in period one with associates period two outputs. This struc-
ture of the firm follows from the introduction of two period productions sets.
These sets are exogenously determined. The main drawback of this interpreta-
tion of assumption (P.2) is that present-value prices are indeterminate for S > n,
and consequently the objective of the firm indeterminate. This follows from the
no-arbitrage condition βjΠ = 0 for all j ∈ {1, ..., n}. Dre`ze [21], and Gross-
man and Hart [28] solved this problem by assigning some average utility of the
91
initial/final share holders to firms.
Assumptions (F.2): The standard assumptions on production sets introduced
by Debreu [12] apply to production sets which are prolonged over two periods.
The sequential, one argument objective function of the firm is defined by
(
yj
) ∈
yj∈Yj
arg max
{
β¯j · (p¯yj)
}
, for all j ∈ {1, ..., n} , (5.28)
This equation is derived from the more general equation, where financial
assets enter the objective function additively, and the no-arbitrage condition for
each firm implying β¯jΠ = 0 holds. Then
(
yj, zj
) ∈
yj∈Yj ,zj∈R−
arg max
{
β¯j · (p¯yj) + β¯jΠ
}
, for all j ∈ {1, ..., n} , (5.29)
where the present-value vector β¯j is derived from the utilities of the sharehold-
ers (Dre`ze, or Grossman and Hart criterion). For each j ∈ {1, ..., n} there ex-
ists a t = 0 investment value vector −qj + p(0) · yj(0), and at t = 1 a column
vector of returns Vj = (Vj(1), ..., Vj(S))
T , where each Vj(s) = p(s) · yj(s), for
s ∈ {1, ..., S}. Denote for each producer j ∈ {1, ..., n} a net activity vector
yj =
(
ymj (0)× ynj (s)
)S
s=1
in the two period production set yj ∈ Yj = Rl(S+1).
Denote the full matrix of payoffs
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ΠP (p, q, y) =

−q1 + p(0) · y1(0) ... qn + p(0) · yn(0)
p(s) · y1(s) ... p(s) · yn(s)
...
...
p(s) · y1(S) ... p(s) · yn(S)

. (5.30)
A typical budgets set for consumer i ∈ {1, ...,m} is denoted
BP (i) =
xi ∈ Rl(S+1)++ , : p(0) · (xi(0)− ωi(0)) + qξi = [−q + p(0) · yj(0)] θip(s)(xi(s)− ωi(s)) = [p(s) · yj(s)] θi
 .
(5.31)
Let forZP := zi(j) = (θij − ξij)
∑m
i=1 zi(j), denote the number of assets traded
by consumer i ∈ {1, ...,m}, where ξij = zi(j)∑m
i=1 zi(j)
denotes the initial ownership
share, and θij =
zˆi(j)∑I
i=1 zˆi(j)
the final ownership share after trade zi(j) at t = 0
took place. At t = 0, after trade on the stock market has taken place, individual
i ∈ {1, ...,m} holds a proportion θij of pyj for s ∈ {0, ..., S}. The consumer’s
problem is to choose optimal consumption and optimal ownership share θij of
pyj such that for all i ∈ {1, ...,m}
(x, θj)i ∈ arg max {ui(xi) : xi ∈ BP (i)} . (5.32)
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5.3.5 The economy EP with fixed production FP: EFP
The relation between the vector y = (y1, ..., yn) and the vector q = (q1, ..., qn)
is obtained by solving for an equilibrium of the exchange economy EFPE with
fixed production plans y and running through all possible plans y ∈ Πnj=1Yj =
Rl(S+1)n, given the PO objective function
{
β¯j · (p¯yj) : yj ∈ Yj
}
for any definition
of β¯j. Introduce virtual endowments ω˜i = (ω˜i(0), ω˜i(s))
S
s=1 , where
ω˜i(0) = ωi(0) +
∑n
j=1
θjiyj(0) for all i ∈ {1, ...,m} , (5.33)
ω˜i(s) = ωi(s) +
∑n
j=1
θjiyj(s) for all i ∈ {1, ...,m} , s ∈ {1, ..., S} , (5.34)
with net activity vectors yj|β¯j not independent of the exogenously chosen crite-
rion, β¯j . A net portfolio trades is denoted
zi(j) = (θij − ξij)
∑m
i=1
zi(j) for all j ∈ {1, ..., n} . (5.35)
The budget set of an individual i ∈ {1, ...,m} for the induced exchange econ-
omy with fixed production plans is denoted
BFPE(i) =
xi ∈ Rl(S+1)++ , : p(0) · (xi(0)− ω˜i(0)) = −qzip(s)(xi(s)− ω˜i(s)) = Vj(s)zi
 , (5.36)
where Π is defined as in the same way as in the model EP , but where Vj(s)FP =
p(s)·yj(s)∑I
i=1 zi(j)
= Vj(s)FPE denotes the payoff of asset j ∈ {1, ..., n} in state s ∈ {1, ..., S} .
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Π(p, q, y)FPE =

−q1 + p(0) · y1(0) ... qn + p(0) · yn(0)
V1(s) ... Vn(s)
...
...
V1(S) ... Vn(S)

. (5.37)
5.4 On the equivalence of the EE, EC , and EP : (In)-
efficient organization of production
This part of the chapter formally introduces the equilibrium definitions of the
two models considered and their variations, and then presents a series of equiv-
alence results. The main idea of this study is to show that both models can be
reduced to an exchange economy. The two models are allocational equivalent
if their derived exchange economies are allocational equivalent to the classical
GEI exchange model. (i) We first show that EE ⇐⇒ EC . This result is a conse-
quence of a series of equivalence results, where it is shown that EE ⇐⇒ EFCE
⇐⇒ EFC ⇐⇒ EC . (ii) We then show that, EE < EP . This result follows by
showing that following relations hold: EE < EFPE ⇐⇒ EFP ⇐⇒ EP . (iii) It is
then shown that for fixed financial policies ZP = ZC , allocational equivalence
between EC and EP does not hold, EC < EP . This result is a consequence of the
results introduced in subsections (5.4.1) and (5.4.2). It suggests that any util-
ity dependent GEI model of production is organizational inefficient relative to
the model introduced in this thesis. In other words, it implies organizational
efficiency of the CO objective function model of the firm. (iv) The final result
suggests that the EC model maintains the standard inefficiency properties of the
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pure exchange GEI model, EE .
5.4.1 On the equivalence of EE, and EC
This section of the paper introduces the formal definitions of equilibrium of the
pure exchange model and of all variations of the CO objective function model,
EC . The results of this model are presented subsequently.
Definition 5.2 A pure exchange financial markets (FM) equilibrium EE, is a pair of
prices (p, q) ∈ Rl(S+1)++ × Rn++, and associated actions (x, z) ∈ Rl(S+1)m++ × Rnm, for
generic initial resources ω ∈ Ω, such that conditions (i)-(iii) are satisfied:
(i) (x¯i, z¯i) ∈ arg max {ui(xi) : xi ∈ BE(i), zi ∈ Rn} ∀i ∈ {1, ...,m}
(ii)
∑m
i=1 (x¯i − ωi) = 0
(iii)
∑m
i=1 z¯i = 0.
(5.38)
Definition 5.3 A CO objective function financial markets (FM) equilibrium with fixed
production plans y ∈ Πnj=1Yj, EFC , is an equilibrium of the induced exchange economy
EFCE, consisting of a pair of prices (p, q) ∈ Rl(S+1)++ × Rn++ and associated equilibrium
allocations (x, z) ∈ Rl(S+1)m++ × Rn, for generic initial resources ω ∈ Ω, such that
conditions (i)-(iii) are satisfied:
(i) (x¯, z¯)i ∈ arg max {ui(xi) : xi ∈ BF (i), zi ∈ Rn} , ∀i ∈ {1, ...,m}
(ii)
∑m
i=1 (x¯i − ω˜i) = 0
(iii)
∑m
i=1 z¯i = 0.
(5.39)
Definition 5.4 A CO objective function financial markets (FM) equilibrium, EC , con-
sists of pair of prices (p, q) ∈ Rl(S+1)++ ×Rn++, and allocations (x, z), (y, zˆ) ∈ Rl(S+1)m++ ×
Rn+ × RlSn × Rn−, for generic initial resources ω ∈ Ω, such that conditions (i)-(iv) are
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satisfied:
(i) (x¯i, z¯i) ∈ arg max
{
ui(xi) : xi ∈ BC(i), zi ∈ Rn+
}
,∀i ∈ {1, ...,m}
(ii) arg max
(y¯(s),z¯,y¯(0))j
q¯zj +∑Ss=1 p¯(s)yj(s) : q¯
∑m
i=1 z¯i(j) ≥ q¯zj = p¯(0)yj(0)
yj(s) ∈ Yj|zˆ (s)

∀j ∈ {1, ..., n}
(iii)
∑m
i=1 (x¯i − ωi) =
∑n
j=1 y¯j
(iv)
∑n
j=1
∑m
i=1 z¯i(j) = 0, and
∑m
i=1 θ(z¯i)j = 1, ∀j ∈ {1, ..., n}.
(5.40)
Proposition (5.2) shows the allocational equivalence between the classical
pure exchange GEI economy and the economy with fixed production plans. In
such an economy it is implicitly assumed that each firm j ∈ {1, ..., n} chooses
the profit maximization net activity yj automatically. The equivalence result
essentially follows from the similar one period asset structure available to the
agents in period two. The asset structure is a consequence of the interpretation
of the long run profit maximization assumption.
Proposition 5.2 (i) If (p, q) is a (FM ) equilibrium of the exchange economy, EE, with
associated equilibrium allocations (x, z) for generic initial resource ω ∈ Ω, and if
θj (zi) = zi(j)/
∑m
i=1
zi(j) for all j ∈ {1, ..., n} (5.41)
ω˜i(s) = ωi(s) +
∑n
j=1
θj (zi) yj(s), for all i ∈ {1, ..., n} (5.42)
y ∈ Πnj=1∂Yj,eff (5.43)
are satisfied, then (p, q) is a (FM ) equilibrium with fixed production plans, EFC , of the
induced exchange economy, EFCE, with associated equilibrium allocations (x, y, z) for
ω ∈ Ω. (ii) A (FM ) equilibrium with fixed production plans y ∈ Πnj=1Yj , EFC , of the
induced exchange economy, EFCE, is also a (FM ) equilibrium of the exchange economy
EE .
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Proposition (5.3) shows the allocational equivalence between the financial
markets equilibrium with fixed production plans, EFC , and the CO objective
function model, EC, for the objective of the firm introduced in equation (3.1) for
all j ∈ {1, ..., n}. The idea of the proof is to take an intermediate step, and to
introduce an induced exchange economy, EFCE , where by definition EFCE =⇒
EFC , and therefore, need to show that, EC ⇐⇒ EFCE. This equivalence then
implies EC ⇐⇒ EFC .
Proposition 5.3 (i) If (p, q) is a (FM ) equilibrium with fixed production plans, EFC ,
with associated equilibrium allocations (x, y, z) for generic initial resources ω ∈ Ω, of
the induced exchange economy, EFCE, and if
θj (zi) = zi(j)/
∑m
i=1
zi(j) for all j ∈ {1, ...,m} (5.44)
y ∈ Πnj=1∂Yj,eff =
∑n
j=1
yj ∈ ∂ Yj|z,eff , for all j ∈ {1, ..., n} (5.45)
are satisfied, then (p, q) is a (FM ) equilibrium of the economy with CO objective func-
tions, EC , with associated equilibrium allocations (x, y, z) for generic initial resources
ω ∈ Ω. (ii) And if (p, q) is a (FM ) equilibrium of the economy with CO objective func-
tions, EC , with associated equilibrium allocations (x, y, z) for generic initial resources
ω ∈ Ω, then (p, q) is a (FM ) equilibrium with fixed production plans, EFC , with associ-
ated equilibrium allocations (x, y, z) for generic initial resources ω ∈ Ω, of the induced
exchange economy, EFCE.
Proposition (5.2) and proposition (5.3) together imply the main result of this
subsection. This result shows the allocational equivalence between the pure ex-
change GEI model and the CO objective function model. The economic intuition
of this result suggests efficient productive organization. This is a consequence
of the expansion of the decentralization theorem of the Arrow-Debreu model to
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incomplete markets proved in the first part of this chapter.
Theorem 5.3 (i) If (p, q) is a (FM ) equilibrium of the exchange economy, EE, with
associated equilibrium allocations (x, z) for generic initial resources ω ∈ Ω, and if
θj (zi) = zi(j)/
∑m
i=1
zi(j) for all j ∈ {1, ..., n} (5.46)
y ∈ Πmj=1∂Yj,eff = yj ∈ ∂ Yj|z,eff , for all j ∈ {1, ..., n} (5.47)
ω˜i(s) = ωi(s) +
∑n
j=1
θj (zi) yj, for all i ∈ {1, ...,m} (5.48)
are satisfied, then (p, q) is a (FM ) equilibrium of the economy with CO objective func-
tions, EC , with associated equilibrium allocations (x, y, z) for generic initial resources
ω ∈ Ω. (ii) A CO objective functions equilibrium (p, q) of EC , with associated equi-
librium allocations (x, y, z) for generic initial resources ω ∈ Ω, is also an equilibrium
(p, q) of the exchange economy, EE, with associated equilibrium allocations (x, z) for
generic initial resources ω ∈ Ω, and conditions satisfied.
5.4.2 On the equivalence of EE, and EP
This section introduces all equilibrium definitions and results of the PO objec-
tive function model, EP . Section (5.4.3) then states the two main welfare im-
plications associated with the organization of production in classical general
equilibrium models with incomplete markets.
Definition 5.5 A PO objective function financial markets (FM ) equilibrium with fixed
production plans y ∈ Πnj=1Yj, EFP , is an equilibrium of the induced exchange economy
EFPE, consisting of a pair of prices (p, q) ∈ Rl(S+1)++ × Rn++ and associated equilibrium
allocations (x, y, z) ∈ Rl(S+1)m++ × Rl(S+1)n × Rn, for generic initial resources ω ∈ Ω,
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such that conditions (i)-(iii) are satisfied:
(i) (x¯, z¯)i ∈ arg max {ui(xi) : xi ∈ BFP (i), zi ∈ Rn} , ∀i ∈ {1, ...,m}
(ii)
∑m
i=1 (x¯i − ω˜i) = 0
(iii)
∑m
i=1 z¯i = 0.
(5.49)
Definition 5.6 A PO objective function financial markets (FM ) equilibrium, EP , con-
sists of a pair of prices (p, q) ∈ Rl(S+1)++ × Rn++, and associated allocations (x, y, z) ∈
Rl(S+1)m++ × Rl(S+1)n × Rn, for generic initial resources ω ∈ Ω, such that conditions
(i)-(iv) are satisfied:
(i)
(
x¯i, θ¯ij,β¯ji
) ∈ arg max {ui(xi) : xi ∈ BP (i)} ∀i ∈ {1, ...,m}
(ii) (y¯)j ∈ arg max
{
β¯j · [p¯(s)yj(s)] : yj ∈ Yj|β¯j
}
∀j ∈ {1, ..., n}
(iii)
∑m
i=1 (x¯i − ωi) =
∑n
j=1 y¯j
(iv)
∑m
i=1 θ¯ij = 1, ∀j ∈ {1, ..., n}
, (5.50)
where β¯j =
∑m
i=1 θ¯ijβ¯ji, for all j ∈ {1, ..., n}. (Dre`ze or Grossman and Hart criterion)
Proposition (5.4) shows allocational non-equivalence between the classical
pure exchange GEI economy and the PO objective function economy with fixed
production plans. The economic intuition driving this result comes from the ex-
ogenously assigned present-value vectors to firms. Implicitly, proposition (5.4)
further states that for different measurements of the present value vector β¯j 6= β˜j
for all j ∈ {1, ..., n} , corresponding net activity vectors of the firms are generally
different, y¯j|β¯j 6= y˜j|β˜j . This in turn implies changes in affordable consumption
sets for the consumers, and therefore, consumption bundles.
Proposition 5.4 (i) If (p, q) is a (FM) equilibrium of the exchange economy, EE, with
100
associated equilibrium allocations (x, z) for generic initial resources ω ∈ Ω, and if
zi(j) = (θij − ξij)
∑m
i=1
zi(j), for all j ∈ {1, ..., n} (5.51)
ω˜i(0) = ωi(0) +
∑n
j=1
θijyj(0), for all i ∈ {1, ...,m} (5.52)
ω˜i(s) = ωi(s) +
∑n
j=1
θijyj(s), for all i ∈ {1, ...,m} (5.53)
are satisfied, then (p, q) is not an equivalent (FM) equilibrium with fixed production
plans, EFP , of the induced exchange economy EFPE with associated equilibrium alloca-
tions (x, y, z) for generic initial resources ω ∈ Ω. (ii) A (FM) equilibrium with fixed
production plans, EFP , of the induced exchange economy, EFPE, is not an equivalent
(FM) equilibrium of the exchange economy EE .
Proposition (5.5) shows the allocational equivalence of a PO objective func-
tion model with fixed production plans, EFP , with the PO objective function
model, EP , if the objective of the firm introduced in equation (5.3) is satisfied for
chosen criterion βj for all j ∈ {1, ..., n} . The idea of the proof is to take an inter-
mediate step, and to introduce an induced exchange economy, EFPE , where by
definition EFPE =⇒ EFP , and therefore, need to show that, EP ⇐⇒ EFPE. This
equivalence then implies EP ⇐⇒ EFP .
Proposition 5.5 (i) If (p, q) is a (FM) equilibrium with fixed production plans y ∈
Πnj=1Yj = Rl(S+1), EFP , with associated equilibrium allocations (x, y, z) for generic
initial resources ω ∈ Ω, of the induced exchange economy EFPE, and if
zi(j) = (θij − ξij)
∑m
i=1
zi(j) for all j ∈ {1, ..., n} (5.54)
y ∈ Πnj=1∂Yj = yj ∈ Yj|β¯j for all j ∈ {1, ..., n} (5.55)
aresatisfied, then (p, q) is a (FM) equilibrium of the PO objective functions economy
EP with associated equilibrium allocations (x, y, z) for generic initial resources ω ∈ Ω.
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(ii) And every PO objective functions equilibrium, EP is a (FM) equilibrium of the
economy with fixed production plans, EFP , induced by the exchange economy EFPE .
Theorem (5.4) is the main result of this subsection. It is a consequence of
proposition (5.4), and proposition (5.5). It states that the classical PO objective
function model is not allocational equivalent to the classical pure exchange GEI
model. This follows from the objective function of the firm, which is not inde-
pendent of extra information not contained in market prices such as weighted
present-value vectors. The result implicitly implies some degree of organiza-
tional productive inefficiency associated with different choices of present-value
vectors β¯j 6= β˜j for all j ∈ {1, ..., n} .
Theorem 5.4 (i) If (p, q) is a (FM) equilibrium of the exchange economy EE, with
associated equilibrium allocations (x, z) for generic initial resources ω ∈ Ω, and if
θj (zi) = zi(j)/
∑m
i=1
zi(j) for all j ∈ {1, ..., n} (5.56)
y ∈ Πnj=1Yj = yj,β¯j ∈ Yj|β¯j , for all j ∈ {1, ..., n} (5.57)
ω˜i(0) = ωi(0) +
∑n
j=1
θijyj(0), for all i ∈ {1, ...,m} (5.58)
ω˜i(s) = ωi(s) +
∑n
j=1
θijyj(s), for all i ∈ {1, ...,m} , s ∈ {1, ..., S} (5.59)
are satisfied, then (p, q) is not an equivalent (FM) equilibrium of the economy with
PO objective functions, EP , with associated equilibrium allocations (x, y, z) for generic
initial resources ω ∈ Ω. (ii) A PO objective functions equilibrium, EP , for generic initial
resources ω ∈ Ω, is not an equivalent (FM) equilibrium of the exchange economy, EE ,
and conditions satisfied.
5.4.3 (In)efficient productive organization
Theorem (5.5) and (5.6) introduce the main results of the analysis of this part
of the paper. Theorem (5.5) shows the allocational non-equivalence between the
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model EP and the model EC . This result follows from the inefficient productive
organization of the EP model, where each firm maximizes a weighted average
utility exogenously assigned to it. At heart of this result is the interpretation of
the long run profits maximization assumption, which suggests firms to choose
inputs in period one with associated outputs in period two. This assumption
is reinterpreted in the EC model, where each firm issues stocks in period one,
and then, after uncertainty has resolved, takes real decisions subject to installed
production sets. This (endogenous asset formation) model of the firm does not
only suggest efficient superior organization of economic activities relative to
the private ownership model, but further allows a natural way of modeling the
financing of production. Theorem (5.6) suggests production efficiency in the
sense that no further source of inefficiency is introduced beyond those of the
pure exchange GEI economy due to the organization of production. This re-
sults follows readily from the decentralization theorem of the objective function
introduced earlier in this chapter.
Theorem 5.5 (i) If (p, q), is a (FM) equilibrium of the economy EC , with associated
equilibrium allocations (x, y, z) for generic initial resources ω ∈ Ω, and if conditions
∑m
i=1 θ¯ij = 1⇐⇒
∑m
i=1 z¯i = 0, for all j ∈ {1, ..., n} (5.60)
β¯j =
∑m
i=1 θ¯ijβ¯i, for all j ∈ {1, ..., n} (5.61)
(y¯j) ∈ arg max
{
β¯j · (p¯y) : yj ∈ Yj|β¯j
}
, for all j ∈ {1, ..., n} (5.62)
(z¯, y¯)j ∈ arg max
{
p¯(s)yj(s)
∣∣yj ∈ Yj|z} , for all j ∈ {1, ..., n} (5.63)
are satisfied, then (p, q) is not an equivalent (FM) equilibrium of the economy EP , with
associated equilibrium allocations (x, y, z) for generic initial resources ω ∈ Ω. (ii) An
equilibrium of the economy EP is not an equivalent (FM) equilibrium of the economy
EC for conditions satisfied.
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The idea of the proof is simple. For ΠC ,ΠP and BC(i), BP (i) for all i ∈
{1, ...m}, show that BC(i) < BP (i) =⇒ max
xi,zi
ui(xi)C < max
xi,θi
ui(xi)P . Since 〈ΠC〉<
〈ΠP 〉 =⇒ BC(i) < BP (i), the result follows. The difference in the payoff span
follows from the difference in net activity vectors associated with the objective
functions, where yj|β¯j < yj|βˆj for different definitions of β¯j. Consequently, for
same z¯, yj|z¯ < yj|β¯j and yj|βˆj .
Theorem 5.6 EC is productive superior efficient relative to EP .
Efficiency properties of EC are those of the standard GEI exchange economy,
EE.
5.5 Conclusion
This chapter has formalized some of the economic intuition derived in chapter
4 by means of simple examples. It formally introduces the full model of the firm
for which under the assumption of long run profits maximization existence of
equilibrium was shown in chapter 3. A formal study of the objective function
of the firm shows that the objective function of the firm is well defined, and
independent of extra information provided by the share holders. The extensive
form definition of the model of the firm separates the objective of the firm from
the objective of the stock holders, and enables a new formalization of the idea
that ownership implies control. The equivalence of a reduced form and the
extensive form equilibrium has another interesting implication. In its simplest
form, it says that financial policy of the firm is non-neutral. This follows from
the role financial assets (stocks) play.
The model considers idiosyncratic risk introduced by the assumption of tech-
nological uncertainty. It is show that incomplete markets is a consequence of the
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competitive nature of the model and this assumption. Consequently, the num-
ber of financial assets is endogenously determined. This result can be improved
by considering endogenous default.
The second part of this chapter considers the (in)efficient organization of pro-
duction. It essentially shows that the way production is organized in economic
general equilibrium with incomplete markets is non-trivial. A main result sug-
gests that utility maximizing firms introduce a further source of inefficiency in
the economy. This is not the case for the profit maximization model introduced
in this thesis.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
6.1 Concluding remarks and research outlook
A study of incomplete markets is a challenging project. Besides the study of
economics, it requires some good working knowledge of some areas of mathe-
matics. However, the fixed time constraint of a PhD course in economics does
not facilitate a rigorous study of both fields. Therefore, I’ll not be able to claim
a complete set of results on the theory of the firm in incomplete markets as the
constraints are those of an Economics PhD program. This is certainly not satis-
fying, given the high barriers to entry into this research field, and the mathemat-
ical sophistication. What I can claim however, is an alternative approach to the
study of the firm in incomplete markets to the mainstream view of the role of
the firm, and to enhance the theory of the firm in a model of production where
the objective function of the firm is independent of the utilities of the owners of
the firm. Some of the main economic contributions of this approach to the study
of production are listed below.
This thesis is my first attempt towards a general equilibrium study of pro-
duction when financial markets are incomplete. What the research suggests is
that the way production is organized in a general equilibrium framework with
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incomplete markets is non-trivial. The main contribution of the paper is the
model of the firm introduced in great detail in chapter 3, and in its extensive
form in chapter 5. This model turns out to have a nice property, namely the
equivalence of the decentralization property of the Arrow-Debreu model to in-
complete markets. This result follows from the particular role financial assets
play in this model.
The model of the firm is such that it establishes a link between the financial-
and the real sector of the economy. In particular, each firm issues stocks, and
purchases capital. The total level of capital a firm can purchase is bounded
above by the total cash it is able to acquire by issuing stocks. Given total produc-
tion capacity and states of nature, each firm has a well defined (endogenously
determined) production set. Given that set, the activity of each firm is to choose
profit maximizing real quantities at given prices. The objective of the firm of
long run profit maximization is formally described by a two argument sequen-
tial optimization structure. The arguments are the financial and real quantities,
and the sequential structure links the efficient boundary of the production set
with the financial policy chosen by the firm.
This non-dichotomy of the financial-, and production sets suggests a reex-
amination of the Modigliani and Miller theorem. In its simplest form, chapter
4 and 5 show that every extensive form equilibrium can be transformed into a
reduced form equilibrium for a fixed feasible financial policy of the firm. How-
ever, any small change in financial policy generates associated real effects. This
result follows from the fact that the efficient boundary of the production set
available to a firm is not independent of its capital accumulated in period one
by issuing stocks. This result however, is only a partial study of the Modigliani
and Miller theorem.
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The full version of the Modigliani and Miller theorem still needs to be stud-
ied. This requires to expand the model and to include other financial assets,
such as bonds for example. This expansion of the model is research in progress.
There are many other practical directions to expand this model. These include
going beyond two periods and to study short and/or long lived assets. One
particular example could be to introduce this model of the firm into the over-
lapping generations model. Other interesting directions are related to the field
of industrial organization, such as mergers and acquisitions, and strategic inter-
actions. An obvious expansion of this model is to consider endogenous default.
From a mathematical perspective, there are still many more properties of the
equilibrium manifold to be proved. These include showing connectedness and
path connectedness of the equilibrium manifold, once it has been rigorously es-
tablished as a smoothRk submanifold ofRn. There are some topological proper-
ties to be shown, including the ramifying covering over a set of parameters, the
study of catastrophes, the characterization of the set of singularities, and many
others. Beyond connectedness, it would be interesting to endow the equilibrium
manifold with a Riemanian structure, and to study geodesics. One can then
think, whether it is possible to define an economically meaningful geodesic.
This is not possible in the standard Arrow-Debreu model as firstly remarked by
Balasko [6]. However, the model presented here has more structure, and this
question therefore, should be taken up again as such a definition is a very im-
portant step towards a study of economic policy. First attempts on this front are
in progress.
I hope that this thesis pushes the boundaries of the general equilibrium liter-
ature by providing new insights into how to model profit maximizing firms in
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incomplete markets.
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Appendix A
Mathematical Proofs
This section collects most of the proofs.
Proof A.1 (Proposition 3.1) Consider the the classical production set Yj ⊂ Rl(S+1)
as introduced in [12]. By assumption 3.2 it follows separability of production across
states of nature s ∈ S in period t = 1 given capital yj(0) in period t = 0 for every
j ∈ {1, ..., n}. Then in period t = 1 Yj|z ∈ RlS becomes Yj|z ∈ RlS = {y(1), ..., y(S) ∈
RlS|(y(0), y(1), ..., y(S)) ∈ Y }. Clearly, the set Yj1(y(0)) is the set of production pos-
sibilities at date t=1 given capital at t=0. See Chambers and Quiggin,[10].
Proof A.2 (Lemma 3.3) The proof is an immediate consequence of the separation the-
orem for ((S + 1) × n) matrices in Gale (1960). This asserts that either there exists
a portfolio z ∈ Rn+ such that Π̂(p1,Φ|Z)z ≥ 0, or there exists a present value vector
β ∈ RS+1++ such that βΠ̂(p1,Φ|Z)z = 0.
Proof A.3 (Lemma 3.2) Choose n linearly independent vectors vj inL, for j = 1, ..., n,
such that a matrix A(S×n), a collection of n linearly independent vectors vj is in the set
A of (S × n) matrices. Then in the basis S ∈ RS, L = span(A). Since n < S by
hypothesis, there are n linearly independent columns in A, rank(A) = n. Denote the
set of permutations Σ = {1, ..., σ, ..., S}, and for each permutation σ ∈ Σ, denote the
corresponding permutation matrix Ξσ of order (S×S). We premultiply A with Ξσ and
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denote it Aσ(S×n) = ΞσA.
We need to show that this matrix is invertible and that it locally identifies L in
Gn(RS). For mathematical convenience, we partitionAσ(S×n) =
 Aσ,1(n×n)
Aσ,2(S−n×n)

(S×n)
.
By invertibility ofAσ,1(n×n), since det
(
Aσ,1(n×n)
) 6= 0 as indicated by the rank(Aσ,1(n×n)) =
n, we obtain
 I(n×n)
Aσ(S−n×n)A−1σ,1(n×n)
 .
Let Unσ =
L ∈ G
n(RS) :
(i) ∃ Aσ(S−n×n)A−1σ,1(n×n) ∈ R(S−n)n
(ii)
 I(n×n)
Aσ(S−n×n)A−1σ,1(n×n)
 ∈ L
 . For each σ ∈
Σ we define a homeomorphism ϕnσ : Unσ → R(S−n)n by
 I(n×n)
ϕjσ(L)
 ∈ L. The collec-
tion of all charts {Unσ , ϕnσ}Sσ=1 defines a smooth, compact atlas without boundary for the
Grassmanian manifold of dimension (S−n)n. This manifold is smooth since the overlap
of all charts σ 6= σ′ ∈ Σ have a smooth coordinate changes ϕnσ ◦ ϕnσ′ : ϕnσ′(Unσ ∩ Unσ′)→
ϕnσ(U
n
σ ∩ Unσ′). The chart transformations are diffeomorphisms. The manifold has no
boundary since the set {Unσ }∀ σ∈Σ defines an open cover on Gn(RS).
Proof A.4 (Proposition 3.2) Observation (1): By lemma (3.3), there exists β ∈ RS++
such that (FE) spot prices at p¯ can be rescaled such that P = βp¯, then (x¯, y¯, z¯), (p¯, q¯)
is a (x¯, y¯), (P¯ , L) equilibrium. Since by definition β ∈ RS++ is
(
λs
λ0
)
i=1
of agent 1 at
(x¯, y¯, z¯), (p¯, q¯), agent 1’s consumption bundle is x¯1, since ∇u1(x1) = P, and P(x −
ω) = 0.
On the contrary, if have a (x¯, y¯), (P¯ , L) equilibrium, and z¯2, ..., z¯m such that (i)
∑m
i=1(x¯i−
ωi) =
∑n
j=1 y¯, (ii)
{
x¯1 ∈ Rl(S+1)++ : P (x− ω) = 0
}
, (iii) (x¯, y¯, z¯) solves i ≥ 2 maxi-
mization problem for constraintsBFMzi . Then by defining z¯1 = −
∑m
i=2 z¯i, every (x¯, y¯), (P¯ , L)
is a (x¯, y¯, z¯), (p¯, q¯) equilibrium.
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Remark: Since agent 1 faces only the Arrow-Debreu constraints, his behavior is
identical in both models.
Observation (2): Suppose (P, L˜) ∈ Ψρ are elements of the (FE) pseudo equilibrium
manifold, and conditions (i)
[
I F
]
Vˆ (P1, φ) = 0, and (ii) Qρ×(S−n)
F
Q
(n−ρ)×(S−n)

n×(S−n)
− [L]
n×(S−n)
= 0 hold.
Under these conditions, a consumption bundle x¯i (i ≥ 2) is feasible under the con-
straints (ii) in the ψ model if and only if x¯i (∀i) is feasible under the constraints holding
with equality in (i) in the (FE) model.
The next step is then to show that L˜ = (L⊥ ⊂ 〈Γρ(P1, φ)〉⊥) exists. Recall Ψρ = (P1, 〈Γ
ρ(P1, φ)〉⊥ , L⊥) ∈ P ρ ×GS−n+ρ(RS)×GS−n(RS) :
L⊥ ⊂ 〈Γρ(P1, φ)〉⊥
 . Let e = 〈Γρ(P1, φ)〉⊥
and l = L⊥ ⊂ 〈Γρ(P1, φ)〉⊥ . Relabel an element (Pˆ , eˆ, lˆ) of Ψρ in the orthogonal basis
of RS such that in the neighborhood of eˆ, the vector space e is spanned by the columns
of a S × (S − n + ρ) matrix
 1(S−n+ρ)×(S−n+ρ)
E(n−ρ)×(S−n+ρ)
. Similarly, in the neighborhood of
lˆ, the vector space l in the same orthogonal basis of RS is spanned by the columns of
a S × (S − n) matrix
 1(s−n)×(s−n)
Ln×(s−n)
. We also rewrite the financial return matrix
V (., .) in this basis, such that it becomes Vˆ (P1, φ) =
 (n−ρ)×(n−ρ)
(S−n+ρ)×(n−ρ)
 , S × (n− ρ).
Condition (1): e = (span(Γρ(P1, φ))
⊥.
Translate
 I(S−n+ρ)×(S−n+ρ)
E(n−ρ)×(S−n+ρ)

S×(S−n+ρ)
→
[
I E
]
then condition (1) becomes
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[
I E
]
Vˆ (P1, φ) = 0. (A.1)
Condition (2): l ∈ GS−n(RS) ⊂ e ∈ GS−n+ρ(RS).
Need to find a matrix Q such that
 I
E
−
 I
L
 = 0. We first partition
 I
E
 such
that it becomes

1(S−n)×(S−n) 0(S−n)×ρ
0ρ×(S−n) 1ρ×ρ
E
′
(n−ρ)×(S−n) E
′′
(n−ρ)×ρ
 , then

1(S−n)×(S−n) 0(S−n)×ρ
0ρ×(S−n) 1ρ×ρQρ×(S−n)
E
′
(n−ρ)×(S−n) E
′′
(n−ρ)×ρQρ×(S−n)
 =

1(S−n)×(S−n)
1ρ×ρQρ×(S−n)
E
′
(n−ρ)×(S−n) + E
′′
(n−ρ)×ρQρ×(S−n)

=

1(S−n)×(S−n)
Qρ×(S−n)
E
Q
(n−ρ)×(S−n)
 . Q is a (ρ× S − n) matrix. Condition (2) can then be written in
terms of Q and E:
 Qρ×(S−n)
E
Q
(n−ρ)×(S−n)

n×(S−n)
− [L]
n×(S−n)
= 0. (A.2)
The final step is then to show that the pseudo equilibrium manifold Ψρ, parameter-
ized by P and Q is locally identified by a diffeomorphism Λ(P, L˜), defined by (A.1) ×
(A.1) 7→ Ψρ. The partial derivative D−1P,QΛ(P, L˜(Q) exists, moreover, the map is bijec-
tive.
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Proof A.5 (Proposition 3.3) This part of the proof requires some definitions intro-
duced in the main section (3.4). Using the definition of a pseudo equilibrium with
production (3.6), let the value of the no-arbitrage stock price system q at t = 0 be de-
fined by q =
∑S
s=1(Γ(P1, φ))θ(zi)
S
s=1], let t = 1 spot price system p1 be determined by
p1 = proj((
1
β(s)
)TP1(s)), and let the z1 =
∑m
i=2 zi. Recall that there are no discon-
tinuities in θ(zi)Ss=1]. The equivalence of a pseudo equilibrium with production and a
financial markets equilibrium with production then follows from similar arguments as
in Magill and Shafer [39].
Suppose (x¯, y¯), (P¯ , L¯) is a ψ (FE) with production, and x¯1 solves (i) in ψ. Then
agent 1’s maximization problem, by observation (1) above, implies that x¯1 solves (i)
in the (FE). Using observation (2) above, all other agents, i ≥ 2 solve (ii) in the
ψ (FE). Therefore, there exist investment portfolios z¯i, and asset price vectors q¯j =∑S
s=1
(
Γρ(P¯1, φ¯)
)s
j
, j = 1, ..., n, and by rescaling P1 by β ∈ RS++, a spot price system
p¯ = proj
((
1, 1
βs
)T
2P¯
)S
s=1
such that (x¯, y¯), (P¯ , L¯) is a (FE). (x¯, y¯) is allocational
equivalent.
Proof A.6 (Proposition 3.4) (i) We prove that the set Aρ(S×n) of rank (n− ρ) reduced
matrices Aρ(S×n), for 1 ≤ ρ < n, is a submanifold of the smooth manifold defined by
the full rank n matrices A(S×n) in the set A(S×n). Since A(S×n) is homeomorphic to
RSn, for Aρ(S×n) ⊂ A(S×n) the reduced matrices manifold is shown to have codimension
(S − n+ ρ)ρ, for 1 ≤ ρ < n.
Consider the open setU of (S × n) matrices a˜ =
 A¯(n−ρ)×(n−ρ) B¯(n−ρ)×ρ
C¯(S−n+ρ)×(n−ρ) D¯(S−n+ρ)×ρ

of rank (a˜) = (n− ρ) in the neighborhood of
a =
 A¯(n−ρ)×(n−ρ) B¯(n−ρ)×ρ
C¯(S−n+ρ)×(n−ρ) D¯(S−n+ρ)×ρ
 such that by invertibility of A¯ in a, since
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detA¯ 6= 0, it remains invertible in a˜. Then a˜ has rank (n− ρ) if and only if the last
ρ columns of a˜ are spanned by the first (n − ρ) columns in it. This implies that there
exists a matrix b(n−ρ)×ρ such that
 B¯(n−ρ)×ρ
D¯(S−n+ρ)×ρ
 =
 A¯(n−ρ)×(n−ρ)
C¯(S−n+ρ)×(n−ρ)
 b(n−ρ)×ρ ⇔
b(n−ρ)×ρ = A¯−1(n−ρ)×(n−ρ)B¯(n−ρ)×ρ, and D¯(S−n+ρ)×ρ = C¯(S−n+ρ)×(n−ρ)A¯
−1
(n−ρ)×(n−ρ)B¯(n−ρ)×ρ.
Hence
U ∩ Aρ(S×n) =
a˜ =
 A¯(n−ρ)×(n−ρ) B¯(n−ρ)×ρ
C¯(S−n+ρ)×(n−ρ) D¯(S−n+ρ)×ρ
 ∈ U : D¯ − C¯A¯B¯ = 0
 .
Then, the map
U → RSn ' R(n−ρ)(n−ρ) × R(n−ρ)ρ × R(S−n+ρ)(n−ρ) × R(S−n+ρ)ρ, A¯(n−ρ)×(n−ρ) B¯(n−ρ)×ρ
C¯(S−n+ρ)×(n−ρ) D¯(S−n+ρ)×ρ
 7→ (A¯, B¯, C¯, D¯ − C¯A¯B¯) ,
is locally a diffeomorphism, a chart with the property that the set U ∩ Aρ(S×n) is the set
of points such that the last (S − n + ρ)ρ coordinates vanish, and therefore, the reduced
matrices manifold Aρ(S×n) has codimension (S − n + ρ)ρ. In the cases (ii) and (iii) we
look at the corresponding elements in the set of reduced matrices Aρ(S×n). In (ii), it is
easy to see that there are no linear independent mappings, while in (iii) all mappings are
linearly independent, and A is non-singular since A is of full rank.
Proof A.7 (Theorem 3.1) (i) The linear map Dypij is surjective everywhere in Yj , and
Image(Dypi) + Ty(Aρ) = Ty(A) is satisfied for all j ∈ {1, ..., n}. (ii) The surjectivity
of the push forward map for all j ∈ {1, ..., n} does not change for any scaling β ∈
RS++. (iii) Immediate consequence of the transversality theorem for maps to ambient
manifolds and submanifolds, Hirsch [32]. Since each set t (Γ,A;Aρ)j is residual for
all j ∈ {1, ..., n}, their intersection is residual.
Proof A.8 (Proposition 3.5) For each j ∈ {1, ..., n}, denote the state dependent con-
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volute
Φ(s)j(λσ ∗ φj(y))j(s) =
∫
Rm−
(φ(y − ζ)jλσ(ζ)dζ)j(s) (A.3)
Can restrict domain of integration to Intsup(λ). See (Dieudonne´ [19]). Let limp→0 yp =
−∞, and let limp→∞ yp = 0. Denote A = ({−∞, 0})m ⊆ Rm− . For any z ∈ Rn+ there
exists y|z ∈ A. Denote the compact subset associated with any z, A|z. A|z ⊆ A. The
the image of the continuous map Φ : A|z → ∂Y˜ |z is compact by surjectivity of Φ.
Proof A.9 (Proposition 3.6) Define for all j ∈ {1, ..., n}, diam(λ(s))j with supp(λ(s))j
contained in the unit ball Rm,− . Let εj(s) = (y(φ, diam(λ)))j (s) .Now, for any C∞ ker-
nel λj ∈ L1(Rm− ), since ‖λj‖ ≤ ‖λj‖L1 = 1 can write for any map φ in RlS
((λ ∗ φj − φ)(y0))j (s) =
∫
Rm−
[
(φ(y0 − ζ)j − φ(y0))λ (ζ)
1
2 dζ
]
j
(s) , (A.4)
using Cauchy inequality
|(λ ∗ φj − φ)(y0)|2j (s) ≤
[∫
Rm−
(φ(y0 − ζ)j − φ(y0))λ (ζ)
1
2 dζ
]2
j
(s)
≤ ∫Rm− [|(φ(y0 − ζ)j − φ(y0))|2 λ (ζ) dζ]j (s) (A.5)
by integration and using Fubini’s theorem we obtain
(∫
Rm−
|λ ∗ φj − φ)(y0)|2 dy0
)
j
(s)
≤ ∫Rm− ∫Rm− {[|(φ(y0 − ζ)j − φ(y0))|2 λ (ζ) dζ] dy0dζ}j (s)
=
∫
Rm−
dy0
∫
Rm−
[|(φ(y0 − ζ)j − φ(y0))|2 λ (ζ) dζ]j (s)
=
∫
Rm−
[∫
Rm−
|(φ(y0 − ζ)j − φ(y0))|2 λ (ζ) dy0
]
j
dζ(s)
=
∫
Rm−
{[∫
Rm−
|(φ(y0 − ζ)j − φ(y0))|2 dy0
]
λ (ζ) dζ
}
j
(s)
(A.6)
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Since mass of λ is equal to one, and ζ ranges over its support,
(∫
Rm−
|λ ∗ φj − φ)(y0)|2 dy0
)
j
(s) ≤ sup
‖ζ‖≤σ
(∫
Rm−
|(φ(y0 − ζ)j − φ(y0))|2 dy0
)
j
(s)
(A.7)
denote it y(φ, diam(λ))2j(s).
Remark 7 The measurement error is then defined by an oscillation
sup
‖ζ‖≤σ
(∫
Rm−
|(φ(y0 − ζ)j − φ(y0))|2 dy0
) 1
2
j
(s).
Thus it follows that
(∫
Rm−
|λ ∗ φj − φ)(y0)| dy0
)
j
(s) ≤ sup
‖ζ‖≤σ
(∫
Rm−
|(φ(y0 − ζ)j − φ(y0))|2 dy0
) 1
2
j
(s)
(A.8)
Denote this oscillation y(φ, diam(λ))j(s). It converges to zero when diam(λ) con-
verges to zero.
What remains to be shown is that y(φ, diam(λ))j(s) is bounded above. Since map-
pings are smooth with compact support, the upper bound is obtained by
y(φ, diam(λ)j(s) ≤ c
(
m∑
k=1
∣∣Dkφ (y0)∣∣2j (s)
) 1
2
(A.9)
where c = k1σ. k1 is a constant of differentiation, and σ a distance.
Proof A.10 (Proposition 4.1) Forming the Lagrangean
L
(
x¯, ξ¯, y¯, λ¯, µ¯
)
= u(x)− λ(0) [p¯(0)x(0)− p¯(0)ω(0) + q¯ξ − θ(z¯)p¯(0)y(0)]
−
∑S
s=1
λ(s) [p¯(s)x(s)− p¯(s)ω(1) + θ(z¯)p¯(s)y(s) +R(y¯, s)ξ]
−
∑S
s=0
µ (s) Φ(y¯) (A.10)
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The necessary and sufficient conditions for (x, ξ, y) to be a solution of L, are that there
exists λ ∈ RS+1++ , and µ ∈ RS+1++ such that
∇L (x¯, ξ¯, y¯, λ¯, µ¯) ≡ 0
is satisfied. This is equivalent to
∇u(x¯) = λ¯p¯
q¯ =
(∑S
s=1 λ¯ (s)
λ¯(0)
)
p¯(s)y¯(s)
µ¯∇Φ(y¯) = λ¯p¯
p¯x¯− p¯ω = θ(z¯)p¯y¯ + Π(y¯, p¯)ξ¯
Φ(y¯) = 0 (A.11)
where Π =

−q
p(s)y(s)
...
p(S)y(S)

. Let β¯ =
(∑S
s=1 λ¯(s)
λ¯(0)
)
. Then q¯ =
∑S
s=1 β¯(s)p¯(s)y¯(s). It
follows from the first order conditions that
β¯p¯ =
1
λ¯(0)
∇u(x¯) = µ¯
λ¯(0)
∇Φ(y¯) (A.12)
Proof A.11 (Proposition 4.2) The necessary and sufficient conditions for (x, z, y) to
be a solution of L, are that there exists λ ∈ RS+1++ , and µ ∈ RS+1++ such that
∇L(x¯, z¯, y¯, λ¯, µ¯) ≡ 0
is satisfied. This is equivalent to
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∇u(x¯) = λ¯p¯
q¯ =
(∑S
s=1 λ¯ (s)
λ(0)
)
p¯(s)y¯(s)
µ¯∇Φ(y¯) = λ¯p¯
p¯x¯− p¯ω = θ(z¯)p¯y¯ + Π(p¯, y¯)z¯
Φ(y¯) = 0 (A.13)
Proof A.12 (Proposition 4.3) From (1) have ξ¯ = 0, and from (2) have z¯ + bˆ = 0. The
equivalence follows from ξ¯ = z¯ + bˆ = 0.
Proof A.13 (Proposition 4.4) Suppose that the agent assigns β¯ to the producer. It
remains to show that
max
y¯
{
β¯p¯y : y ∈ Y } (A.14)
is well defined. Since the first order conditions are such that there exists µ ∈ RS+1++ . From
∇L(y¯) ≡ 0 (A.15)
have
β¯p¯ = ν¯∇Φ(y¯) (A.16)
it follows that
β¯p¯ = ν¯∇Φ(y¯)⇐⇒ µ¯
λ¯(0)
∇Φ(y¯) = 1
λ¯(0)
∇u(x¯) = β¯p¯ (A.17)
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Proof A.14 (Proposition 4.5) The source of inefficiency comes from the no-arbitrage
condition, βΠ = 0. This equation is indeterminate for the case that S > n. Therefore
for any βˆ 6= β assigned to the firm it follows that y¯|βˆ 6= y¯|β in Y since
max
y¯|βˆ
{
βˆp¯y : y ∈ Y
}
6= max
y¯|β
{βp¯y : y ∈ Y } (A.18)
Proof A.15 (Proposition 4.6) Let v : RS+1 × R+ → R be defined by v(y, z) =
u(y + z). Then the two variable control problem above is equivalent to
(y¯, z¯) arg max {v(y, z) : (y, z) ∈ Y × Z} (A.19)
By application of the separation theorem for convex sets (y¯, z¯) is a solution of this con-
trol problem if and only if
(∇yv(y¯, z¯),∇z(y¯, z¯)) ∈ Ny×Z(y¯, z¯) (A.20)
where ∇y denotes the gradient of v with respect to y. From the definition of a normal
cone it follows that
Ny×Z(y¯, z¯) = Ny(y¯)×NZ(z¯) (A.21)
and from the definition of the function v that
∇yv(y¯, z¯) = ∇zv(y¯, z¯) = ∇u(y¯ + z¯) (A.22)
so that (∇yv(y¯, z¯),∇z(y¯, z¯)) ∈ NY×Z(y¯, z¯) reduces to∇u(y¯ + z¯) ∈ NY (y¯) ∩NZ(z¯).
Proof A.16 (Corollary 4.1) The proof is similar to the proof of proposition (4.6). It
follows from z ⇒ ξ, and Z ⇒ Ξ.
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Proof A.17 (Proposition 4.7) The proof is a slight modification of the proof of propo-
sition (4.6).
Proof A.18 (Proposition 4.8) ((p¯, q¯), (x¯, ξ¯))) satisfies (i) of the reduced form model
with separated activities if and only if the geometric first order condition holds (4.16).
The profit maximization problem (ii) of the reduced form model with separated activities
(y¯) is satisfied if and only if the first order condition above holds (4.17). Since (x¯, ξ¯, y¯)
satisfies (i) of the (centralized) reduced form model if and only if both geometric first
order conditions hold(4.16, 4.17), ((p¯, q¯), (x¯, ξ¯, (y¯))) is a geometric reduced form with
separated activities equilibrium if and only if assign β¯ to the maximization problem of
the firm.
Proof A.19 (Proposition 4.9) (1) show that (x¯, ξ¯, y¯) satisfies the first order conditions
so that (i) in definition of a reduced form equilibrium is satisfied. The first order condi-
tions are
p¯x¯− p¯ω¯ = p¯y¯ + Πb¯+ Πz¯, and β¯Π = 0 (A.23)
which is equivalent to
p¯x¯− p¯ω¯ = p¯y¯ + Πξ¯, and β¯Π = 0 (A.24)
since ξ¯ = z¯ + b¯ holds, so that first order condition (above) holds. Next, show what the
no-arbitrage condition implies for the firm for all (y¯, b¯), the present value of the firm to
the producer reduces to
β¯p¯y¯ = β¯p¯y¯ + β¯Πb¯ = β¯p¯y¯ (A.25)
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Thus the producer’s problem in the extensive form equilibrium definition is equivalent to
(y¯) arg max
{
β¯p¯y : y ∈ Y } (A.26)
for which the first order conditions are given (above). The last step is to recall that the
market clearing condition ξ¯ = z¯ + b¯ = 0 holds, and from which the result follows.
(2) show that if (x¯, ξ¯, y¯) is a solution to the reduced form problem, then the first order
conditions(above) are satisfied. This implies that, for any b ∈ R
(
y¯, b¯
)
arg max
{
β¯p¯y + Πb¯ : (y; b) ∈ Y × R} (A.27)
since by no-arbitrage condition β¯Π = 0. Therefore, can pick any b ∈ R, and define
z = ξ¯ − b¯ (A.28)
then the first order condition of extensive form equilibrium is satisfied by (x¯, z), and
thus (x¯, z) is a solution of the extensive form equilibrium, since (y¯, b¯) is a solution of
the extensive form equilibrium, and the result follows from 0 = ξ¯ = z + b¯.
Proof A.20 (Proposition 4.10) Forming the Lagrangean
L = u(x) −λ(0) [p¯(0)x(0)− p¯(0)ω(0) + q¯ξ + p¯(0)k¯(0)]
−∑Ss=1 λ(s) [p¯(s)x(1)− p¯(s)ω(s) +R(y¯, s)ξ + p¯(s)y(s)]
−∑Ss=1 µ(s) [Φ|bˆ (y¯(s))]
the first order conditions are necessary and sufficient for (x; ξ, y) to be a solution of
equilibrium definition (4.4) if there exists λ ∈ RS+1++ and µ ∈ RS++ such that
∇L (x¯, ξ¯, y¯, λ¯, µ¯) ≡ 0
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This is equivalent to
∇u(x¯) = λ¯p¯ (A.29)
q¯ =
∑S
s=1 λ¯(s)
λ¯(0)
R(y¯, s) (A.30)∑S
s=1
µ¯(s)∇ Φ|Z (y¯(s)) =
∑S
s=1
λ¯(s)p¯(s) (A.31)
p¯x¯ = p¯ω + Π(y¯, p¯)ξ¯ (A.32)
Φ|bˆ (y¯(s) = 0 (A.33)
Let β¯(s) =
(∑S
s=1 λ¯(s)
λ¯(0)
)
, then q¯ =
∑S
s=1 β¯(s)R(y¯, s) and from (A.29) and (A.31) have
∑S
s=1
λ¯(s)p¯(s) = ∇u(x¯(s)) =
∑S
s=1
µ¯(s)∇ Φ|bˆ (y¯(s))
using p¯i
∑S
s=1
β¯(s)p¯(s) =
1
λ¯(0)
∇u(x¯(s)) =
∑S
s=1
µ¯(s)
λ¯(0)
∇ Φ|Z (y¯(s)) (A.34)
The first part of the proof shows that (4.4) has a solution and that (i) of (4.10) has a
solution. It remains to show that part (ii) of (4.10) has a solution. Now, if assign β¯(s)
for each s ∈ S to the optimization problem of the producer, and the producer takes β¯ as
given then
(y¯) arg max
{∑S
s=1
β¯(s)p¯(s)y(s) : y(s) ∈ Y |bˆ
}
. (A.35)
This problem has a solution if there exists ν ∈ RlS++ such that
L(y¯) ≡ 0 (A.36)
This is equivalent to
∑S
s=1 β¯(s)p¯(s) =
∑S
s=1 ν¯(s)∇ Φ|bˆ (y¯(s)) (A.37)
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The separation result follows from (A.34) and (A.37).
∑S
s=1
µ¯(s)
λ¯(0)
∇ Φ|bˆ (y¯(s)) =
∑S
s=1
ν¯(s)∇ Φ|bˆ (y¯(s)). (A.38)
Proof A.21 (Proposition 4.11) The result follows from the first order conditions
∑S
s=1
β¯(s)p¯(s) =
1
λ¯(0)
∇u(x¯(s))
q¯ =
∑S
s=1
β¯(s)R(y¯, s)
and from
(y¯) arg max
{∑S
s=1
p¯(s)y(s) : y(s) ∈ Y |bˆ
}
This problem has a solution if there exists ν ∈ RlS++ such that
L(y¯) ≡ 0
This is equivalent to
∑S
s=1 p¯(s) =
∑S
s=1 ν¯(s)∇ Φ|bˆ (y¯(s)) (A.39)
Equ. (A.39) is independent of the present value vector β¯ of the consumer. This decen-
tralizes the objective function of the firm.
Proof A.22 (Proposition 4.12) Consider a reduced form incomplete financial markets
equilibrium with decentralized profit maximizing objective function (p¯, q¯) with associ-
ated equilibrium allocations (x¯, ξ¯), (y¯) for an economy ω ∈ Ω. Let (x, y) not be a con-
straint productive efficient allocation at price system p¯ and q¯, and period one financial
trade ξ¯ = z¯ + bˆ for implicit feasible bˆ. Then, because (x, y) at ξ¯ is a feasible competitive
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financial markets equilibrium with production allocation at t = 1, it satisfies
x¯(0) = ω(0) + k¯(0)
x¯(s) = ω(1) + y¯(s)
ξ¯ = 0, (A.40)
Because (x, y) is not efficient optimal, in the sense that period two allocations are not
optimal, given financial constraint ξ¯ implying production capacity k¯(0) and technology
Φ|bˆ , which in turn implies the constraint production set available to the firm in t =
1, denoted Y |bˆ, there must exist and alternative feasible allocation (xˆ, yˆ) within the
constraint production set available to the producer Y |bˆ such that
u(xˆ(0), xˆ(s); ξ¯) > u(x(0), x(s); ξ¯), for all s ∈ {1, .., S} (A.41)
We have that
p¯(0) · xˆ(0) > p¯(0) · x(0)
p¯(s) · xˆ(s) > p¯(s) · x(s), for all s ∈ {1, .., S} (A.42)
This implies that
p¯(0) · xˆ(0) > p¯(0) · x(0)
p¯(s) · xˆ(s) > p¯(s) · x(s), for all s ∈ {1, .., S}
We then have for feasible (xˆ, yˆ) that
p¯(0) · ω(0) + p¯(0)k¯(0) > p¯(0) · ω(0) + p¯(0)k¯(0)
p¯(s) · (yˆ(s) + ω(1)) > p¯(s) · (y(s) + ω(1)) ,
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for all s ∈ {1, .., S} so that period two long run profits
p¯(s) · yˆ(s) > p¯(s) · y(s). (A.43)
However, this implies that p¯ · yˆ > p¯ · y , where yˆ ∈ Y |bˆ at equilibrium ξ¯. This is a
contradiction to the fact that yj ∈ Y |bˆ is profit maximizing at price system p¯ and ξ¯.
Proof A.23 (Proposition 4.13) To see the inefficient organization of production of the
first model (similar to the literature). Assign present value vector β¯ to the firm, then for
financial constraint ξ¯ let the firm maximize its present value profits
(y¯) arg max
{∑S
s=1
β¯(s)p¯(s)y(s) : y(s) ∈ Y |bˆ
}
(A.44)
Then (A.44) is equal to
(y¯) arg max
{∑S
s=1
p¯(s)y(s) : y(s) ∈ Y |bˆ
}
(A.45)
if and only if
β¯(s) = e for every s ∈ S ∈ {1, .., S} (A.46)
where e is an unit vector. This condition is generally not satisfied for a no-arbitrage
equilibrium when S > n. For any β¯(s)
~0 < β¯(s) < e (A.47)
the centralized model of production is less efficient than the fully decentralized objective
function model since
max
y¯
Π|β (β¯p¯) < maxy¯ Π(p¯) (A.48)
y(s)|β¯ 6= y(s) ∈ Y |bˆ .
126
Proof A.24 (Proposition 4.16) The result follows from the first order conditions
∑S
s=1
β¯(s)p(s) =
1
λ¯(0)
∇u(x¯(s))
q¯ =
∑S
s=1
β¯(s)R(y¯, s)
and from
(y¯) arg max
{∑S
s=1
p¯(s)y(s) : y(s) ∈ Y |bˆ
}
equivalent to
arg max
(y¯,bˆ;(k¯(0)))
q¯b+
∑S
s=1
p¯(s)y(s) :
q¯z¯ ≥ q¯b = p¯(0)k(0)
y(s) ∈ Y |Z
s ∈ S
 (A.49)
for feasible bˆ. This problem has a solution for any feasible bˆ equivalent to the solution in
the (RFE), where there exists ν ∈ RlS++ such that
L(y) ≡ 0
This is equivalent to
∑S
s=1 p¯(s) =
∑S
s=1 ν¯(s)∇ Φ|bˆ (y¯(s))
Equ. (A.49) is independent of the present value β(s) of the consumer for any feasible
bˆ ≤ z¯. This decentralizes the objective function of the firm.
Proof A.25 (Proposition 4.15) Part (i). Let us first show that ((x¯, ξ¯), (y¯)) satisfy the
first order conditions (1) τ ∈ 〈Π(y¯, p¯)〉 , β ∈ 〈Π(y¯, p¯)〉⊥ , and (2) y ∈ Y |bˆ , p ∈ NY |Z (y)
so that conditions (i) and (ii) in (RFE) are satisfied, where τ = Π(y¯, p¯)z is an income
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vector. The FOC’s for the consumer’s problem in (EFE) are
px = pω + Π(y¯, p¯)
 z¯
θ (z¯)
 , and βΠ(y¯, p¯) = 0 (A.50)
and can be rewritten as
px = pω + Π(y¯, p¯)ξ, and βΠ(y¯, p¯) = 0
since ξ¯
∣∣
bˆ
= z¯ + bˆ, so that (1) above holds for any feasible bˆ 6 z¯. The firm’s problem in
(EFE)
arg max
(y¯,(bˆ;k¯(0)))
q¯b+
∑S
s=1
p¯(s)y(s) :
q¯z¯ ≥ q¯b = p¯(0)k(0)
y(s) ∈ Y |bˆ (s)
s ∈ S

for any feasible bˆ 6 z¯ reduces to
arg max
(y¯(s))
{∑S
s=1
p¯(s)y(s) : y(s) ∈ Y |bˆ (s), s ∈ S
}
since feasible b ⇒ Φ|bˆ (s) =⇒ Y |bˆ for which the first order condition (2) which is
equivalent to ν(s)∇ Φ|bˆ = p(s) above holds. The result follows ,since market clearing
condition ξ¯
∣∣
bˆ
= z¯ + bˆ = 0, and x¯(0) = ω(0) + k¯(0), x¯(s) = ω(1) + y¯(s) for all
s ∈ {1, .., S} hold.
Part (ii). If ((x¯, ξ¯), (y¯)) is an (RFE) for implicit bˆ, then the first order conditions are
satisfied. This implies that for any feasible bˆ ≤ z
arg max
(y¯(s))
{∑S
s=1
p¯(s)y(s) : y(s) ∈ Y |bˆ (s), s ∈ S
}
(A.51)
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expands to
arg max
(y¯,(bˆ;k¯(0)))
q¯b+
∑S
s=1
p¯(s)y(s) :
q¯z¯ ≥ q¯b = p¯(0)k(0)
y(s) ∈ Y |bˆ (s)
s ∈ S
 (A.52)
for which the first order conditions are satisfied, hence y¯ is a solution of (ii) in (EFE) for
feasible bˆ. Pick any feasible bˆ and define
z + bˆ = ξ¯ (A.53)
such that Πz + Πbˆ = Πξ¯ becomes Π(z + bˆ) = Πξ¯, then first order conditions for
the consumer of the (EFE) (A.50) is satisfied for (x¯, z). (x¯, z) is a solution of (EFE)
(i) and (y¯, bˆ) is a solution of (EFE) (ii). The result follows from 0 = ξ = z + bˆ and
x(¯0) = ω(0) + k¯(0), x¯(s) = ω(1) + y¯(s) for all s ∈ {1, .., S}.
Proof A.26 (Lemma 4.1) (i) x¯|z¯ is a solution of utility max (4.1) if and only if x¯|z¯ ∈ B
and
intU x¯|z¯ ∩B = ∅.
By the separation theorem for convex sets (appendix), there exists P = βip ∈ Rn, P 6= 0
such that
H−P = {x ∈ Rn : Px ≤ Px′,∀x ∈ B, ∀x′ ∈ intUx¯}
since x¯|z¯ ∈ B,
H−P =
{
x ∈ Rn : P x¯|z¯ ≤ Px′, ∀x′ ∈ intU x¯|z¯
}
.
By continuity of utility, intUx¯ = Ux¯, and by continuity of the scalar product,
H+P =
{∀x′ ∈ U x¯|z¯ : Px¯ ≤ Px′,∀x′ ∈ U x¯|z¯} ⇔ P ∈ ∂u( x¯|z¯)
H−P = {∀x ∈ B : Px ≤ P x¯|z¯ , } ⇔ P ∈ NB( x¯|z¯)
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hence, there exists p such that ∂u( x¯|z¯) ∩NB( x¯|z¯) 6= {0} is satisfied.
(ii) Suppose that x¯|z¯ ∈ B, and there exists P ∈ ∂u( x¯|z¯) ∩ NB( x¯|z¯), P 6= 0.
If x¯|z¯ is not a solution of the utility maximization problem (4.1) then there exists
x’∈ intU x¯|z¯ ∩B. Since P ∈ ∂u( x¯|z¯), we have
Px′ > P x¯|z¯
But since P ∈ NB( x¯|z¯) and x′ ∈ B, it follows that Px′ ≤ P x¯|z¯ which contradicts that
x′ is preferred to x¯|z¯.
Proof A.27 (Lemma 4.2) (i) y¯|z¯ is a solution of profit max in (4.2) if and only if y¯|z¯ ∈
Y |z¯ and
intΠy¯ ∩ Y |z¯ = ∅.
By the separation theorem for convex sets (appendix), there exists p ∈ Rn, p 6= 0 such
that
H−p =
{
y ∈ Rn : py ≤ py′, ∀y ∈ Y, ∀y′ ∈ intΠ y¯|z¯
}
since y¯|z¯ ∈ Y |z¯ ,
H−p =
{
y ∈ Rn : p y¯|z¯ ≤ py′,∀y′ ∈ intΠ y¯|z¯
}
.
By continuity of utility, intΠ y¯|z¯ = Π y¯|z¯ , and by continuity of the scalar product,
H+p =
{∀y′ ∈ Uy¯ : py¯ ≤ py′,∀y′ ∈ Π y¯|z¯} ⇔ p ∈ ∂Π( y¯|z¯)
H−p = {∀y ∈ Y : py ≤ p y¯|z¯ , } ⇔ p ∈ NY |z¯( y¯|z¯)
hence, there exists p such that ∂u( y¯|z¯) ∩NY |z¯( y¯|z¯) 6= {0} is satisfied.
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(ii) Suppose that y¯|z¯ ∈ Y |z¯ , and there exists p ∈ ∂Π( y¯|z¯) ∩ NY ( y¯|z¯), p 6= 0.
If y¯|z¯ is not a solution of the profit maximization problem in (4.2), then there exists
y′ ∈ intΠ y¯|z¯ ∩ Y |z¯ . Since p ∈ ∂Π( y¯|z¯), we have
py′ > p y¯|z¯
But since p ∈ NY |z¯( y¯|z¯) and y′ ∈ Y |z¯ , it follows that py′ ≤ p y¯|z¯ which contradicts
that y′ is preferred to y¯|z¯.
Proof A.28 (Lemma 4.3) Let v : RS+1 × R+ → R be defined by v(y, ξ) = u(y + ξ).
Then the two variable control problem above is equivalent to
(
y¯, ξ¯
)
arg max
{
v(y, ξ) : (y, ξ) ∈ Y |ξ¯ × Ξ
}
(A.54)
By application of the separation theorem for convex sets (y¯, ξ¯) is a solution of this control
problem if and only if
(∇yv(y¯, ξ¯),∇ξ(y¯, ξ¯)) ∈ NY |ξ¯×Ξ(y¯, ξ¯) (A.55)
where ∇y denotes the gradient of v with respect to y, and ∇ξ denotes the gradient of v
with respect to ξ. From the definition of a normal cone (appendix) it follows that
NY |ξ¯×Ξ(y¯, ξ¯) = NY |ξ¯(y¯)×NΞ(ξ¯) (A.56)
and from the definition of the function v that
∇yv(y¯, ξ¯) = ∇ξv(y¯, ξ¯) = ∇u(y¯ + ξ¯) (A.57)
so that
(∇yv(y¯, ξ¯),∇ξ(y¯, ξ¯)) ∈ NY |ξ¯×Ξ(y¯, ξ¯) reduces to∇u(y¯+ ξ¯) ∈ NY |ξ¯(y¯)∩NΞ(ξ¯).
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Proof A.29 (Proposition 5.2) For ΠE,ΠFC ,ΠFCE and corresponding budget setsBE(i)
and BFCE(i), show that, if conditions (25− 27) are satisfied, then this implies that (1)
BE(i)⇐⇒ BFCE(i), for all i ∈ {1, ...,m} (A.58)
The equivalence of the budget sets implies the equivalence of
max
(x,z)i
ui(xi)E ⇔ max
(x,z)i
ui(xi)FCE, for all i ∈ {1, ...,m} (A.59)
where BE ⇐⇒ BFCE ⇐= 〈ΠE〉 = 〈ΠFC〉 = 〈ΠFCE〉 .We have Vj(s)E = V˜j(s)FCE =
p(s)·yj(s)∑m
i=1 zi(j)
, for all j ∈ {1, ..., n}. For ω˜i(s), θj (zi) , and y(s) ∈ ∂Yj,eff , have
p(s) · (xi(s)− ωi(s)) = Vj(s)Ezi
p(s) ·
(
xi(s)−
(
ωi(s) +
∑n
j=1 θj (zi) yj(s)
))
=
p(s)·yj(s)∑m
i=1 zi(j)
zi
p(s) ·
(
xi(s)−
(
ωi(s) +
∑n
j=1 θj (zi) yj,eff (s)
))
=
p(s)·yj,eff (s)∑m
i=1 zi(j)
zi
p(s) · (xi(s)− ω˜i(s)) = V˜j(s)FCEzi
(A.60)
have that for all i ∈ {1, ...,m}
p(s) · (xi(s)− ωi(s)) = Vj(s)Ezi = V˜j(s)FCEzi = p(s) · (xi(s)− ω˜i(s)) . (A.61)
For equilibrium z¯i, and p¯ii for all i ∈ {1, ...,m}, 〈ΠE〉 = 〈ΠFCE〉
(2) Market-clearing conditions of the two models are equivalent,
∑
zi = 0 ⇐⇒
∑
zi = 0∑m
i=1 θj (zi) = 1 ∀j ∈ {1, ..., n}
(A.62)
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and ∑m
i=1 (xi(0)− ωi(0)) = 0∑m
i=1 (xi(s)− ωi(s)) = 0
⇐⇒
∑m
i=1 (xi(0)− ωi(0)) = 0∑m
i=1 (xi(s)− ω˜i(s)) = 0
, (A.63)
where at t = 0,
∑m
i=1 z¯i(E) =
∑m
i=1 z¯i(FCE) is obvious for same β¯i, for all i ∈
{1, ...,m}, and at t = 1 (i) θj (zi) = zi(j)/
∑m
i=1 zi(j) for all j ∈ {1, ..., n} , is satisfied
for (ii) ω˜i(s) = ωi(s)+
∑n
j=1 θj (zi) yj, for all i ∈ {1, ...,m} , and (iii) y ∈ Πnj=1∂Yj,eff .
Proof A.30 (Proposition 5.3) For ΠFCE , ΠC ,ΠFC BFCE, and BC . (1) Have that
BFCE ⇐⇒ BC (A.64)
This implies that
max
(x,z)i
ui(xi)FCE ⇔ max
(x,z)i
ui(xi)C , (A.65)
where BFCE ⇐⇒ BC ⇐= 〈ΠFCE〉 = 〈ΠFC〉 = 〈ΠC〉 . We have that V˜j(s)FCE,FC =
p(s)·yj(s)∑m
i=1 zi(j)
, for all j ∈ {1, ..., n}, and θj (zi) for all j ∈ {1, ..., n}, then, at t = 1 have that
for fixed z¯i, β¯i for all i ∈ {1, ...,m},
p (s) · (xi(s)− ω˜i(s))FCE = p (s) ·
(
xi(s)− (ωi(s) +
∑n
j=1 θj (zi) y¯j)
)
= V˜ (s)FC,FCEzi =∑n
j=1
p(s)·y¯j(s)∑m
i=1 zi(j)
zi(j) =
∑n
j=1 θj (zi) [p(s) · yj(s)] = p (s) · (xi(s)− ωi(s))C
(A.66)
for any y¯ = (y¯1, ..., y¯j, ..., y¯n) ∈ Πnj=1∂Yj,eff = yj ∈ ∂ Yj|z¯,eff , for all j ∈ {1, ..., n},
where for z¯i
(z¯, y¯(s), y¯(0))j arg max
p¯(s)yj(s)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
yj ∈ Yj(s)|z¯
q¯
∑m
i+1 z¯i(j) = q¯z¯(j) = p¯(0) · yj(0) ∀s ∈ S
 .
(A.67)
We have that 〈ΠC〉 = 〈ΠFCE〉 is satisfied, and by definition (2), 〈ΠFC〉 = 〈ΠFCE〉 .
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(2) Market-clearing conditions of the two models are equivalent,
∑m
i=1 zi = 0 ⇐⇒
∑n
j=1
∑m
i=1 zi(j) = 0∑m
i=1 θj (zi) = 1 ∀j ∈ {1, ..., n}
(A.68)
and
∑m
i=1 (xi(0)− ωi(0)) = 0∑m
i=1 (xi(s)− ω˜i(s)) = 0
⇐⇒
∑m
i=1 (xi(0)− ωi(0)) = 0∑m
i=1 (xi(s)− ωi(s)) =
∑n
j=1 yj(s)
, (A.69)
where at t = 0, (i)
∑m
i=1 zi(FCE) = 0, and
∑m
i=1 zi(C)j = z(j) for all j ∈ {1, ..., n} ⇐⇒∑n
j=1
∑m
i=1 zi(C)j = 0. At t = 1 (ii) θj (zi) = zi(j)/
∑m
i=1 zi(j) for all j ∈ {1, ..., n},
and
∑m
i=1 θj (zi) = 1 satisfied for all j ∈ {1, ..., n}.(iii)
∑m
i=1 (xi(s)− ω˜i(s)) =∑m
i=1
(
xi(s)−
(
ωi(s) +
∑n
j=1 θj (zi) yj(s)
))
, consequently
∑m
i=1
(
xi(s)−
(
ωi(s) +
∑n
j=1
yj(s)
))
= 0⇐⇒
∑m
i=1
(xi(s)− ωi(s)) =
∑n
j=1
yj(s).
(A.70)
Proof A.31 (Theorem 5.3) By definition of an induced exchange economy with fixed
production plans EFC ⇐= EFCE, and by proposition (5.2), EFCE ⇐⇒ EE. By propo-
sition (5.3), EC ⇐⇒ EFCE . This proposition follows from EC ⇐⇒ EFC , and where by
definition EFC ⇐= EFCE. We conclude that
EC ⇐⇒ EFCE ⇐⇒ EE. (A.71)
Proof A.32 (Proposition 5.4) For ΠE,ΠFPE,ΠFCE, and BE(i), and BFPE(i) for all
i ∈ {1, ...,m}. Need to show that ωi,E 6= ω˜i,FPE = ω˜i,FP . Since y ∈ Πnj=1Yj,FP = yj ∈
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Yj|β¯j but
yj ∈ Yj|β¯j 6= yj ∈ ∂ Yj|z¯,eff =⇒ y ∈ Πnj=1Yj,FP 6= y ∈ Πnj=1Yj,FC . (A.72)
for any definition of β¯j. By proposition (1), ω˜i,FPE 6= ω˜i,FCE = ωi,E, for all i ∈
{1, ...,m}. It follows that 〈ΠFPE〉 6= 〈ΠFCE〉 = 〈ΠE〉 which implies that BFPE(i) 6=
BE(i), and max
(xi,θi)
ui(xi)FPE 6= max
(xi,zi)
ui(xi)E. We conclude that EE < EFPE.
Proof A.33 (Proposition 5.5) For ΠFPE,ΠFP ,ΠP , and BFPE(i), BP (i) for all i ∈
{1, ...,m}.
BFPE(i)⇐⇒ BP (i), for all i ∈ {1, ...,m}, (A.73)
implies that
max
(xi,θi)
ui(xi)FP ⇐⇒ max
(xi,zi)
ui(xi)FPE ⇐⇒ max
(xi,θi)
ui(xi)P , for all i ∈ I, (A.74)
where zi(j) = (θij − ξij)
∑m
i=1 zi(j) for all j ∈ {1, ..., n}. BFPE(i) ⇐⇒ BP (i), for all
i ∈ {1, ...,m}, is implied by
〈ΠFPE〉 = 〈ΠFP 〉 = 〈ΠP 〉 (A.75)
where y ∈ Πnj=1∂Yj = yj ∈ Yj|β¯j for all j ∈ {1, ..., n} is satisfied.
∑m
i=1
θ¯ij ⇐⇒
∑m
i=1
zi(j) (A.76)
where zi(j) = (θij − ξij)
∑m
i=1 zi(j) for all j ∈ {1, ..., n}, then∑m
i=1 zi(j) =
∑m
i=1 (θij − ξij)
∑m
i=1 zi(j), where
∑m
i=1 (θij − ξij) = 0.
∑m
i=1
(xi − ω˜i) = 0⇐⇒
∑m
i=1
(xi − ωi) =
∑n
j=1
yj, (A.77)
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Where for y ∈ Πnj=1∂Yj = yj ∈ Yj|β¯j for all j ∈ {1, ..., n},∑m
i=1 (xi − ω˜i) = |FPE =
∑m
i=1
(
xi − ωi −
∑n
j=1 θijyj
)∣∣∣
FP
= 0
⇐⇒ ∑mi=1 (xi − ωi) = ∑nj=1 yj∣∣∣
P
Proof A.34 (Theorem 5.4) By definition of an induced exchange economy with fixed
production plans EFP ⇐= EFPE, and by proposition (5.4) EFPE < EE. By proposi-
tion (5.5) EP ⇐⇒ EFPE . This proposition follows from EP ⇐⇒ EFP , and where by
definition EFP ⇐= EFPE. We conclude that
EP ⇐⇒ EFPE < EE. (A.78)
Proof A.35 (Theorem 5.5) For ΠC ,ΠP , BC(i), BP (i), and equilibrium z¯, and β¯i for
all i ∈ {1, ...,m}. Then for β¯j =
∑m
i=1 θ¯ijβ¯i, for all j ∈ {1, ..., n} have associated net
activity vector yj|β¯j . For any other definition of βˆj =
∑m
i=1 ξˆijβ¯i, for all j ∈ {1, ..., n}
have associated net activity vector yj|βˆj , where obviously yj|β¯j < yj|βˆj , since β¯j 6= βˆj.
For same equilbrium z¯ =⇒ m(j) ∈ R+, for all j ∈ {1, ..., n}, have period two yj|z¯ .
Then, the objective functions
β¯j · (p¯y) 6= βˆj · (p¯y) 6= (p¯y) (A.79)
obviously imply that yj|z¯ 6= yj|β¯j 6= yj|βˆj .
Consequently,
yj|z¯ 6= yj|β¯j =⇒ 〈ΠC〉< 〈ΠP 〉 (A.80)
and
〈ΠC〉< 〈ΠP 〉 =⇒ BC < BP . (A.81)
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Let zi = (θij − ζij)
∑m
i=1 zi, and consumer i ∈ {1, ..., n} choosing θi =⇒ zi, and vice
versa zi =⇒ θi =
∑n
j=1
zi(j)∑m
i=1 zi(j)
. Therefore, can rewrite utility maximization in EP of
max
xi,θi
ui(xi)P into max
xi,zi
ui(xi)P . It follows
max
xi,zi
ui(xi)P < max
xi,zi
ui(xi)C (A.82)
since BC < BP . We conclude that
EP < EC (A.83)
Proof A.36 (Theorem 5.6) Follows from Theorem (5.3), and from the profit maxi-
mization Theorem (5.4) in chapter 5.
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Appendix B
Collection of Mathematical
Theorems and Definitions
This section collects some theorems and mathematical concepts applied in this
thesis. We state the results without proof. Most of the differential geometry
material can be found in [32],[30],[17],[42],[19]. Other mathematical material
on analysis can be found in [51], including calculus on manifolds . See [3] for
functional analysis, and [48] for measure theory. Basic concepts in topology
are found in [44], and [35], [36]. For concepts on convex sets see [24]. General
equilibrium theory and mathematical concepts in general equilibrium such as
the equilibrium manifold, can be found in [6],[5], [12], and [17].
Theorem B.1 (Separation Theorem for Convex Sets) (i) IfC andU are non-empty
convex subsets of Rn with C ∩ U = ∅, then there exists, p ∈ Rn, p 6= 0, such that
sup
x∈C
px ≤ inf
x′∈U
px′ (B.1)
(ii) if in addition C is compact, and U closed, then
sup
x∈C
px < inf
x′∈U
px′ (B.2)
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Definition B.1 (Definition of a Convex Cone) Let C ⊂ Rn be a convex set. If
x¯ ∈ C, then the normal cone to C at x¯ is defined by
NC(x¯) = {P ∈ Rn : Px¯ ≥ Px,∀x ∈ C} .
Definition B.2 (Abstract definition of a Manifold) A manifold is a topological space
which locally looks like Cartesian n-spaceRn; it is built up of pieces ofRn glued together
by homeomorphisms. If these homeomorphisms are differentiable we obtain a differen-
tiable manifold.
Theorem B.2 (Transversality Theorem) If the smooth map f : X → Y is transver-
sal to a submanifold Z ⊂ Y , then the preimage f−1(Z) is a submanifold of X. Moreover,
the codimension of f−1(Z) in X equals the codimension of Z in Y.
Theorem B.3 (Parametric Transversality Theorem) Let V,M,N be Cr manifolds
without boundary and A ⊂ N a Cr submanifold. Let F : V → Cr(M,N) satisfy the
following conditions:
(i) the evaluation map F ev : V ×M → N, (v, x) 7−→ Fv(x), is Cr;
(ii) F ev is transverse to A;
(iii) r >max{0, dimM + dimA− dimN} .
Then the set
t (F ;A) = {v ∈ V : Fv t A} (B.3)
is residual and therefore dense. If A is closed in N and F is continuous for the strong
topology on Cr(M,N) then t (F ;A) is also open.
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